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Pouyet from Toulouse. We started our research on cartel formation in the Autumn
of 1997 and only recently nished a rst paper (included as Chapter 6 of this thesis).
Even though the work has taken quite some time and has been tough, it has proved
to be very rewarding. This period has conrmed my belief that nothing can beat
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Competition law or antitrust law, as it is called in the United States, is a eld of law
for which economic concepts are of central importance. Many of the key concepts
of competition law - for example, 'competition', 'restriction of competition', 'anti-
competitive eect' - are concepts which are clearly economic by nature, if not even
rooted in economics. This is not to say, however, that the reasons for adopting
competition laws have always been strictly 'economic', or that always purely economic
interpretations have been given to these concepts. Rather, political, social and even
moral considerations have been at the forefront in many instances1.
The adoption process of the earliest antitrust laws in the United States provides
a good example2. In the late 19th century, the U.S. economic landscape exhibited a
strong consolidation process in the form of trusts, legal arrangements by which owners
of dierent companies transferred their control to a trustee in return for trust cer-
ticates entitling them to a proportionate share of the prots in the jointly managed
companies. The Standard Oil Trust, for example, controlled about 95% of the oil
production in the US. Similar concentrations were not uncommon in banking, the
railways, tobacco and other sectors. This situation did not leave the Americans indif-
ferent. The end of the 19th century was marked by deep social unrest and economic
uncertainty. In the public opinion, the well-publicized vested interests and special
priviliges of the trusts and other big business concentrations were the root cause of
these problems. Commentators of the time even labelled the trusts 'conspiracies',
1This apposition is perhaps more apparent than real. After all, one can argue that the political,
social and moral considerations were at least in part reective of the prevailing distribution of wealth
and inuence in society.
2Cf. Hovenkamp (1999), Jenny (1993), Fasquelle (1993), Rubin (1976).
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exercising a 'demoralising inuence'3. Faced with strong popular dissatisfaction with
the trusts, the U.S. Congress adopted its rst antitrust law, the Sherman Act, in 1890.
Economists, however, hardly played a role in the realisation of the Sherman Act. In
part, this may be explained by the academic position of late 19th century American
economists: they generally favoured a rather dogmatic laissez-faire approach and
therefore did not feel comfortable with government intervention in the rst place.
In addition, they perhaps lacked the tools to give a clear description of the central
antitrust issues as well: it is illustrative that the members of the American Economic
Association, created in 1885, did not consider it necessary to intervene in the political
debate to inuence the Congress or the contents of the Sherman Act4. In this sense,
the adoption of the Sherman Act was a choice advocated by politicians, rather than
a choice inspired by economists.
It was to take a while for economics to take a more important role in the applica-
tion of the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that 'every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States (...) is hereby declared to be illegal'. In the
landmark case Board of Trade of Chicago of 1918, the U.S. Supreme Court set the
test which has since become standard5. In my view, it is diÆcult to come up with a
better description of the role of economics in antitrust policy than the one given by
this Court:
'The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes com-
petition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question, the court must ordi-
narily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its eect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not
because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
3Morgan , W. (1889) 'History of the Wheel and Alliances and Impending Revolution', p.15.
Quoted in Fasquelle (1993).
4Cf. Greenhut and Benson (1989).
5Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may
help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences'.
It is by no means a simple matter to determine from the outset whether a given
contract or business practice is good or bad for competition. For example, if two
competing companies enter into a co-operation agreement for the development of a
new technology, what will be the eect on competition in the market? If the two
companies are of a modest size, probably not much harm is to be expected, rather the
contrary. On the other hand, if the two companies are each other's closest competitors,
their co-operation may well lead to a substantial reduction of competition in the
market. But where to draw the line? Similarly, if the largest manufacturer in the
industry concludes an exclusive distribution contract with the strongest distributor,
what must we think of this?
In the rst place, as suggested by the Supreme Court's ruling, it is only by con-
sidering the specics of the case that sound conclusions can be drawn concerning the
competitive nature of a given contract or a business practice. Further, this will often
require not just an examination of the possible eects, but also an inquiry into the
possible motivations of companies to adopt such market behaviour. After all, in view
of the inherent diÆculties in evaluating and predicting the eects of most kinds of
market behaviour, it must be instructive to complement the analysis by exploring why
rational companies in a competitive situation choose to act in such a way: 'knowledge
of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences'6. If the as-
sessment of the possible eects is inconclusive, an analysis of the business motivations
may shed suÆcient light on the case.
In economics, it is the eld of Industrial Organization that studies the behaviour of
rms and its implications for the functioning and structure of markets. This eld was
initially empirical by nature, focusing on obtaining descriptive statistics and correla-
tions among industry variables. Very well known is the resulting 'structure-conduct-
performance' paradigm, developed by economists from the University of Harvard (Ed-
ward Mason, Joe Bain and others). According to this paradigm, market structure (the
number of rms in the market, the degree of vertical integration and so on) determines
market behaviour (prices, investment in R&D, advertising, ...), which in turn results
in performance (eÆciency, prots). However, with its emphasis on nding empirical
6Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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regularities, it did not give much insight into the underlying 'mechanics' of markets
nor into the rationality of some of the observed market behaviour.
Since the 1970s, Industrial Organization has complemented (and in some cases
turned upside down) the traditional empirical line of research with a more rigorous
theoretical analysis, focusing, among other things, on the rationality of market be-
haviour. An important tool in this line of research has proved to be game theory.
This theory studies strategic or competitive interaction using mathematical models7.
A game model species the players in a game (for example, rms in a market or in-
dividuals in an organisation), the information they have (or do not have), the actions
they can choose, the timing of these actions, the pay-os for each player that result
from the actions which are chosen and the preferences of the players over the possible
pay-os. In such a model, each player is supposed to choose a strategy (a plan of
action) that maximizes his pay-os (or, more generally, his utility level) based on
the information available to him and his expectations about his rivals' actions. The
widely accepted solution concept to game models is the so-called Nash equilibrium
(Nash, 1951). This solution concept represents an equilibrium in the sense that each
player maximizes his pay-os while correctly anticipating what the other players are
going to do8.
For the greater part, this thesis will be about the application of such game-theoretic
analyses to vertical agreements, i.e. agreements concluded between rms operating
at dierent levels of the production or distribution chain, such as between suppliers
and retailers. Many relationships between suppliers of goods and their distributors go
well beyond simple agreements to deliver goods at a certain unit price. Often, these
relationships are governed by medium or long term contracts that impose certain obli-
gations on one or both parties, restricting in some way their commercial freedom. For
example, a supplier who grants an exclusive sales territory to a distributor necessarily
commits itself not to sell to other distributors based in that specic area. Contractual
obligations of this kind are commonly referred to as 'vertical restraints'.
7A good and comprehensible survey of game theory - as it relates to the law - can be found
in Baird, Gertner and Picker (1994). A more formal introduction to game theory is provided by
Gibbons (1992).
8For a discussion on the precise relation between rationality and the use of an equilibrium concept,
see Mas-Colell e.a. (1995).
Introduction 5
Overview of the thesis
The thesis is divided into two parts. The rst part, consisting of Chapters 2
and 3, has a review character. Chapter 2 reviews the economic literature on the
competitive eects of vertical agreements. The purpose of the chapter is to obtain an
understanding of the main insights that economic theory has provided as regards such
agreements. Chapter 3 analyses the role of economic analysis from a legal perspective,
by focusing on the role of economic analysis in the application of the competition rules
of the European Union towards vertical agreements. As will transpire from these two
chapters, European competition policy has its peculiarities but is more and more
moving towards a real balancing of pro- and anti-competitive eects.
The second part of the thesis will provide three concrete applications of game-
theoretic analyses. In two chapters, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the rationality of
the use of a particular type of vertical restraint, namely resale price maintenance,
will be tested in specic market circumstances. Under resale price maintenance, a
manufacturer requires retailers not to sell its products below a certain minimum price9.
It will follow from these chapters that the need for retailers to recover their xed
costs plays a determining role in the type of vertical restraint that will be used by
the manufacturer. Finally, Chapter 6 is about cartel formation in industries where
rms are uncertain about each other's cost levels (and, therefore, about each other's
pricing incentives). In a specic model, the general conception will be tested that
the likelihood of rms forming a cartel is greater in concentrated industries than in
industries with many rms.
A more detailed description of each of the Chapters 2 to 6 is set out below.
Chapter 2: A focus on vertical agreements
In the economic science, there have been quite a few shifts in attitude as to the admis-
sibility of vertical agreements. The most notable shift occurred in the 1960s, a shift
commonly associated with scholars from the University of Chicago, such as Aaron
Director, Lester Telser, George Stigler and Robert Bork10. The 'Chicago School'
9The analysis also applies to related practices. For example, a manufacturer's unilateral policy
not to deal with 'discounters' can be considered a kind of resale price maintenance.
10The Chicago School developed already as of the 1930s but it was only since the 1960s that it
began to get truly inuential, in economics and beyond (Reder, 1982). It should be noted that
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stimulated a line of research with a rigorous focus on the motivations of companies
using the restraints: why do rational companies in a competitive situation choose to
be restricted in their choice possibilities? The aim was to nd explanations for ob-
served business conduct in line with the starting points of neoclassical theory (utility
maximisation by rational economic agents) and consistent with the idea that mar-
ket participants are generally capable of correcting and internalising possible market
imperfections themselves11. In addition, the Chicago economists proposed to use the
criterion of economic eÆciency (welfare) as the sole normative standard against which
the lawfulness of a given business practice should be tested12.
The Chicago School emphasized that agreements concluded by companies in a
vertical relationship are, by their nature, very dierent from agreements concluded by
rms which are in direct competition with each other (also called 'horizontal agree-
ments'). The fact that the former are agreements concluded by companies which each
perform an indispensable function in putting the product on the market, suggests that
they are primarily used to make the vertical combination more eÆcient. After all, in a
vertical relationship one party will be damaged when the other party does not function
properly. And 'properly' means, in by far most cases: from the point of view of the
consumers, because in the end, they are supposed to buy the product. Through this
special interdependent relationship, every party in a vertical agreement can, in prin-
ciple, be considered a natural ally of the consumer. The permissive attitude towards
vertical restraints has become widely known as the 'Chicago view'.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Chicago methodology of studying the rationale of
observed behaviour on the basis of rigorous theoretical analysis (and its emphasis on
the use of an economic eÆciency criterion to evaluate the impact of such behaviour)
has gone to the centre ground of Industrial Organization13. Its sharpest conclusions
(the 'Chicago view'), however, have not. For a large part this can be attributed
to the increasing use of game theory in Industrial Organization, which allowed for
the focus of the University of Chicago was much wider than just Industrial Organization. In fact,
'Chicago economics' refers to the application of strict neoclassical theory to a great number of elds
of study, such as the macro economy (Milton Friedman, Robert Lucas), the political process (George
Stigler), sociological phenomena (Gary Becker), and the legal system (Richard Posner).
11See Reder (1982) for a detailed account of the assumptions made by the 'Chicago School'.
12Welfare can be conceived as the (weighted) sum of consumer surplus (a monetary measure of the
utility derived from consumption) and producer surplus (such as prots). Normally speaking, the
consumer surplus goes up when prices go down, when consumption levels go up, when the quality of
products gets better, etc.
13Cf. Van den Bergh (1997).
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the construction of a wider range of models and, correspondingly, a wider range of
outcomes. These models suggested that vertical integration or contractual restraints
could be rational and eective ways to engage in anti-competitive behaviour. For
example, it was shown that delegating pricing decisions to exclusive distributors might
allow producers to credibly commit to less competitive behaviour towards each other,
making use of the fact that the incentives to compete on the distribution level dier
from those on the producer level14. Similarly, some exclusive dealing contracts were
shown to be possible tools for foreclosing markets, in particular because they render
the anti-competitive objective (foreclosure) more credible and time-consistent15.
As to the characterisation of the circumstances in which vertical restraints are
likely to have positive or, on the contrary, detrimental eects for competition and
welfare, the current body of economic literature oers fairly extensive material on
which to base such a characterisation. The purpose of Chapter 2 is to provide an
overview of the main insights that economic theory has provided. Rather than giving
a long enumeration of the dierent market situations that have been studied and
the corresponding results, the aim is to present and develop the main arguments,
occasionally with the use of some simple examples and models.
Chapter 3: Vertical agreements and Article 81(1) EC
In the European Union a lively debate has taken place in recent years concerning the
approach that should be adopted in competition policy towards vertical agreements.
Among other things, this debate has centered around the question what role economic
analysis should play in the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty and, in particular,
in the application of the rst paragraph of the article, Article 81(1), which establishes
the principle that agreements which are restrictive of competition (and which aect
trade between member states) are prohibited.
Central to the application of Article 81 EC is the notion of what constitutes a
'restriction of competition' under Article 81(1). While Article 81(1) states a few
broad examples of what might constitute such restrictions, these have left ample
opportunity for dierent interpretations in the application of this article in individual
cases, notably in the context of vertical agreements. The European Commission, the
central institution in the application of Article 81, has tended to be rather strict in its
14Cf. Rey and Stiglitz (1995).
15Cf. Aghion and Bolton (1987).
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interpretation, in the sense that many vertical agreements were seen as constituting
restrictions of competition, given that they reduce the commercial freedom of the
contracting parties and of third parties. Throughout the years, there have been regular
calls for a more economics based analysis of the concept 'restriction of competition'
under Article 81(1)16. According to the critics, the Commission's approach was too
formalistic and, as a result, ineÆcient in making a distinction between the competition
enhancing eects of vertical agreements and the eects restricting competition - pre-
eminently a matter of economic analysis.
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to obtain an understanding of the main developments
in the interpretation of the concept 'restriction of competition' in Article 81(1) in rela-
tion to vertical restraints. The focus will be on the developments in the jurisprudence
of the European Courts17, as it is the most important source of guidance.
It emerges from more than 30 years of jurisprudence that the words 'restriction
of competition' have been interpreted in the light of the overall objectives of the
EC Treaty (in particular, the creation of a single European market), rather than in
the light of competition as such. Nonetheless, it is striking to see how many points
of reference particularly the jurisprudence of the European Courts has oered for a
greater role for economic analysis, notably under Article 81(1). On a lighter tone:
the analysis also shows that attempts by economists to comment on concepts which
appear 'economic' at rst sight, need not always lead to comments which are precisely
to the point. This in particular applies to commenting on the concept 'restriction of
competition' in Article 81(1) without taking into account the role of Article 81(3),
the exemption possibility to the rule of prohibition, or the particular attribution of
competences in the enforcement system of the competition rules.
Whereas the role of economic analysis in the application of Article 81 has by no
means been a constant one throughout the years, in recent years it can be said to
evolve very rapidly. On a policy level, the main driver behind this development has
been the publication of the Green Paper (a consultation document) of the European
16Economists typically mean by this an analysis to establish whether or not particular agreements
reduce (consumer) welfare: only when an agreement reduces welfare, should it be deemed 'restrictive
of competition'. Some of the critics may have been referring to more 'limited' forms of economic
analysis (e.g. regarding the question whether or not a restriction is necessary for the attainment of
some commercial objective; see Chapter 3).
17The European Court of Justice and, since 1988, also the Court of First Instance. On appeal,
these institutions review the decisions adopted by the European Commission in the application of
Article 81. In addition, the Court of Justice gives rulings on questions of law asked by national
courts concerning the interpretation of Article 81.
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Commission concerning vertical agreements in 1997, in which the subject of economic
analysis took a prominent place18. Since then, a number of steps have been taken to
reform EU competition policy towards vertical restraints. On the substantive side,
these steps can be seen as increasing the role for economic analysis in the application
of Article 81 as a whole. In this respect, the integral application of the whole of
Article 81 by the Commission, national Courts and national competition authorities
(as proposed by the most recent policy initiative) appears to me to be a logical and
welcome step. There remain a number of questions, however, such as the question
who, in practice, will bear the burden of proof in cases under Article 81. While the
principle is clear (the burden of proving an infringement of Article 81(1) rests on the
party alleging the infringement, a party claiming the benet of Article 81(3) shall
bear the burden of proving that the conditions of that paragraph are fullled), much
will depend on the Commission's own style in characterising the aected markets and
in assessing vertical restraints, whether the burden will be at the requisite level.
Chapter 4: Resale price maintenance in a spatial market
Chapter 4 is the rst chapter in the thesis providing for a concrete game-theoretic
analysis. It applies to the use of resale price maintenance. Under this practice, a
manufacturer obliges retailers not to sell its products below a certain minimum price.
Likewise, a manufacturer's unilateral policy not to deal with 'discounters' can be
considered a kind of resale price maintenance.
As will be discussed in Chapter 2, several explanations for the use of minimum
resale price maintenance (RPM) have been given in the economic literature. One
explanation that has received little attention recently is the outlets hypothesis, artic-
ulated by Yamey (1954) and elaborated upon by Gould and Preston (1965). The
outlets hypothesis assumes that nal demand for the manufacturer's product is a
function both of the retail price and the number of retail outlets: the price-demand
schedule for a product shifts outward if the number of retailers carrying the prod-
uct increases. One of the informal arguments for this positive relationship given is
that the inconvenience of shopping (e.g. travelling) is reduced when retail density is
higher. Gould and Preston then argue that price oors, by raising the retail margin
above the competitive level, lead to an increase in the number of retail outlets in a
18Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, 22 January 1997, COM(96) 721
nal.
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free-entry market equilibrium and, because of the positive impact of this increase on
nal demand, to higher prots for the manufacturer.
In determining the optimal number of retail outlets, the manufacturer has two
opposite eects to take into account. First, the higher the number of retail outlets
entering the market in equilibrium, the higher the sum of xed costs involved (to be
covered through the retail mark-up). On the other hand, an increase in the equilibrium
number of retailers may go with a decrease in the 'eective price' faced by consumers
as the average travelling distance for consumers decreases. For a given wholesale price,
a drop in the 'eective price' benets the producer as the total quantity of goods sold
increases. Therefore, the reduction in transportation costs incurred by the consumers
may allow the producer to capture a larger part of the consumer surplus.
Two articles which have evaluated the two above eects in a context of spatial
retail competition19, Mathewson and Winter (1983) and Bittlingmayer (1983), nd
that the rst eect - as evaluated at the market equilibrium without vertical restraints
- appears to always dominate the second eect. The main reason for this result is
that in the absence of vertical restraints, there is a strong 'business stealing eect'
(Tirole, 1988): retailers, when deciding to enter the market, do not take into account
the negative eect of entry on the prots of the other retailers. From the viewpoint
of the industry, this leads to a certain bias towards excess entry. It also renders the
result that price ceilings, and not price oors, are required if the producer wants to
maximize prots by inuencing the number of retail outlets in the long run.
In Chapter 4, I will verify whether the above described results for the outlets
hypothesis are due to the particular transportation cost assumptions of the underly-
ing models. In line with the majority of spatial models of retail competition, these
models have made the assumption that transportation costs depend proportionally
on the quantity of products actually bought at the retail outlet. By contrast, I will
assume that customers only incur a xed cost when visiting a retail outlet, i.e. a cost
irrespective of whether they buy several products or nothing at all. This assumption
seems quite justied when the size or quantity of the goods transported is relatively
small or transportation costs are looked upon as opportunity costs associated with
the time spent on shopping and not on other activities.
An interesting feature of the fact that transportation costs are not dependent on
19Spatial retail competition refers to competition between retailers that are dierentiated through
distance. Retailers being dierentiated amounts to retailers possessing some (localized) market
power.
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the quantity bought is that it changes the analysis of where a consumer will buy. The
larger the quantity consumers want to buy, the more they will get interested in going
to a remote shop with a low price, rather than going to the shop closeby with high
prices. In a way, the choice of where to buy also depends on the choice how much
to buy. The xed transportation cost structure thus appears to bring about more
competitive retail conditions than the proportionally dependent transportation cost
structures. In principle, this may reduce the extent of the excess entry bias of spatial
models and, therefore, lead to price oors being more attractive as a means to foster
entry by retailers.
However, despite this feature it is found that also with the xed transport cost
specication, the manufacturer does not nd it protable to impose price oors.
Again, the better capture of consumer surplus appears not to weigh up against the
increase in xed costs involved with the larger retail network. To put the conclusion of
this analysis into business motivations in the negative: if one observes a company em-
ploying price oors in a setting such as the one studied in Chapter 4, this company is
not doing it to increase its retail network. Rather, other motivations (anti-competitive
motivations?) must be underlying its use.
Chapter 5: Resale price maintenance under cost uncertainty
As will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, several explanations for the use of resale price
maintenance have been given in the economic literature. The emphasis of Chapter 5 is
on the incentive and insurance properties of resale price maintenance in an uncertain
trading environment, a subject that has notably been analysed by Rey and Tirole in
their article 'The logic of vertical restraints' (1986, American Economic Review 76: p.
921-936). In this article, Rey and Tirole set up a spatial model of retail competition
and analyse the role of resale price maintenance (RPM) when there is uncertainty
about future demand and cost levels. The retailers are assumed to be better informed
(ex post) about the realisation of nal demand and about their own costs than the
manufacturer.
The basic trade-o in the choice of contract is between the optimal exploitation of
market power and the amount of risk that the retailers are willing to accept. The opti-
mal exploitation of market power requires that one avoids the double marginalisation
problem associated with linear wholesale pricing, i.e. the problem that nal prices
end up too high from the viewpoint of the vertical chain due to consequent stages of
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market power (Spengler, 1950). One way of doing so is to use two-part taris, involv-
ing a xed upfront payment (e.g. a franchise fee) and a low marginal wholesale price.
Another method is resale price maintenance, by which the producer directly imposes
the proper nal price on the retailers. If there is no uncertainty, the two methods yield
identical results. However, when there is uncertainty the two may dier. Whereas
free competition between retailers clearly allows better use of local information than
the inexible instrument of RPM, the insurance properties are more complex: risk
averse retailers dislike the burden of a franchise fee, but also RPM exposes them to
risks, to the extent that their prot margins are subject to uctuations.
One of Rey and Tirole's specic results is that when there is uncertainty about
costs, free competition between retailers (in combination with a two-part tari) has
good incentive and insurance properties in the various cases considered in the article20.
The principal reason is that under cost uncertainty, the retail margin is particularly
volatile under RPM: the retail price is xed but the cost level varies, a feature for
which risk averse retailers need some compensation (e.g. via lower wholesale prices).
The principal aim of Chapter 5 is to show that Rey and Tirole's result concerning
the favourable incentive and insurance properties of retailer competition does not
generally carry over to the case in which retailers possess some degree of market
power (due to retailer dierentiation) and face retailer-specic cost uncertainty. When
dierentiated retailers face rm-specic risks on cost levels, resale price maintenance
may be a more protable instrument for the manufacturer than free retail competition.
The essential point is that in the absence of market power associated with re-
tailer dierentiation, there is only one source of double marginalisation: the double
marginalisation due to cost dierences at the retail level (when one retailer turns out
to be more eÆcient than the other, it obtains a positive retail margin by just undercut-
ting the price of the other retailer). With only this source of double marginalisation,
the need for a powerful two-part wholesale tari is not very great: even when retailers
are so risk averse that they are not willing to accept any positive franchise fee at all
(because this might result in a loss in some situations), free downstream competition
20Free retailer competition turns out to be a more protable option for the manufacturer than
RPM in all three model specications analysed: 1) the case in which cost uncertainty is market-
wide (the costs faced by all retailers uctuate in the same way) and retailers have no market power
2) the case in which cost uncertainty is market-wide and retailers derive market power from being
dierentiated 3) the case in which cost uncertainty is rm-specic ('idiosyncratic') and retailers lack
market power unless they are more eÆcient than the competition.
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turns out to perform better than resale price maintenance21.
However, when there is also a double marginalisation problem due to retailer
dierentiation, there is a greater need for a powerful wholesale tari, involving lower
wholesale prices and, correspondingly, a higher franchise fee. But the extent to which
the manufacturer can charge the required franchise fee is limited by the risk that the
retailers are willing to bear: a franchise fee can only be recovered by the retailers
when the retail margin they earn is suÆciently positive (in some average sense)22.
Whereas rm-specic cost uncertainty makes it more diÆcult to charge a franchise
fee to risk averse retailers which are competing in prices, resale price maintenance is
an instrument to protect the retailers against more eÆcient rivals. As a result of this
insurance property, resale price maintenance can be an optimal commercial policy for
a manufacturer. In particular, it is shown that in the case of dierentiated retailers,
RPM is optimal when the cost uncertainty is rm-specic, the retailers are suÆciently
risk averse and the range of possible retail cost levels is not too wide (so as to make
RPM too 'rigid' as an instrument).
To put the conclusion of this analysis into business motivations in the positive: if
one observes a company employing price oors in a setting such as the one studied
in Chapter 5, this company may well be doing it because it is in its own interest to
better protect its retailers.
Chapter 6: Cartel formation under incomplete information
It is generally thought that the likelihood of rms forming a cartel is greater in
concentrated industries than in industries with many rms. Not only because it is, so
the argument goes, easier to monitor a cartel agreement in the relatively surveyable
environment of a tight oligopoly (cartel enforcement argument) but also because it
may be easier or more attractive for fewer rms to come to terms about the conditions
applying to the cartel (cartel formation argument)23.
One element that can be a source of diÆculty in the formation of cartels is the
problem of incomplete information with respect to the cost levels of the participating
21Cf. Rey and Tirole (1986). When no franchise fee is imposed, the insurance properties of direct
competition are necessarily very good: even when the retail margin ends up being zero (which occurs
whenever the competitors are at least as cost eÆcient), the retailers just break even.
22In a similar fashion, the results of Rey and Tirole (1986) also depend on the specic assumption
made as regards the level of xed costs required to set up a retail outlet.
23See Phlips (1995) for an overview of the literature.
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rms. This information asymmetry may pose a problem at the stage where the cartel
must determine the conditions of the cartel agreement (e.g. production quotas, xed
market shares) for the participants. Obviously, the conditions of the cartel agreement
also bear on the decision to join the cartel in the rst place. For example, a rm
which is relatively eÆcient will typically only be satised with a production quota
that somehow steps up to this fact (in other words, the quota must be relatively
large), otherwise it may just prefer to compete on the market. This, however, should
induce rms which are less eÆcient to overstate their eÆciency in order to obtain
a higher share of the cartel output. But when every rm is saying to be eÆcient
(or saying to have become more eÆcient since the latest negotiations) and claiming
large quota, this reduces the attractiveness of the cartel for rms which are eectively
among the most eÆcient.
The extent to which cartel agreements can overcome the conicting requirements
mentioned above has been the subject of extensive research24. In order to characterise
the outcomes that a cartel can achieve in situations of incomplete information, the
issue of cartel formation has typically been approached using a standard mechanism
design approach: in an industry, there is a `cartel manager' who proposes a cartel
arrangement and determines the optimal quotas depending on the costs each rm
announces to have25. Given this scheme, rms decide whether or not to join and, if
they do, they announce their costs. A proposed cartel agreement is called `eÆcient'
when only the rm(s) with the lowest cost produce(s). In order to form such a cartel,
the cartel manager must, according to the well-known Revelation Principle, propose
a scheme (possibly involving side payments) that ensures individual participation and
induces the rms to reveal their cost information.
The current literature does provide some justications for the generally held belief
that cartels are most diÆcult to form in industries with many rms, but it fails to do
so in several constellations. In particular, in a setting where the number of possible
eÆciency types is limited to two (rms are either eÆcient or ineÆcient), Kihlstrom
and Vives (1989, 1992) have shown that the formation of an eÆcient cartel is possible,
24Cf. Cramton and Palfrey (1990) and Kihlstrom and Vives (1989, 1992).
25In studying the problems related to cartel formation, the literature abstracts away from the
cartel enforcement problem (and vice versa). Cartel arrangements are assumed to be enforceable,
even though the secrecy of the arrangement implies that there is, for example, no public authority
available to enforce it. The assumption of enforceability is a short-cut to capture in a static context
the reputation of the cartel manager and the rms participating in the cartel which guarantee the
self-enforceability of the arrangement in a dynamic context (e.g. by means of trigger strategies).
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both in the case of a duopoly and in the borderline case of an industry comprising
very many rms (modelled as a continuum of rms). The reason of this latter, rather
surprising, result is that in such an industry there is little uncertainty about the type
of rm that should produce nor about the fraction of eÆcient rms being present,
so that it turns out to be not so diÆcult to reconcile all individual participation and
incentive requirements. This result holds for all meaningful probability distributions
on the two cost types.
The purpose of Chapter 6 is to consider again the issue of cartel formation in
the above context, but from a dierent angle: in order to characterise the possible
outcomes that a cartel can achieve, it is proposed to explore the additional require-
ment of collusion-proofness. The above mentioned models of the cartel manager (the
principal) trying to obtain the eÆcient cartel outcome by inducing truthful cost rev-
elation by the rms (the agents), all use the standard assumption that every agent
behaves non-cooperatively: no communication is possible between the agents, which
is a standard assumption for the Revelation Principle. The aim of Chapter 6 is to see
whether the obtained results continue to hold when communication between groups
of rms cannot be excluded and, in particular, when groups of rms try to (secretly)
coordinate their cost announcements in order to obtain a better result.
The possibility of collusion by subcoalitions is shown to change the set of imple-
mentable rules, but not to change the principal result that eÆcient cartel formation
is possible for any number of rms in the industry. Similarly, cases can be identied
in which the extra requirement of collusion-proofness need not have an impact on
the minimal level of transfers that is required to form these cartels. It appears that
these results are due to a range of factors. An important one is undoubtedly the
strong congruence of interest between the cartel manager and the individual cartel
members: after all, the cartel manager is acting costlessly on behalf of the members,
by maximizing their total expected prots. The fact that the cartel manager can
freely use side transfers is a relevant aspect as well. With restrictions on the use of
side-transfers, eÆcient cartels may not always be possible in the rst place.
It emerges from this chapter that while the literature on cartel formation pro-
vides some theoretical support for the idea that cartels are most diÆcult to form in
industries with many rms, it still leaves a number of open ends.
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Many relationships between suppliers of goods and their distributors (e.g. whole-
salers and retailers) go well beyond simple agreements to deliver goods at a certain
unit price. Often, these relationships are governed by medium or long term contracts
that impose certain obligations on one or both parties, restricting in some way their
commercial freedom. For example, a supplier who grants an exclusive sales territory
to a distributor necessarily commits not to sell to other distributors based in that
specic area. Similarly, distributors who want to become part of a franchise network
usually have to commit not to disclose the know-how that they receive in the context
of the franchise agreement to companies outside the network. Contractual obligations
of this kind are commonly referred to as 'vertical restraints'1. Furthermore, con-
tracts between suppliers and distributors frequently involve rather elaborate payment
schemes, such as quantity discounts, xed fees or royalties2.
During the 20th century, there have been quite a few shifts in attitude as to the
admissibility of such restraints. Leading decisions early in the development of an-
titrust law reected the somewhat orthodox view that restraints of all sorts reduce
the economic freedom to act of the trading parties and that they are, hence, bound to
1At the end of this chapter, a short glossary can be found with descriptions of the main types of
vertical restraints.
2In the economic literature, the mentioned payment schemes are sometimes also referred to as
'vertical restraints'. As the more general payment schemes are not, by themselves, restricting the




interfere with the free play of trade. In particular, they would lead to interrupted seller
access to customers and should thus be considered bad for competition3. In this re-
spect, there was hardly any dierence between the treatment of horizontal agreements
(agreements concluded between rms operating at the same level of the production
or distribution chain, i.e. competing rms) and vertical agreements (between rms
operating at dierent levels of the production or distribution chain). After World War
II, this approach found support in a number of empirical studies that tended to show
a positive relationship between dense market structures and price and prot levels in
the industry4.
Since the 1960s, a line of thought commonly associated with the University of
Chicago, has changed the direction of the debate5. The 'Chicago School' stimulated
a line of research with a rigorous focus on the motivations of companies using the re-
straints: why do rational companies in a competitive situation choose to be restricted
in their choice possibilities? The aim was to nd explanations for observed economic
behaviour in line with the starting points of neoclassical theory (utility maximisation
by rational economic agents) and consistent with the idea that market participants are
generally capable of correcting and internalising possible market imperfections them-
selves6. In addition, the Chicago economists proposed to use the criterion of economic
eÆciency (welfare) as the sole normative standard against which the lawfulness of a
given business practice should be tested7. According to Bork (1978), 'Antitrust policy
cannot be made rational until we are able to give a rm answer to one question: What
is the point of law - what are its goals? Everything else follows from the answer we
give'.
The Chicago School emphasized that agreements concluded by companies in a
3For the US, see Brennan (2000) or, in the context of the American 'rule of reason', Chapter 3.
For the European Community, see Chapter 3.
4Fasquelle (1993, p. 46) notes that this positive relationship was perceived to hold for horizontally
concentrated as well as vertically integrated industries.
5Cf. Brennan (2000). The Chicago School developed already as of the 1930s but it was only since
the 1960s that it began to get truly inuential, in economics and beyond (Reder, 1982).
6See Reder (1982) or Posner (1979) for a detailed account of the assumptions made by the 'Chicago
School'.
7Total welfare can be conceived as the (weighted) sum of consumer surplus (a monetary measure
of the utility derived from consumption) and producer surplus (such as prots). The weights put
to consumer surplus and producer surplus imply a certain value judgment. The Chicago School
proposed that the weights should be taken equal, rendering antitrust policy 'nonpolitical', i.e. not
taking sides in any political dispute about how wealth ought to distributed among interest groups
(Hovenkamp, 1999).
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vertical relationship are, by their nature, very dierent from agreements concluded by
rms which are in direct competition with each other (also called 'horizontal agree-
ments'). The fact that the latter are agreements concluded between companies in a
vertical relationship - that is, between companies which both full an indispensable
function in putting the product on the market - suggests that they are primarily used
to make the vertical combination more eÆcient. After all, in a vertical relationship
one party will be damaged when the other party does not function properly. And
'properly' means, in by far most cases: from the point of view of the consumers,
because in the end, they are supposed to buy the product. Through this special in-
terdependent relationship, every party in a vertical agreement can, in principle, be
considered a natural ally of the consumer.
It is useful to approach this key observation in terms of an analogy: the dier-
ence between substitute products and complementary products (cf. Baxter, 1990).
Whereas horizontal agreements concern agreements concluded by companies provid-
ing competing, substitutable goods or services, vertical agreements are concluded by
companies that are providing complementary goods or services8.
Where goods and services are substitutes, companies providing these goods or
services are in direct competition with each other. When one rm cuts its price this
will have a negative eect on the prots of other rms in the market as the demand
for the products of those rms will fall. This eect is an external eect, in the sense
that the price cutting company will, normally speaking, not take it into account. Each
rm in the market has an interest in seeing the prices of the substitute products being
increased. A joint prot maximizing agreement between the two (a cartel) will then
seek to internalize the price externalities and lead to a joint increase in the prices.
It goes without saying that the customers of these companies are hurt by such an
agreement.
When goods and services are complements, the eects of price cuts are quite the
opposite. When one company cuts its price this will tend to have a positive eect on
the prots of suppliers of the complement by stimulating demand for their products.
This eect is again an external eect, in the sense that the price cutting company will,
normally speaking, not take it into account. Now, each rm has an interest in seeing
8Such a complementarity is most apparent in the interdependence between production and distri-
bution: when a producer produces a good the only way the product can reach the market is through
some form of distribution. On the other hand, each distributor is dependent on supply of products
from the part of the producers.
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the prices of the suppliers of complementary products being reduced. A joint prot
maximizing agreement between the two rms will then seek to internalize the price
externalities and lead to a reduction of the prices. This is exactly in the interest of
the consumers. As a result, an agreement entered into by providers of complementary
products is unlikely to be bad for welfare9.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Chicago methodology of studying the rationale of
observed behaviour on the basis of rigorous micro-economic analysis (and its emphasis
on the use of an economic eÆciency criterion to evaluate the impact of such behaviour)
has gone to the centre ground of Industrial Organization10. Its sharpest assumptions
and conclusions, however, have not. For a large part this can be attributed to the
increasing role of non-cooperative game theory in industrial organization, which al-
lowed for the construction of a wider range of models and a wider range of outcomes.
These models suggested that vertical integration or contractual restraints could be
both rational and eective ways to engage in anti-competitive behaviour. For ex-
ample, it was shown that delegating pricing decisions to exclusive distributors might
allow producers to credibly commit to less competitive behaviour towards each other
(to 'soften' competition), making use of the fact that the incentives to compete on the
distribution level dier from those on the producer level11. Similarly, some exclusive
dealing contracts were shown to be possible tools for foreclosing markets, in particu-
lar because they render the anti-competitive objective (i.e. foreclosure) more credible
9The importance of the products being complements rather than substitutes can also be more
formally illustrated, along the lines of Baxter (1990). Let p1 and p2 be the prices of the two comple-
mentary products, 1 and 2 the prot levels of companies 1 and 2, respectively, CS1 and CS2 the
consumer surplus associated with products 1 and 2, respectively and SW social welfare, the sum of
consumer surplus and prots. The derivative of social welfare with respect to the prices of each of















where i = 1; 2. What this expresses is that the change in social welfare when p1 (resp. p2) varies
is the sum of the change in prots and consumer surplus associated with both products. When the
two rms are setting prices non-cooperatively it follows that they will price according to the rst
order conditions @1=@p1 = 0 and @2=@p2 = 0, respectively. The terms @CS1=@p1 and @CS2=@p2
are negative: price rises are obviously negative for consumer surplus. Furthermore, when the two
products are complements, the cross derivatives @2=@p1 and @1=@p2 are negative. Using these
elements, it follows that at, at the non-cooperative equilibrium, the signs of @SW=@p1 and @SW=@p2
are also negative. This means that, at the non-cooperative equilibrium, each rm has an incentive
to inuence the price of the other into a direction that improves both consumer surplus and welfare:
the private and the social incentives are aligned.
10Cf. Van den Bergh (1997).
11Cf. Rey and Stiglitz (1988, 1995).
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and time-consistent12.
As a result of the above development a consensus has arisen that it is impossible to
predict the competitive and welfare eects of vertical restraints out of the context in
which they are applied; there are circumstances in which they improve the eÆciency
of supplier-distributor relationships and increase competition, but there are also cir-
cumstances in which they may indeed be anti-competitive. Consequently, when it
comes to vertical restraints, the move has been away from the traditional 'Chicago
view' to advocacy of a more explicit balancing test, based on the circumstances of
each case. As Tirole (1988) puts it 'theoretically, the only defensible position on ver-
tical restraints seems to be the rule of reason. Most vertical restraints can increase
or decrease welfare, depending on the environment. Legality or illegality per se thus
seems unwarranted'. According to Kay (1990, p.560), 'the best conclusion is that we
should principally look at the consequences, rather than the form or rst order eects
of the restraints'.
While this approach makes much sense from the viewpoint of economic theory, it
has been recognized - not least by the cited authors themselves - that it would put far
too heavy a burden on the antitrust authorities. An investigation into the eects of all
the agreements that are concluded between rms at dierent levels of the production
or distribution chain is just impracticable. Guidance in the form of a relatively robust
characterisation of the circumstances in which vertical restraints are likely to have
detrimental eects is therefore necessary to allow for antitrust supervision that is not
only eective, but also eÆcient in keeping down administrative costs.
Seabright (1998) also points to a dierent reason as to why it is important to de-
velop such guidance: to limit the costs that go with entrusting government authorities
with discretionary powers. Seabright refers, among others, to the following 'costs of
discretion', which are all fairly familar from the eld of public economics. In the rst
place, discretionary policy may make it hard for rms to predict what the authorities
are going to decide in particular circumstances. From the viewpoint of legal certainty,
essential to any market economy, this is not desirable. Furthermore, the discretionary
powers may incite both the authorities and the companies to engage in rent-seeking
behaviour (lobbying on the part of the companies; cultivating 'friendly' relations on
the part of government oÆcials or governing political parties). It is well documented
that often the most eective lobbying comes from the side where the economic stake
12Cf. Aghion and Bolton (1987).
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is bundled in the hands of a few (industry), rather than from the side where interests
are dispersed among many (consumers). Finally, even with a competition authority
having the best intentions, the exercise of discretion bears the risk of inconsistency
between decisions and between dierent branches of competition policy, with conse-
quent distortionary incentives for the way in which rms plan their business strategies
(see Chapter 3 for some examples in Europe).
As to the characterisation of the circumstances in which vertical restraints are
likely to have detrimental eects for competition and welfare, the economic literature
oers very extensive material on which to base such a characterisation13. The purpose
of this chapter is to provide an overview of the main insights that economic theory has
provided. Rather than giving a long enumeration of the dierent market situations
that have been studied and the corresponding results, the aim is to present and develop
the main arguments, occasionally with the use of some simple examples and models.
In this, we will link up with the two main groups of motives for vertical restraints
touched upon above: the vertical co-ordination motives (Section 2.2) and the anti-
competitive motives (Sections 2.3 and 2.4, on foreclosure and 'softening' competition,
respectively)14. A conclusion will follow in Section 2.5.
2.2 The vertical co-ordination motives
The simple analysis that identies an essential dierence between vertical and hor-
izontal agreements (cf. Baxter, 1990) bears most of the argument that pleads in
favour of vertical agreements in the economic literature: vertical agreements serve to
13The literature on vertical restraints has largely been framed in terms of the search for vertical
control within a principal{agent relationship, where the principal (the supplier) imposes contrac-
tual obligations on its agent (the distributor) when delegating responsibility for selling its products.
However, in contrast with the literature on mechanism design which seeks to characterise the out-
comes that a supplier-distributor pair can achieve using general contracts, the literature on vertical
restraints has traditionally taken contract obligations that are observed in practice as a starting
point (exclusive distribution agreements, exclusive dealing, resale price maintenance, etc.). A good
overview of general contract theory is provided by Salanie (1997).
14The classication into 'vertical co-ordination motives' and 'anti-competitive motives' (which is,
in fact, common in the literature) might suggest that the former motives are not 'anti-competitive'.
In the sense that the motives are intended to reduce ineÆciencies within the vertical structure, rather
than to hurt rivals outside the structure, this might be a proper interpretation. However, as will
transpire from the analysis in section 2.2, it is not to be taken for granted that vertical restraints
taken in pursuit of 'vertical co-ordination' will be benecial for welfare. This may particularly be
the case when 'vertical co-ordination' also allows for a better exploitation of monopoly power. In
those cases, the vertical restraints may just as well be deemed 'anti-competitive'.
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co-ordinate the actions of an upstream rm and a downstream rm and they may well
be welfare inproving in view of the complementary nature of the relationship. At the
same time, it does not capture the complexity of most market situations and a more
developed analysis is required to account for this complexity. For example, what are
the welfare eects of the respective vertical restraints in settings in which companies
take decisions on more dimensions than just the price dimension (e.g. service levels,
advertisement) ? And what if there are more players on either level ? What are ef-
fective ways to co-ordinate when it is diÆcult or even impossible to write contracts
that take into account every possible contingency ? In this section, these variations
will be discussed in turn.
At rst sight, it would seem that a supplier (manufacturer) would be keen on its
distributors (retailers) being as competitive as possible: all other things being equal,
the smaller the distributor mark-up, the greater the sales and prot levels for the
supplier. However, this is very much like wishful thinking. Distributors incur xed
costs, many of which contain a sunk element. The fact that there are xed costs means
that perfect competition is an unattainable ideal framework for the distribution level.
As a result, suppliers will normally be faced with a distribution level which has some
market power (in the sense that they can set prices above marginal cost) and which is,
by consequence, in a position to choose actions which are not in line with the interests
of the consumers or of the supplier. The distributor's possibility to choose actions
'for itself' may lead to externalities of the type illustrated by the analysis of Baxter
(1990).
2.2.1 Controlling the basic vertical externalities
Let us, in rst instance, abstract from the interaction with other suppliers and dis-
tributors and focus on the possible co-ordination problems within a structure which
is made up of one supplier (upstream) and one distributor (downstream)15. In its
simplest setting, with consumer demand only depending on the retail price, we obtain
the classic problem of double marginalisation (Spengler, 1950). Let D(p) denote mar-
ket demand as a function of the retail price. Let us suppose that the marginal cost of
production is c and that, for simplicity, the distributor incurs no cost other than the
wholesale price pw it has to pay to the supplier. Suppose further that the manufac-
turer supplies the distributor at a constant wholesale price and that the distributor
15The structure of the analysis provided in this subsection is along the lines of Tirole (1988).
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can determine the retail price independently. Then, for a given wholesale price, the
distributor will charge the retail price that maximizes its prot (p  pw)D(p), i.e. it
will charge the corresponding monopoly price pm(:), which is a function of the whole-
sale price pw. To make a prot, the supplier will charge a wholesale price that exceeds
its marginal cost of production: pw > c. However, because of the two successive mar-
gins (both p > pw and pw > c), the retail price ends up too high from the viewpoint
of the structure as a whole: the retail price is pm(pw), with pw chosen optimal by
the supplier, whereas it should optimally be pm(c), as c is the 'true' marginal cost of
the vertical structure. The pricing distortion arises from the fact that the distributor
does not take into account the eect on the prot stream owing to the supplier; nor
does the supplier take into account the prot stream owing to the distributor, for
that matter.
Vertical integration in the usual sense of the expression, namely common ownership
of both rms, would internalize this eect, but alternative contractual relationships
also solve the problem. Using Tirole's (1988) terminology, the 'target' of the vertical
structure is to x the retail price at the right level. One way of doing so would be for
the manufacturer to use resale price maintenance and x the price at p = pm(c). A
condition to use this instrument is that the retail price is observable by the supplier
and veriable, i.e. suitable to be written down in a contract. Another way would to
avoid the pricing distortion would be to use a two-part tari, consisting of a marginal
wholesale price equal to marginal cost (c) and a xed fee that recovers the distributor's
subsequent operating prot. The distributor is then made the residual claimant of
the vertically integrated prot: it captures the entire benet of every extra unit of
product sold. A nal way to solve the problem would be to sell at a wholesale price
equal to the target price and impose quantity forcing. All three steps lead to a lower
retail price, an increase in prots and an increase in consumer surplus.
A variation of the double marginalisation problem discussed above results when
'promotional eort' or 'services' provided by the distributor enhance the value of the
product to the nal consumer16. In these circumstances, demand will depend on
both the price level p and on s, the level of service: D = D(p; s). Suppose that it
costs the distributor an amount (s) per unit of output to oer these services. A
vertically integrated structure would choose the price-service combination (pm; sm)
that maximizes the integrated prot (p   c   (s))D(p; s). A distributor however
16A similar argument can be built when the supplier takes care of promotional eort.
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maximizes only its own prot, (p  pw  (s))D(p; s). Whenever the supplier charges
a wholesale price that exceeds the true marginal cost of production, there will be a
distortion similar to the one observed in the simple example of double marginalisation:
both in choosing the level of service and in the level of the retail price, the distributor
will not take into account the prots owing to the supplier. In particular, as the
distributor does not reap all the benets from increasing the level of service, it will
typically choose a level that is too low from the viewpoint of the structure. A supplier
should therefore not opt for regular market transactions at a certain unit price, but
opt for some form of control.
If s or (s) were observable and veriable, a contract could be written that explic-
itly species the appropriate amount of service, sm, to be provided. In combination
with retail price maintenance at a price equal to pm, the vertically integrated prot
could be realized. A dierent, less involved way, would again be to make the distrib-
utor a residual claimant by selling him the input at marginal cost, pw = c, and to
appropriate the distributor's operating prot through a xed fee equal to the verti-
cally integrated structure's prot. An alternative way to ensure that the distributor
provides the appropriate level of services would be to write a quantity forcing contract
at D(pm).
The welfare eects of the possible vertical restraints in this setting are ambiguous
(cf. Comanor, 1985). Whereas the consumers will appreciate the internalization
of the double marginalisation eect (which leads, all other things being equal, to a
decrease in the retail price), the internalization of the service externality leads, all
other things being equal, to an increase in the service level. The resulting increase
in the service costs may lead to a net increase in the retail price. Depending on the
exact specication of the demand structure, it cannot be excluded that the situation
without vertical control is the preferred one by the consumers. The underlying reason
is that the exercise of market power creates a division of interest between the marginal
customers (customers that are at the brink of not buying the product) and infra-
marginal customers (ones that are buying the product even if the price rises a little
or the level of service goes down a little). In search of an increase of prots at the
margin, the vertically integrated structure tries to make extra consumers buy the
product, e.g. by further increasing the level of services, as long as this is protable.
However, whereas both marginal and infra-marginal customers share an interest in
the provision of a given product and service at lowest cost, they are likely to have
divergent preferences regarding the exact combination of price and service (this is
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precisely why some consumers are at the margin and others are infra-marginal). For
instance, the infra-marginal consumers who are buying the product anyway, may
rather prefer to pay lower prices and spend the money saved on something else. As a
result, is not necessarily the case that a vertical agreement leading to an increase in
service provision will be welfare enhancing. The simple framework of Baxter (1990)
does not easily translate towards situations with more decision variables than just the
price level.
2.2.2 Controlling externalities between distributors
In the above analysis, we saw that vertical co-ordination is useful when one of the two
parties, say, the distributor, does not reap all the benets from its actions, whereas
it does bear the costs. It was the upstream rm in the vertical structure who was
the co-beneciary of the 'proper' actions taken. When there are more companies
active in the distribution of the supplier's product, another set of externalities arises,
externalities between distributors.
Whenever distributors raise the price at which they sell, they confer benets on
competing distributors of the product, as more consumers will turn to these other
distributors. An individual distributor will normally not take this externality into
account and hence set prices lower than would be optimal for the distribution level.
Whereas this is generally a good thing for the supplier and the consumers alike, some
ineÆciencies may result. One possible concern is the number of distributors willing to
carry the product17. When there is dierentiation between distributors, for example as
a result of their location or their marketing format, aggregate demand for the product
will increase in the number of distributors (all other things being equal). When price
competition between distributors is too strong, this may take away the incentive to set
up a distribution business alltogether. This is, all other things being equal, not in the
interest of the supplier. The supplier might then want to use price restraints (resale
price maintenance) in order to support the number of sales outlets. Alternatively, the
supplier could use xed subsidies (e.g. slotting allowances) to inuence the number
of distributors carrying its product. The exact trade-o between the number of sales
outlets and the use of resale price maintenance has been studied in a number of
settings, but the theoretical support for the argument that the number of distributors
17Cf. Yamey (1954), Dixit (1983), Matthewson and Winter (1983), Bittlingmayer (1983), Ippolito
and Overstreet (1996).
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ends up too low because of price competition is, in fact, limited (see Chapter 4 for
a more general discussion). For an argument of this type to hold, richer structures
appear to be necessary.
Externalities among distributors also occur in the domain of services provision
and promotional eort18. Product specic advertising by one distributor may well
benet other distributors of the product. The same holds when customers can obtain
in-store information from one distributor and buy the product from another. To the
extent that some of the benets of service provision are enjoyed by other distributors,
distributors will want to free ride on each other and provide less service themselves
than would otherwise be the case. This eect is reinforced by the fact that such
behaviour allows for more aggressive pricing from the part of the free-riding rm as
it does not incur the costs related to services provision (e.g. a discounter)19.
To encourage an adequate provision of services and promotional eort by distrib-
utors several options are available to the supplier20. It can choose to eliminate price
competition at the distributor level by imposing resale price maintenance. Similarly,
exclusive territories are a means to reduce the externality problem. More generally, in
fact, any measure that reduces the intensity of price competition between distributors
is a way to reduce the problem (e.g. with dierentiated distributors: operating a
selective distribution system, charting suÆciently high xed fees).
While the above measures will reduce the level of free-riding behaviour by reducing
the scope for price cutting behaviour, they need not entirely take away the externality.
In the case of advertising, for example, there is still the problem that not all of the
benets of are advertising are reaped by the company engaging in it. In this case,
it may be necessary to provide additional incentives to advertise, e.g. by charging a
very low wholesale price (possibly even below marginal cost, while appropriating the
distributor's operating prot by means of a xed upfront payment). In the case of in-
store information provision, resale price maintenance and exclusive distribution may,
however, already be suÆcient as it is unlikely that customers, having obtained the
18Cf. Telser (1960), Mathewson and Winter (1984), Besanko and Perry (1997), among others.
19The eects are most easily seen from the case of two distributors and product advertising.
Suppose market demand is given by D(p; s), where s is the sum of the expenses made by the two
rms for advertising (s = s1 + s2). Suppose also that consumers buy from the distributor which
charges the lowest price. In that case, there is no equilibrium in which one of the two rms will
advertise. The only equilibrium will be one in which no advertisement is provided at all.
20We will focus on services and promotional eort which are best provided by distributors, such as
in-store information provision or location-specic advertising. After all, if the supplier could equally
well take care of promotional eort himself, he could simply choose to do so.
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pre-sale information from one distributor will then go to another if this one charges
the same price or if it is located far away.
As for the welfare eects of the restraints that are used to internalize the service
externalities between distributors: if the divergence of interest between marginal and
inframarginal consumers is not too large, it is likely that the restraints are welfare
enhancing, as consumers will also appreciate the resulting increase in the level of
services.
2.2.3 Avoiding externalities that benet other suppliers
The previous section highlights the role of vertical restraints to control for external-
ities among distributors. By just considering one supplier and its distributors, they
abstract from concerns that the supplier may have about the externalities that are at
play at the upstream level.
Important from the perspective of internal eÆciency are the externalities that go
with eorts from the part of the supplier to improve the distribution channel when
also other suppliers make use of this channel for the distribution of (part of) their
sales21. For example, when a supplier provides commercial or technical training to
its distributors, this makes these distributors not only more eective in selling the
supplier's product but also at selling its rivals' products. The training, therefore, also
works to the rival suppliers' benet. In addition, because these rivals do not incur the
costs of training, they are in a position to charge lower wholesale prices and obtain
extra market share. As a consequence of this free-rider problem, suppliers can be
expected to make investments that are too low from the viewpoint of the vertical
structure.
In order to eliminate this externality, the supplier may want to use exclusive
dealing contracts, as a result of which the distributors cannot deal in the competitors'
products. While it may be true that the supplier still does not capture all the benets
of its eorts (the distributor may still use the knowledge for other purposes), the
benets no longer accrue to its direct competitors. As such, exclusive dealing is a
means of providing the supplier with a kind of property right to the fruits of his
eorts.
Marvel (1982) notes that the upstream externality problem is likely to arise in
situations where the opinion and recommendation of the distributor carries a certain
21Cf. Marvel (1982), among others.
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weight in the consumers' purchase decisions (otherwise, the supplier will not bother to
provide training in the rst place). It is precisely in such a setting that the downstream
service externality can play a role. According to Marvel, this might form an important
explanation for the fact that exclusive distribution agreements and exclusive dealing
agreements often go hand in hand. Furthermore, he notes that franchise agreemeents
are often accompanied by non-compete obligations, as they involve the transfer of a
substantial amount of know-how generated by the supplier.
A dierent eÆciency motive that has been given for exclusive dealing arrangements
is that they ensure that the distributors market the products 'with maximum energy
and enthusiasm'22. If a distributor markets several products it will spend its eorts in
such a way that the marginal revenue of eort will be equal acrosss the products. A
manufacturer may then choose exclusive dealing in order to elicit distributor eort for
its product. This argumentation does have a weakness, however. After all, a supplier
might also choose to reduce the wholesale price in order to elicit more eort (possibly
accompanied by a xed fee).
2.2.4 Vertical co-ordination and risk sharing
As can be seen from the above sections, vertical restraints can be used to align incen-
tives in cases where these are not aligned. One reason for the divergence of interest
are the respective horizontal and vertical externalities. In the above sections, these
externalities occurred in situations where both the supplier and the distributors are
similar in the sense that they are all prot-maximizers. Another reason why there
may be divergences of interest is that the supplier and the distributors may have
diering attitudes towards risk. In that case, the two levels of the vertical structures
make dierent trade-os between prot maximization and the risk they want to bear.
It turns out that while dierent types of vertical restraints may bring about similar
results in deterministic environments (see the above sections23), this is less the case in
risk environments. For risk considerations to play a role, one should not only presup-
pose that there is uncertainty about the level of some parameter but also that there
is an asymmetry of information about this parameter. After all, if a supplier could
22Scherer (1980, p. 586).
23This is not to say that in deterministic environments vertical restraints always have similar
eects. Cf. Marvel and McCaerty (1996) for resale price maintenance vs. exclusive territories or
Reien (1999) for resale price maintenance vs. quantity ceilings.
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observe, ex-post, the realisation of all parameters relevant to the distribution stage,
he could structure the incentives for the distributor as in a deterministic environment,
using contracts which are conditional on these parameters24.
In order to explore risk considerations in the context of vertical restraints, Rey
and Tirole (1986) set up a spatial model of retail competition and analyse the role
of the restraints when there is uncertainty about future demand and cost levels. The
retailers are better informed (ex post) about the realisation of nal demand and about
their own costs than the supplier. The latter is assumed not to be able to obtain this
information, directly or indirectly (one of the reasons for this is that the retailers
can engage in arbitrage, making it impossible for the supplier to keep track of the
supplies). Hence, informational problems prevent the supplier from using contracts
based on the true performances (prots) of the distributors.
Rey and Tirole consider two vertical restraints, resale price maintenance and ex-
clusive territories, and compare them with the situation of competition between dier-
entiated retailers. The basic trade-o in the choice of contract is between the optimal
exploitation of market power and the amount of risk that the distributors are willing
to accept. The optimal exploitation of market power requires that one makes opti-
mal use of local information and that one avoids the double marginalisation problem
associated with linear wholesale pricing. With uncertainty, the supplier is best able
to exploit its market power by providing exclusive territories since the retailers, as lo-
cal monopolists (when they are made residual claimants for the prots of the vertical
structure), adjust their prices optimally to cost and demand conditions. If instead the
supplier imposes resale price maintenance, the retail price is xed and, hence, cannot
repond to cost and demand shocks. Without either of these restraints, competition
ensures that the retail price is principally driven by the cost level, rather than by the
demand conditions, even though the latter also have some inuence.
Whereas the ranking in terms of exploitation of market power is rather clear, the
risk properties are more complex. When the retailers are more risk averse than the
manufacturer, internal eÆciency requires that the supplier shares some of the risk with
the distributors. Competition provides the distributors generally good insurance: as
the retail price is mainly cost driven, the response to cost shocks is good. At the same
time, as their margins are anyway not very large, the variability of their prots to
24In fact, this argument holds if the relevant parameters are observable and veriable, i.e. suitable
for use in a contract.
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demand conditions is moderate. The insurance properties of resale price maintenance
depend on the type of uncertainty. With demand uncertainty, resale price maintenance
may provide rather good insurance, in particular if the distributor margin is kept low
by the supplier. With market wide cost shocks, distributors bear the whole risk as they
cannot adjust the price level to these shocks. On the other hand, with distributor-
specic cost shocks, the picture is mixed: whereas resale price maintenance remains a
rigid instrument, it may provide insurance in the sense that they protect distributors
against more eÆcient distributors. Exclusive territories generally have poor insurance
properties, despite the fact that exclusive distributors can adjust their prices to meet
cost and demand changes: as their incentives are structured to be those of residual
claimants, they are faced with substantial uctuations in their prots.
The specic choice of vertical restraints depends on the trade-o between the
insurance objective and the optimal exploitation of monopoly power. When risk
is not too important, exclusive territories are likely to an optimal way to adjust
to local circumstances. With very risk averse distributors, the insurance objective
dominates the desire for optimal exploitation of market power. The nature of the
market uncertainty, therefore, determines the supplier's choice whether or not to use
vertical restraints at all and the ranking of the preferred restraints.
2.2.5 Reducing transaction costs
>From one point of view, the theory of vertical integration and vertical restraints is
just a special case of the theory of the rm. An alternative way to look at vertical
linkages is that they are a way to minimize transaction costs, or to reduce them below
market transaction levels25. Transaction costs can be understood as the usual costs
of searching a trading partner and of drawing up and enforcing contracts, but also as
ineÆciencies that result from not being able to write contracts as comprehensive as
one might wish (incomplete contracts).
In the rst interpretation, the costs that result from searching a trading partner
may lead companies to engage in longer term contracts, whereas the desire to reduce
the costs of drawing up and enforcing contracts may lead rms to limit the number
of trading partners. Similarly, the logistics of dealing with trading partners may lead
to a limitation of the number of trading partners, also in time. Frequency of trade is
25Cf. Coase (1937), Williamson (e.g. 1975, 1989). Formalized by Grossman and Hart (1986);
rened by Holmstrom and Tirole (1988).
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also an important element: if the same sort of bargain is to be concluded quite often,
then it may make sense to devise a contracting framework to facilitate it.
The main elements in the second interpretation of transaction costs are the con-
cepts of contract incompleteness and asset specity. A contract is called complete
when it covers all possible contingencies that may occur and has the relevant deci-
sions (on price, quantity, product characteristics, etc.) depend on veriable variables
(including, possibly, announcements by the parties, e.g. concerning their valuations,
costs, etc.). On the other hand, when the contract does not cover all possible contin-
gencies and, hence, leaves open what to do in those cases, a contract is incomplete.
At the origin of contract incompleteness is, of course, that it may be very costly (or
even impossible) to write complete contracts.
Assets are specic to a transaction to the extent that they are more valuable within
the scope of the transaction than outside the scope of the transaction. An example
of asset specity is when a distributor makes investments (e.g. in retail format) to
suit the product range of the supplier and these investments are of little use for the
distribution of other suppliers' products. Similarly, the provision of technical and
commercial training provided by a supplier to a distributor is most useful when this
distributor is eectively going to distribute for the supplier and not for some other
supplier.
A crucial aspect of specic investment is that even though the supplier and the
distributor may select each other ex ante from a pool of competitive suppliers and
distributors, they end up forming an ex post bilateral monopoly in the sense that they
have an incentive to trade with each other rather than with outside parties. However,
each party also knows that, if there are no checks and balances on each other's be-
haviour, the parties may have an incentive to enter into opportunistic behaviour the
moment at which the other party has invested, in an attempt to obtain a greater part
of the surplus that is created: to the extent that a substantial part of the value of the
investment has become 'stuck' in the relationship, the party that has invested a lot
nds itself in a weak bargaining position vis-a-vis the party that has not invested (as
much) in the relationship. This perspective, the weak bargaining situation ex post, is
likely to change the incentives to invest ex ante and to lead to investment levels that
are too low from the viewpoint of the vertical structure.
In order to avoid these ineÆciencies, it may be optimal for the parties to enter
into contracts ex ante. If complete contracts could be written, the solution would be
trivial: specify in the contract the investments that should be undertaken and the
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terms and conditions under which trade is to occur. In fact, it would not even be
necessary to say anything about the investment levels in the contract. In particular,
pre-specied selling prices for the products of the investing supplier (whenever there
are eectively gains from trade), will do; in this case, the supplier is ensured that
the distributor will not engage in opportunistic behaviour26. Similarly, when it is
the distributor who must make the specic investments, a guaranteed purchase price
(whenever there are eectively gains from trade) will be suÆcient.
However, when it is too costly or simply impossible to write complete contracts,
internal eÆciency cannot be attained (save in a few exceptional circumstances); after
all, in the cases that a non-specied contingency occurs and ex post bargaining must
occur, the party that has less at stake may engage in the types of opportunistic
behaviour described above. In the realm of vertical restraints, one way to reduce the
incentives to engage in such behaviour would be to enter into contracts that provide
for some kind of exclusivity. For example, when the distributor is the party that has
to make the specic investments, a contract granting an exclusive territory to this
distributor has the eect of reducing the outside opportunities for the supplier. As
a result, the bargaining position of the distributor is improved and its incentives to
invest have increased. Similarly, when the supplier is the party that has to make
specic investments, an exclusive dealing contract prohibiting the distributor to deal
in rival products may have the eect of reducing the outside opportunities for the
distributor.
Despite the insights obtained from the transaction cost / incomplete contracting
approach, it is unfortunate that the approach typically does not address the question
whether there are possible divergences between the private and social desirability
of vertical restraints (the literature typically focusses on the private incentives of
rms). Nonetheless, according to Williamson, the transaction cost approach shows
that vertical links can yield cost savings over a wider range of circumstances than the
earlier market power approach indicated and that a more permissive view of vertical
integration is warranted.
26One may note that the transaction cost literature, with its emphasis on restoring the ex-ante
incentives to invest, has a avour similar to the externalities-based literature. In a way, it is just the
source of the investment problem which is dierent.
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2.3 The anti-competitive motives (I): foreclosure
The various settings considered up to this point address the ways in which vertical
structures seek to improve the internal eÆciency of the structure. While there are
exceptions, it transpires that, generally, vertical restraints inspired by an internal
eÆciency motive may well improve welfare. There exists, however, also a body of
literature that has considered the ways in which vertical structures attempt to reduce
the competition with rivals and the circumstances in which this is protable.
This literature can be divided into two main lines of thought. The rst is that
vertical restraints may lead to foreclosure of market access, leading to a reduction
of the ability of other rms to compete. The second line of thought is that vertical
restraints may be used to 'soften' the competition between suppliers or even to enact
and enforce outright cartels.
2.3.1 Foreclosing market access to rival suppliers
Exclusive contracts have long been considered in the literature as practices to reduce
market access to actual or potential competitors, thereby increasing their costs. This
motive is interchangeably referred to as 'foreclosure', 'exclusionary behaviour' and
'raising rival's costs'. Most attention in this eld has focused on the role of exclusive
dealing contracts, contracts that prohibit a distributor to deal with other suppliers.
A supplier's prots are typically an increasing function of its rivals' costs and
prices. When there are substantial economies of scale and scope in distribution,
signing exclusivity contracts with particular distributors raises the distribution costs
of other suppliers and reduces the possibilities to reach the market for new suppliers
(entry barriers). In the extreme, when there is only one distributor available, exclusive
dealing arrangements have the eect of completely foreclosing the market.
Whereas the above eects of exclusive restraints appear rather straightforward,
the rationality of foreclosure is not to be taken for granted. Indeed, one question
that has frequently been raised is the following: why would a distributor, in particular
when he is a monopolist, be willing to enter into exclusive dealing agreements with
suppliers and forego the opportunity to deal (also) with other, possibly more inter-
esting suppliers? As Bork (1978) points out, the distributor would only accept such
an arrangement if it were compensated in some way. In this sense, the problem may
not be so much that the supplier will not desire to exclude a competitor, but that the
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cost of inducing a distributor to sign an exclusivity arrangement may not make such
a restraint protable.
One formalization of this intuition has been provided by Mathewson and Winter
(1987)27. In essence, they consider a model in which two suppliers sell dierentiated
products through a local monopoly distributor. Under exclusive dealing, the suppliers
compete on the basis of wholesale prices for the right to be selected by the distributor.
Complete foreclosure occurs when one supplier oers an exclusive dealing contract
with a wholesale price low enough to make it more protable for the distributor to
accept this contract than to accept a contract from the other supplier at a wholesale
price equal to marginal cost. In this model, exclusive dealing allows the eÆcient
supplier to exercise its existing cost advantage in production to exclude the other
supplier, but, depending on the demand characteristics, it will not always choose to
do so.
In fact, the issue of the rationality of foreclosure touches upon a more general point.
As explained in the introduction to this chapter, competition between companies
operating at the same level entails a horizontal externality: all companies would be
better o if they would behave less competitively. An obvious way to internalise this
externality is to vest all of the decision-making power in a single economic actor. So,
why does foreclosure occur in the rst place, if the distributor may as well serve as a
common agent ?
Bernheim and Whinston (1985, 1998) have formally explored this issue in a setting
similar to, but more general than that of Mathewson and Winter (1987). Consider
two suppliers of dierentiated products that both bid for representation by a single
distributor. Each bid consists of two parts: a wholesale price schedule in the event
the supplier is represented exclusively and a wholesale price schedule in the event the
distributor represents both suppliers. A priori, no restrictions are placed on the types
of price schedules that can be used28. In such circumstances, Bernheim and Whinston
show that despite the fact that the suppliers are acting non-cooperatively, the form
of representation will result that maximizes the joint surplus of the suppliers and
the distributor achievable under the circumstances: as each supplier must eectively
compensate the distributor to attract it to an exclusive deal, suppliers internalize the
distributor's cost from the loss in product variety.
27Another, slightly less sophisticated formalization is that of Comanor and Frech (1985). The
contribution of Mathewson and Winter (1987) was a response to their article.
28Mathewson and Winter (1987) only considered linear wholesale taris.
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Having established his principle, Bernheim and Whinston show that the chosen
form of representation critically depends on the existence of contracting ineÆciencies
resulting from the non-cooperative provision of incentives by the two suppliers under
common agency. By way of denition, contracting ineÆciencies are present when
the outcome under common agency is less than the outcome that would arise if the
suppliers were to cooperate in their contract oerings. When there are no contracting
ineÆciencies, common agency will necessarily be the optimal distribution form: after
all, selling both products is jointly more protable than only selling one (whenever
products are dierentiated). In such circumstances, the joint surplus can be obtained
by delegating the actions to the agent and making him the residual claimant. This
entails an optimal wholesale price equal to marginal cost and a franchise fee set to
drive the agent's net prots to zero. In essence, the business is eectively 'sold out'
to the agent29.
It is only when there are certain contracting ineÆciencies that exclusive dealing
may arise in equilibrium. One such contracting ineÆciency underlies, in fact, the result
of Mathewson and Winter (1987). In their setting, each supplier is restricted in its
choice of contract, in the sense that it can inuence the distributor only by means of a
linear wholesale price. This implies that the suppliers cannot use the type of 'sell out'
contract described above: for a supplier to make some prot, it is necessary to keep
a positive wholesale price margin. Because a positive wholesale margin distorts the
pricing incentives of the common agent, the agent will not maximize industry prots
and will not perceive the full opportunity costs of exclusive dealing (in equilibrium, the
agent's perceived opportunity cost of exclusive dealing is less than the corresponding
value to the suppliers)30. Other circumstances in which contracting ineÆciencies can
arise is when incentive provision is costly because of informational asymmetries that
lead to adverse selection or moral hazard problems31. Finally, Bernheim andWhinston
29Note that in the corresponding formal game there is a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria;
the equilibria only dier in the division of prots between the two suppliers.
30The restriction on the feasible set of contracts in Mathewson and Winter (1987) has another,
noticeable eect: even though the two suppliers are competing for the right to be selected, the
distributor ends up worse o than in the case of unrestricted dealing: inducing a distributor to sign
an exclusivity arrangement does not necessarily imply full compensation of this distributor. In this
sense, Mathewson and Winter only provide for a partial formalisation of Bork's setting. Another
dierence is that they assume that the distributor is one of the many local monopolies that are
being served by the 'dominant' supplier and that, as a result, the relative bargaining power of the
distributor is negligible. This implies that the distributor is not able to 'force' the two suppliers to
deal with him.
31See also Martimort (1996).
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identify another possible source of contracting ineÆciencies: when suppliers must serve
more than one market to achieve scale economies, exclusion may result because the
signing of an exclusive contract in one market has knock-on eects that are not fully
being taken into account by the distributor.
In the above settings, exclusive dealing will not occur unless there are some con-
tracting ineÆciencies arising from two suppliers simultaneously bidding for representa-
tion. It does appear, however, that a dierent perspective arises when one supplier, for
instance an incumbent supplier, has a rst-mover advantage. For instance, Aghion
and Bolton (1987) consider a monopoly supplier who faces potential entry into its
market. Whether or not entry will occur is uncertain: the eÆciency level of the en-
trant is not known to the incumbent supplier (or distributor) ex ante. Aghion and
Bolton show that a long-term exclusivity contract between the incumbent supplier
and the distributor that stipulates a penalty clause in the case of prior termination,
is a protable entry-deterrent. The optimal penalty clause has the eect of deterring
entry, but not always: when the entrant's cost is very low, it will enter and reimburse
the distributor for the penalty it has to pay to the incumbent supplier to break the
contract. As a result, the contract has the eect of extracting (part of) the surplus
of the future entrant. This expected benet of the penalty clause allows the supplier
to compensate the dealer in the form of a lower wholesale price for the goods to be
traded. Note that, in this setting, it is not in the interest of the supplier to completely
foreclose the market and always deter entry: the higher the penalty, the lower the risk
of entry, but also the lower the expected payment to be received (at some point).
There is, hence, a trade-o.
Comanor and Rey (1998) provide for another reason as to why a distributor may
want to accept exclusive contracts in a dynamic framework. If, for example in the
above described context, the incumbent supplier has the possibility of setting up a
distribution network of its own (albeit, perhaps, at higher cost), the decision to switch
to the entrant supplier may trigger competition between two vertical structures (the
distributor and the entrant supplier vs. the incumbent supplier and its network)32.
This competition has the eect of dissipating the prots in the industry. To the extent
32It is assumed that the incumbent supplier can distribute its product through a 'new' network,
whereas the entrant supplier cannot. One interpretation is that the entrant supplier's product lacks
market recognition and can only be succesfully sold through an established, inuential distributor.
The 'switch' to the entrant supplier may also be understood as the distributor also selling the entrant's
product (in addition to the incumbent's product). The context of Comanor and Rey (1998) is focused
on an incumbent distributor facing a low cost competitor, but the situation is comparable.
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that the combined prot of the distributor and the incumbent supplier suers, it is in
their mutual interest to enter into an exclusive contract.
2.3.2 Foreclosing market access to rival distributors
It is also possible that distributors seek to conclude exclusivity contracts with a sup-
plier in order to exclude rival distributors from the market. For example, when a
supplier is the sole supplier in a product market, a contract that grants a distributor
an exclusive sales territory has the eect of removing rival distributors as competi-
tors. Similarly, it has been suggested by the literature that a distributor may raise
its rivals' costs by signing up an exclusive contract with an upstream supplier when
there is substantial market power at the upstream level33: by linking up with one sup-
plier, the remaining suppliers end up having more market power and this translates
into higher wholesale prices for the rival distributors. In this version, the theory of
raising rivals' costs is one of creating double marginalisation. However, in the double
marginalisation also lies its weakness: the result disappears as soon as the rival sup-
pliers and distributors can use two-part taris to eliminate the double marginalisation
problem.
As to the rationality of these arrangements, similar remarks can be made as in
the context of exclusive dealing arrangements. For instance, if the distributors are
dierentiated (and consumers appreciate this), why would the supplier agree to deal
with only one of them? The arguments of Aghion and Bolton (1987) and Comanor
and Rey (1998) would appear to apply, mutatis mutandis, also to these situations: in-
cumbent market players may want to avoid entry by new companies and a rst-mover
advantage may make it worthwhile to enter into exclusive contracts. By contrast, the
arguments brought forward by Bernheim and Whinston (1998), which are based in
essence on the observation that it is benecial to avoid price competition by using a
common agent, are less relevant in this context.
2.3.3 Foreclosure as a commitment device
Also when there is no need to raise rival's costs through scale economies, it is possible
that a supplier may want to explicitly exclude some distributors from its market
operations and deal with only one of them. This is a case of 'upstream foreclosure', in
33Cf. Ordover, Salop and Saloner (1990) or Krattenmaker and Salop (1986).
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the sense that the left-out distributors no longer have access to the suppliers' products.
According to Chicago economists such as Bork (1978), if a monopolist supplier were
to use exclusive contracts in such a situation, this supplier would do it for eÆciency
reasons, not for the purpose of raising prices. After all, a monopoly rent can only
be earned once: it is not possible to increase this rent through exclusive contracts.
These arguments have been studied in detail by Rey and Tirole (1996), drawing on
earlier arguments of Hart and Tirole (1990). Their main argument is that one should
not take for granted that a supplier with market power is able to exploit this market
power when it lacks the means to commit to do so34.
Consider the case of a monopolist supplier M with just two distributors, D1 and
D2. The distributors rst order their quantities before they resell them on the market,
which is characterised by Bertrand price competition. Clearly, the prot maximizing
price and output for the vertical structure are given by the monopoly price Pm and
quantity Qm, respectively. Let us suppose that, for simplicity, distributors incur no
costs other than the wholesale price to be paid to the supplier. The standard argument
would then be that the supplier can set the wholesale price at the monopoly price
Pm, so as to capture the entire monopoly prot: both distributors would agree to
procure half of the monopoly quantity in order to sell it on the market. However,
this argument does not work if there is scope for the supplier to oer dierent prices
to dierent retailers and the wholesale contracts are secret (or secretly renegotiable).
Intuitively, a commitment problem arises because, when dealing with one distributor,
the supplier has incentives to free ride on the sales of the other distributor, as he
does not internalize the latter's mark-up on those sales35. The distributor who is
oered a wholesale price equal to the monopoly price anticipates this incentive and
will not accept the oer36. This means that the supplier will not be able to charge
34O'Brien and Shaer (1992) have studied the commitment problem using a less standard approach.
35To see this more formally, denote by P (Q) the market clearing price at quantity Q. Suppose




m units from the supplier. Then D1 will be prepared to




m)  q1, for any amount of q1, as this is the prot it expects to make when




m. In that case, the supplier's prot maximization problem with respect




m) q1 over q1. But this is exactly the way in which a
quantity setting company would react to a given quantity set by its competitor. As the former does
not take into account the prots of the latter, it will typically choose a quantity (a price) that is




price lower than Pm).
36The assumption of 'passive beliefs' is important here, i.e. the assumption that distributors do not
revise their beliefs when they observe out-of-equilibrium oers from the supplier. If the distributors
had 'symmetric beliefs' (believing that the supplier oers identical contracts to all distributors), the
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the monopoly price to its distributors and not realize the monopoly prot37.
The above problem arises because the upstream supplier cannot commit to charge
the same wholesale price to its distributors. A solution is then for the supplier to
eectively 'tie his hands' by signing an exclusive distribution contract with one dis-
tributor. Industry-wide resale price maintenance, if this were enforceable, would be
another option. Both vertical restraints would have the eect of taking away the in-
centive for the supplier to 'cheat' on the distributors and of restoring its market power.
Obviously, the greater the market power to be restored, the greater the incentives to
use vertical restraints as a commitment device.
2.4 The anti-competitive motives (II): softening
competition
In the preceeding section we investigated the possibilities of rms to use vertical
restraints with the objective to foreclose the upstream or downstream markets. The
number of cases in which complete foreclosure is possible as a result of, for example,
entry barriers may be limited. However, also in the absence of foreclosure possibilities,
vertical restraints can be used to reduce competition in a strategic way. Two variants
can be distinguished. First, vertical restraints may be used to 'soften' the competition
between suppliers (section 2.4.1). Second, they may be used to enact and enforce
outright cartels, at the supplier level or at the distribution level (section 2.4.2).
2.4.1 Softening competition
Because vertical restraints directly aect the nature of downstream intrabrand com-
petition between distributors, they also aect the competitive behaviour of the sup-
plier whose product is sold by the distributors. This, in turn, may alter the nature
of upstream interbrand competition. In this sense, vertical restraints may be used
strategically by a supplier as a means to commit itself to act in a certain way vis-a-vis
its rivals.
commitment problem would disappear. As a variation, White (1999) considers the case in which
distributors derive information on the (supposedly unknown) cost level of the rival distributor from
the specic contract being oered.
37In fact, the supplier is only able to obtain the Cournot prot. It will end up maximising P (q1+q2)
q1 over q1 and P (q1 + q2) q2 over q2. The result is the same as that of a Cournot situation.
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Rey and Stiglitz (1988, 1995) consider the case of two suppliers of dierentiated
products using exclusive territories (reducing competition among distributors carry-
ing the same brand) as a device to reduce competition between themselves. When
there is unrestricted competition on the distribution level for a particular product, the
nal price at which distributors sell closely follows the cost level faced by them and,
in particular, the wholesale price set by the supplier. With exclusive territories, a
distributor, as a consequence of being given some monopoly power, has more freedom
in its price setting behaviour. When the supplier reduces its wholesale price, this dis-
tributor will pass on only part of the reduction to the customers. Furthermore, when
distributors of the rival product also have some power over price and can observe the
reduction of the wholesale price, these distributors will react by lowering their selling
price. Both eects lower the increase in demand that can be expected by a supplier
when it reduces its wholesale price, thus discouraging such a reduction in the rst
place. The rival vertical structure will anticipate this and behave less competitively
in selling its product. As a result, the nal selling prices and prots will end up higher
than would be the case if the products were distributed through unrestricted distri-
bution systems or, indeed, directly by the suppliers themselves. Hence, the suppliers,
if they can use franchise fees to capture their vertical structure's prots, will nd it
in their (individual and joint) interest to employ exclusive distribution38. Moreover,
the attractiveness of such a strategy increases with the degree of market power that
the suppliers and the distributors have on their respective levels of operation.
Also exclusive dealing arrangements can be used to 'soften' competition between
upstream suppliers. An argument traditionally brought forward in this context is that
exclusive dealing arrangements have an eect on consumer search costs. When all sup-
pliers use exclusive dealers and dealers are spatially dierentiated, consumer search
costs are higher than they would be if distributors carried the products of several
suppliers instead of only one. This tends to discourage consumers from comparison
shopping, limiting the extent of interbrand competition and raising industry prots.
Alternatively, exclusive dealing arrangements may enhance the degree to which the
38The fact that the contract between a supplier and its distributor is observable to the other
supplier is important, but not vital. Also when contracts are unobservable, exclusive distribution
arrangements can still have an eect on the market outcome. For this to be the case, it must be
that each supplier-distributor combination can somehow anticipate that the other combination uses
a wholesale price that exceeds marginal cost. This will, for example, be the case when, for legal
reasons or risk sharing considerations, the suppliers cannot use xed fees to obtain prots. Similar
observations can be made in the context of slotting allowances paid to retailers (Shaer, 1991).
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suppliers' products are dierentiated, by combining the inherent product dierenti-
ation with the dierentiation that exists at the level of the distributors. Besanko
and Perry (1994) consider a model in which there are two suppliers of dierentiated
products and retailers are spatially dierentiated. Assuming free but costly entry
into retailing, they show that exclusive dealing allows the suppliers to achieve higher
wholesale price margins due to, rst, the absence of in-store interbrand competition
and, second, the cost savings stemming from the reduction in the number of retail-
ers of each brand that can be supported in the market. It must be said, however,
that this result is somewhat biased by the underlying assumption that suppliers can
only use linear wholesale taris. After all, this restriction leads to exactly the type
of contracting ineÆciency discussed by Bernheim and Whinston (1998). When sup-
pliers can use general wholesale price schedules, exclusive dealing is likely to result
less often, precisely because common representation is by itself a means to coordinate
downstream competition.
In a related article, Besanko and Perry (1993) do recognize the fact that exclusive
dealing may intensify competition rather than soften it. Indeed, the focus of their ar-
ticle is the eÆciency reason for exclusive dealing identied by Marvel (1982), namely
that it eliminates an upstream externality problem that may exist when suppliers
provide services or make investments for distributors that they have in common39.
The elimination of the upstream externality may lead suppliers to increase their in-
vestments in their distributors, thus intensifying competition in this dimension. By
contrast, the upstream externality reduces each supplier's incentive to invest in its
distributors, thus 'softening' competition. This strategic eect on the competitive
equilibrium may reduce the attractiveness of exclusive dealing altogether. As a result,
suppliers may wish to maintain the externality by opting for common representation40.
The role of price restraints in softening competition has also received recent atten-
tion in the literature. Rey and Verge (1998) study how resale price maintenance con-
tracts that are purely vertical (i.e. not involving any explicit horizontal co-ordination)
may limit both intrabrand and interbrand competition. In essence, they consider a
model with two suppliers who use two common distributors (intrinsic double com-
mon agency). The existence of competition at the upstream and downstream level
implies that the retail price will always be below the monopoly price and that the
39As discussed in section 2.2.3.
40Besanko and Perry's (1993) more specic results are again depending on the peculiar assumption
that only linear wholesale prices can be used.
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monopoly industry prot cannot be realised. Resale price maintenance may, however,
be an instrument to obtain monopoly prots. Since the suppliers can catch the whole
mark-up through a franchise fee, their own marginal wholesale prices have no direct
eect on that prot but do inuence the pricing behaviour of the competitor. Under
natural conditions on the elasticities, any equilibrium (imposed) retail price is a de-
creasing function of the equilibrium marginal wholesale price41. It follows that there
exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria, one for each choice of wholesale prices.
In particular, there exists an equilibrium leading to the monopoly retail price42. The
extent to which the results continue to hold when double-common agency is not an
equilibrium conguration, is not entirely clear, however.
2.4.2 Facilitating cartel enforcement
Beyond 'softening' competition in the sense described in the above section, vertical
restraints may also serve to facilitate outright cartel agreements. Typically, verti-
cal restraints eliminate (or, at least, reduce), downstream competition: resale price
maintenance, for example, has the eect of eliminating all price competition between
distributors. As a result, competing distributors may be tempted to exert pressure on
their supplier(s) to impose such vertical restraints. In this way, distributors may use
vertical restraints to maintain and enforce a cartel while circumventing antitrust laws
prohibiting price xing behaviour. For such practices to occur, it does appear that
the distributors must be in a particularly strong position vis-a-vis the supplier(s); it is
unlikely that suppliers will generally be enthusiastic about unnecessarily high margins
on the distribution level.
The use of vertical restraints, notably resale price maintenance, has also been
linked to the desire of suppliers to maintain collusion, at the upstream level. Typically,
individual rms have incentives to cheat on any collusive agreement so that rms
must be able to monitor one another in order to collude successfully. Resale price
41A marginal wholesale price increase by both suppliers decreases the retail margins for both
products. Since a supplier can capture the prot made by a distributor on his rival's product by
means of an appropriate franchise fee, this reduces the amount of money that the supplier can raise
in this way. As a result, the supplier will have a stronger incentive to lower the (imposed) retail price
on its own product.
42The multiplicity of possible equilibria is due to the fact that suppliers have more control variables
than needed. A solution to avoid this multiplicity is to introduce an eort variable which is chosen by
the distributors and which aects nal demand. Rey and Verge (1998) show that the resulting unique
equilibrium candidate leads to monopoly prices and prots. Further extensions involve situations in
which distributors have bargaining power.
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maintenance may be instrumental in this respect. Absent resale price maintenance, it
may be diÆcult to tell if the retail price has dropped because one supplier has cheated
on the collusive agreement or because one of the distributors has chosen to lower its
nal price on its own initiative, for example in response to local market conditions.
Under resale price maintenance, nal selling prices are centrally set by the respective
suppliers, in which case it is simpler for these rms to monitor whether the terms of
the cartel agreement are being adhered to.
A formalization has recently been provided by Jullien and Rey (2000)43. Their
paper emphasises that, while resale price maintenance can make it easier to detect
deviations from a cartel agreement, the reasons that make it hard to enforce the
cartel agreement in the rst place, e.g. uncertainty about demand or cost conditions,
also tend to reduce the protability of resale price maintenance. After all, if resale
price maintenance is imposed on distributors, these distributors cannot use localized
information, which leads to an imperfect realisation of monopoly prots44. In this
sense, there is a trade-o between the enforceability and the protability of the cartel
agreement45.
It has also been argued that resale price maintenance might be used to reduce the
suppliers' incentives to make secret wholesale price cuts (cf. Telser, 1960). After all,
when the distributors are unable to openly reduce the price at which they can sell the
product to nal consumers, the only way in which a lower wholesale price can induce
additional sales is by indirect means (e.g. occasional secret price cuts, extra service
provision, promotional activity). It must be noted that this argument is only valid
when the monitoring of the collusive arrangement is watertight; if not, the supplier
and the distributor could simply team up in making secret price cuts (wholesale and
retail).
43In order to study how vertical restraints can be used to maintain collusion, Jullien and Rey (2000)
build on Green and Porter (1984) and Abreu-Pearce-Stachetti (1986): the suppliers use punishment
strategies in order to maintain collusion. In response to information transmitted through observed
market outcomes, the punishment can be triggered or not. In the absence of resale price maintenance,
retail prices react to the distributor's private information, which makes it hard to detect a deviation
from collusive behaviour (a collusion game with noisy observations).
44The imperfect realisation of monopoly prots, in turn, increases the incentive to deviate.
45In addition to an eect on the detection possibilities, Jullien and Rey (2000) show that resale
price maintenance also has an eect on the punishment possibilities.
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2.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we have elaborated upon two possible motives underlying the use of
vertical agreements, the eÆciency motives and the anticompetitive motives. The fact
that vertical agreements are agreements concluded between companies in a vertical
relationship - that is, between companies which both full an indispensable function
in putting the product on the market - suggests that they can often be regarded
as positive: in a vertical relationship it so works out that one party will be damaged
when the other party does not function properly. And 'properly' means, in by far most
cases: from the point of view of the consumers, because in the end, they are supposed
to buy the product. Through this special interdependent relationship, every party in
a vertical agreement can, in principle, be considered a natural ally of the consumer.
However, vertical agreements can have negative consequences from the welfare
point of view. When they lead to the foreclosure of markets or when they 'soften'
competition, it is appropriate to act against them. The number of cases in which
this will be the case is however limited: it transpires that vertical restraints are un-
likely to have detrimental eects when there is no market power on either level of the
industry. This conclusion works in two ways. First, when there is suÆcient inter-
brand competition, consumers are likely to benet from the agreement in question,
as the competition which is present in the market will cause part of the possible eÆ-
ciency gains to be passed on to them. As a bottom line, it is highly improbable that
consumers will suer in this case, since there are plenty of alternatives (competing
products) available to them. Secondly, the analysis also shows that the strategic ef-
fects, e.g. the use of vertical agreements to soften competition, are less strong when
competition in the product market is ercer. Finally, market foreclosure is diÆcult to
achieve when there are many players at both levels of the industry.
As for possible distinctions between the types of vertical restraints, it emerges
clearly from the literature that the type of the restraint does not itself determine
whether it will increase or decrease economic eÆciency. As indicated by the many
examples given in the above sections, a particular contract provision may have either
benecial or detrimental eects, depending on the context. This observation has led
some commentators to the conclusion that the per se prohibition of resale price main-
tenance that is present in many law systems in the world is, in fact, inappropriate46.
46Cf. Seabright (1998, 1999) or Van Damme (1997). Ippolito and Overstreet (1996) come to the
same conclusion on the basis of an impact assessment of an FTC decision that eectively put an end
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I would agree to that. Still, in my perception, there is something to say for a policy
which is 'tougher' on price restraints than on non-price restraints.
The most important element in this respect is that resale price maintenance ap-
pears to provide better scope for monitoring cartel agreements than the use of ex-
clusive territories or other non-price restraints. Resale price maintenance eliminates
price variability whereas an exclusive distributor will respond to local demand and
cost variations. Furthermore, from a practical point of view, it may be more feasible
and cheaper to support a cartel agreement using resale price maintenance than on
the basis of a rigorous and costly rearrangement of the whole distribution system47.
It is diÆcult to see, for instance, music companies maintaining a cartel in compact
discs on the basis of exclusive distribution systems in order to obtain the required
price transparency. Finally, in terms of 'potential damage control', one could say
that where resale price maintenance has a direct eect on preventing intrabrand price
competition, exclusive territories work indirectly and need not mean that competition
is totally ruled out, as consumers may be able to travel to other sales areas in order
to purchase the product.
All in all, while an a priori distinction between price restrictions and non-price
restrictions is theoretically not defendable and, hence, it would make more sense to
'leave all options open', resale price maintenance does seem to bear a number of risks
which, in my perception, seem more diÆcult to check than those associated with
non-price restraints. In this sense, an a priori distinction may be the type of 'policy
guidance' (cf. section 2.1) that is required to make an antitrust policy eective in
ghting collusion. As indicated, this does not mean that one should stick to a policy
prohibiting resale price maintenance. In particular, one should consider lifting the
ban for small market participants. Still, a policy which is generally more cautious
with price restraints than with non-price restraints may be appropriate.
A nal issue is the question to what extent full vertical integration (through owner-
ship) should be looked upon dierently from partial integration in the form of vertical
to the policy of price oors used by Corning Glass Works, a U.S. manufacturer of kitchenware. They
conclude that in the case of Corning, an eÆciency reason (the outlets hypothesis) seems a more likely
explanation of its past policy of resale price maintenance than any of the anti-competitive motives.
47This argument is not totally adequate as the 'rigourous and costly rearrangement' may be exactly
the sort of credible commitment required to sustain collusion. What is meant here are situations in
which the rearrangement of the distribution system is not an option (cf. products that are typically
sold in many outlets in a given city or area). It is diÆcult to see, for instance, music companies
supporting a cartel in CDs based on exclusive distributors in order to obtain the required price
transparency.
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restraints. Here again, while there are many commonalities in both their intent and
eect, there is one noticeable dierence that merits close attention, the commitment
eect. For example, the 'softening of competition' eect identied by Rey and Stiglitz
(1988, 1995) that arises when suppliers (with market power) delegate their pricing
decisions to distributors (with market power) depends on the supply level and the
distribution level not being integrated. Similarly, suppliers may want to give their
distributors more pricing exibility in order to make them respond more aggressively
against potential competitors48. In both examples, the vertical restraints lead to out-
comes that are worse for welfare than what would be the case with full integration.
In this sense, vertical restraints should not be thought of, in social welfare terms, as
an intermediate between no linkage and full integration. A policy which looks with
greater scrutiny to vertical restraints than to full vertical mergers need, therefore, not
be inappropriate.
48Recall that distributors, in making their pricing decisions, do not take into account the possible
eects on the prots of the upstream supplier: this is the double marginalisation problem. This may
make them more aggressive when being faced by potential entry (Rey and Stiglitz, 1988, 1995).
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2.6 Glossary of terms
Vertical restraints observed in practice include:
 exclusive distribution agreements: the supplier appoints a distributor for a
specic territory (or, more generally, for a customer group). The supplier
is typically restricted from supplying other distributors and from selling di-
rectly to customers in that area, while the distributor is generally restricted
from selling into other areas49.
 exclusive purchasing contracts/ requirements contracts: the distributor
undertakes to obtain all his requirements of a specied product from the
supplier.
 exclusive dealing contracts / non-compete contracts: the distributor un-
dertakes not to sell products that compete with those of the supplier.
 selective distribution: the supplier operates a restricted system of distri-
bution on the basis of 'approved' distributors who agree not to supply
unauthorised dealers outside the network.
 quantity forcing: the distributor is required to sell at least a specied
quantity of the products concerned.
 franchise agreements: the supplier (the franchisor) licenses the distribu-
tor (the franchisee) to sell goods under the supplier's trade mark, usually
within a standardised and detailed commercial framework. A franchise
agreement often involves the transfer of a substantial amount of know-
how.
 resale price maintenance: the supplier xes the price at which the distrib-
utor is to sell the product to the consumers.
 tie-in sales: the supplier conditions the sale to the distributor also buying
other products from him.
49Under EU competition law, some further distinctions are made, involving, in particular, the
concepts of 'active sales' into other areas and 'passive sales' into other areas; see Chapter 3.
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Vertical agreements and Article
81(1) EC: on the role of economic
analysis
3.1 Introduction
In the European Union a lively debate has taken place in recent years concerning
the approach that should be adopted in competition policy towards vertical agree-
ments (i.e. agreements concluded between rms operating at dierent levels of the
production or distribution chain). Among others, this debate has centered around the
question what role economic analysis should play in the application of Article 81 of the
EC Treaty and, in particular, in the application of the rst paragraph of the article,
Article 81(1), which establishes the principle that agreements which are restrictive of
competition (and which aect trade between member states) are prohibited1.
Whereas the role of economic analysis in the application of Article 81 has by no
means been a constant one throughout the years, in recent years it can be said to
evolve very rapidly. On a policy level, the main driver behind this development has
been the publication of the Green Paper (a consultation document) of the European
Commission concerning vertical agreements in 1997, in which the subject of economic
1The former Article 85 was renamed to Article 81 on 1 May 1999, following the Treaty of Ams-
terdam. The exact wording of the Article can be found in Appendix A to this chapter.
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analysis - in the sense of an analysis to ascertain whether certain business conduct
leads to a reduction or increase in (consumer) welfare - took a prominent place2 3.
In the late 1990s, there were various reasons for the Commission to start such a pol-
icy discussion, but an important one was certainly the wish to nd out whether the
Commission's policy was eÆcient in making a distinction between the competition
enhancing eects of vertical agreements and the eects restricting competition - pre-
eminently a matter of economic analysis. For a greater part this question had been
suggested by a rather general criticism on the Commission's policy, namely that it
would be too formalistic and not suÆciently based on economic analysis. Many ob-
servers, from industry, national competition authorities and academic circles, pointed
out that the Commission often laid too much emphasis on the legal form of contracts,
on clauses, and too little on the economic impact of agreements, which an eective
competition policy should be about, eventually.
Since the Green Paper, a number of steps have been taken to reform EU compe-
tition policy towards vertical restraints. On the substantive side, these steps can be
seen as increasing the role for economic analysis in the application of Article 81. Be-
fore addressing the possible new role of economic analysis, it is worthwhile, however,
to pay attention to the role that economic analysis has played up to now in European
competition policy, for only in this way is the recent discussion understandable. And
not only for this reason: it is striking to see how many points of reference particularly
the jurisprudence of the European Courts4 has oered for a greater role for economic
analysis, notably under Article 81(1).
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the main developments
in the interpretation of the concept 'restriction of competition' in Article 81(1) in
2Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, 22 January 1997, COM(96) 721
nal.
3Welfare can be conceived as the (weighted) sum of consumer surplus (a monetary measure of
the utility derived from consumption) and producer surplus (such as prots). The weights put to
consumer surplus and producer surplus imply a certain value judgment. Most attention is tradition-
ally paid to consumer welfare. For example, the Commission itself states in its Green Paper: 'To
further the interest of the consumer is at the heart of competition policy. Eective competition is the
best guarantee for consumers to be able to buy good quality products at the lowest possible prices.
Whenever in this Green Paper the introduction or protection of eective competition is mentioned,
the protection of the consumer's interest by ensuring low prices is implied' (at paragraph 54).
4The European Court of Justice and, since 1988, also the Court of First Instance.
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relation to vertical restraints. The focus will be on the developments in the case law
of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of First Instance, as they
are the most important sources of guidance. For the purpose of this analysis, it is
rst of all necessary to address the institutional background of the enforcement of
Article 81, as it appears that this background has had a marked inuence on the way
in which the provisions of the article have been interpreted. Indeed, it is sometimes
said that in few elds of law the manner in which the law provisions are interpreted
is so much related to the question of who interprets them5. Secondly, it is necessary
to have some understanding of the role which is attributed to competition in the EC
Treaty in general. It emerges from more than 30 years of jurisprudence that the words
'restriction of competition' have been interpreted in the light of the overall objectives
of the EC Treaty (in particular, the creation of a single European market), rather
than in the light of competition as such. The divergence has been most apparent
in the treatment of vertical restraints oering territorial protection to distributors,
restraints which have - from a pure economic point of view - all too often been treated
as incompatible with Article 81(1).
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section, Section 3.2, will describe
the institutional background of the enforcement of Article 81 EC, whereas Section 3.3
will look into the general role attributed to competition in the EU. Section 3.4 will
provide a detailed presentation of the case law of the Courts and relates this to the
approach taken by the Commission. A description and evaluation of the respective
policy steps since the appearance of the Green Paper will conclude this chapter.
3.2 An institutional background
The main provision in EC competition law dealing with vertical agreements is Article
81 of the EC Treaty (former Article 85). The article consists of three paragraphs6.
The rst, Article 81(1), establishes the general principle: prohibited are 'all agree-
ments between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices which may aect trade between Member States and which have as their
5Cf. Heinemann (2000).
6The exact wording of Article 81 can be found in Appendix A to this chapter.
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object or eect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market'. The second paragraph provides for a sanction: according to Article
81(2), any agreement or decision prohibited pursuant to Article 81 shall be automat-
ically void, i.e. unenforceable in the courts. The third paragraph, 81(3), establishes
an exemption possibility to the general prohibition principle: it states that Art. 81(1)
may be declared inapplicable when the agreement (or decision or concerted prac-
tice) satises the criteria mentioned in paragraph 3, such as the requirement that it
contributes to economic progress7.
Central to the application of Article 81 EC is the notion of what constitutes a
'prevention, restriction or distortion of competition' under Article 81(1). Whereas
Article 81(1) states a few broad examples of what might constitute such restrictions8
(xing prices or other terms of trade; limiting or controlling production or technical
development; sharing markets or sources of supply; discriminatory practices placing
rms at a competitive disadvantage; tying arrangements), these have left ample op-
portunity for dierent interpretations in the application of this article in individual
cases, notably in the context of vertical agreements.
More than anything else perhaps, it turns out that the particular allocation of
powers in the application of Article 81/85 has had a profound impact on the way
in which vertical agreements have been assessed under the article in the past thirty
years9. This allocation of competences was not set out in the Treaty itself, but in a
subsequent Regulation adopted by the Council of Ministers, Regulation 17 of 1962
(often briey referred to as 'Regulation 17'). This Regulation established that both
the European Commission and national courts have the competence to apply Article
85(1), but that only the European Commission is empowered to grant exemptions
7In order to be exemptable, Article 81(3) mentions four criteria which must all be satised. Two
of these criteria are positivily stated: the agreement must (i) contribute to improving the production
or distribution process or to technical or economic progress and (ii) allow consumers a fair share
of the benet. The remaining two are negatively stated: the agreement should (iii) not involve
restrictions that are not indispensable to the goal to be achieved and (iv) not allow the companies
to eliminate the competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
8See appendix. Whereas, at rst sight, there would appear to be a certain dierence between the
terms 'prevention', 'restriction' and 'distortion' of competition, in practice little distinction has been
made (cf. Ritter, 1993, p.74).
9For the purpose of clarity the old name 'Article 85' will be used when Article 81 is discussed in
its historical context.
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under Article 85(3)10 - a division of competences which is still in force today11. At
the origin of concentrating the competence to apply Article 85(3) in the hands of the
European Commission was the idea that it was necessary for a uniform, Community-
wide working of the competition rules in a period in which few member states had
experience with competition law enforcement.
In addition to the above attribution of competences to apply Art. 85, Regulation
17 also set out the specic rules governing the procedures to be followed. One proce-
dural aspect in particular created a substantial practical dierence in the treatment
of agreements which were legal because they did not infringe Article 85(1) in the rst
place and agreements found to be legal because they were exemptable under Article
85(3). Regulation 17 established an oÆcial notication system for agreements for
which rms sought exemption: without such notication it was impossible to obtain
exemption and the agreement, if found to infringe Article 85(1), would be automati-
cally void12. Therefore, unlike agreements which did not infringe Article 85(1) in the
rst place, agreements caught by Article 85(1), but exemptable under Article 85(3),
had to pass through the EC procedural system in order to be of any legal use for the
companies involved.
Not long after the system was put in place (and the Commission was facing the
prospect of having to deal with more than 30.000 notications), the Commission took
steps to streamline the procedure. Whereas Regulation 17 empowered the Commis-
10The EC Treaty is more than a treaty establishing mutual obligations between signatory nations
(cf. Ritter e.a., 1993). In contrast to most treaties, the EC Treaty establishes a body of law that
has become part of the national law of each member state and is directly enforceable by the national
courts. The so-called directly applicable provisions of the Treaty create rights and obligations hori-
zontally, among individuals, or vertically, between individuals and governments. A condition for the
direct application of Community law is that the relevant provisions are 'self-executing'; they must
be suited, according to their legal nature, system and wording to have direct application in the legal
relationships of the Community and its subjects. In the case of Article 81, it was Regulation 17 that
has made the prohibition contained in Article 85(1) directly applicable by setting out the procedures
to be followed and the assignment of competences. National courts may apply Article 85(3) only to
determine that the conditions for the grant of an exemption are clearly not fullled (Case C-234/89
Delimitis S. v Henninger Brau, judgment of 28 February 1991, (1991) ECR 935). In case of doubt,
both in the application of Articles 85(1) and 85(3), they are advised or, in many cases, bound to
stay proceedings and to request a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice (a ruling
on questions of law concerning the interpretation of the EC Treaty) or to await the opinion of the
European Commission.
11Regulation 17 has not been subject to major changes, with one possible exception (a procedural
change with respect to exemptions in 1999). A far reaching reform is, however, being proposed (cf.
Section 3.5).
12For agreements not infringing Art. 85(1) an oÆcial decision to this end (a 'negative clearance')
could be sought but this was not necessary.
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sion to grant exemptions in individual cases, a later Council Regulation, Regulation
19 of 1965, allowed the Commission to adopt regulations (the 'block exemption' reg-
ulations) which dene certain categories of agreements which generally full the con-
ditions of exemption under Article 85(3). Such agreements would be automatically
exempted. The block exemption regulations in the eld of distribution which were
adopted pursuant to Regulation 19/65 related to exclusive distribution, exclusive pur-
chasing, franchising and motor vehicle distribution agreements. Just as Regulation
17 provided that the European Commission could grant exemptions accompanied by
conditions and obligations on the companies party to the agreement, the block ex-
emption regulations contained provisions which stipulated what could and what could
not be exempted.
The legal monopoly to apply Article 85(3), the notication system and the block
exemption system gave the Commission considerable scope to adopt a regulatory
approach towards Article 85. It is fair to say that the Commission has eectively
taken a regulatory approach, in two respects. First, it has fairly consistently chosen
for a broad interpretation of the concept 'restriction of competition' under Article
85(1). In essence, the Commission has tended to equate a 'restriction of competition'
with a restriction on the economic freedom of the companies concluding the agreement
or third parties13. As vertical agreements usually amount to some sort of restriction
(e.g. a promise to grant exclusivity), many of them were prone to be caught by
Article 85(1). By taking this approach, the Commission ensured that most vertical
agreements ended up in the regulatory framework of the exemption system. Marenco
(1999) explains this interpretation of 'restriction of competition' by noting that in
judging whether or not an agreement between companies will reduce welfare ('restrict
the quality or quantity of supply'), one rst needs to establish whether the agreement
has the tendency to do so. According to him, the 'restriction of economic freedom'
lends itself pre-eminently to identify the existence of such a tendency14. Goyder
(1993) points out in this respect that the words 'restriction of competition' have been
interpreted in a way to assert EU jurisdiction over the use of vertical agreements in the
common market, rather than to give an assessment of whether individual agreements
can be justied. While the European Court of Justice has generally endorsed the
13Cf. Deacon (1995) or Hawk (1995).
14Marenco (1999) further relates the interpretation of 'restriction of competition' and its emphasis
on the freedom of economic action to the legal tradition, i.c. the early interpretation of the concept
'restraint of trade' in the anglo-saxon common law systems. See also Appendix B to this chapter.
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Commission's application of Article 85(1), it has in some cases placed limits upon it,
as will be discussed in detail in Section 3.3.
Perhaps the clearest illustration of the Commission's approach can be given in the
context of the early cases involving exclusive distribution agreements. Rather than
looking into actual anti-competitive eects or issues of market power, the Commission
would typically nd that the appointment of an exclusive distributor for a sales area
constituted a 'restriction of competition' on the basis that the supplier thereby de-
prived himself of the ability to appoint other distributors in the area (for the duration
of the contract) and that other distributors were prevented from sourcing the products
in question directly from the supplier15. At the same time, the Commission normally
granted exclusive agreements an exemption under Article 85(3) as it held the opinion
that they are 'often the most eective way and sometimes indeed the only way for
the manufacturer to enter the market and compete with other manufacturers already
present'16. But if a distribution system involving exclusive distribution is the most
eective way or the only way for a manufacturer to enter the market and to compete
with other manufacturers already present, how can it be that the same distribution
system amounts to a 'restriction of competition' under Article 85(1) in the rst place?
The second respect in which the Commission adopted a regulatory approach was
that the block exemption regulations were drafted in a rather detailed way, with pro-
visions describing which clauses should not be in an agreement for it to be exempted
(the 'black clauses') and which clauses could be in (the 'white clauses'). These reg-
ulations oered little exibility and were considered to have a straight-jacket eect,
in particular in view of the fact that agreements governing comparable economic re-
lationships as those covered by the block exemptions but which did not precisely
match the terms of the regulations did typically not benet from the block exemp-
tions17. Barendrecht and Van Peursem (1997) mention the example of an exclusive
15Cf. Commision Decisions Grundig/Consten (OÆcial Journal 1964, 2545), DRU/Blondel (OJ
1964, 2194), Hummel/Isbecque (OJ 1965, 2581), Jallatte/Voss (OJ 1966, 37) or, in the context
of exclusive license agreements, Nungesser (OJ 1978, 1286). Similar remarks can be made with
regards to manufacturers using dierent wholesale prices, depending on the nal destination of the
merchandise (Distillers, OÆcial Journal 1978, L50/16).
16Regulation 1983/83 on the application of Article 85(3) to categories of exclusive distribution
agreements, recital 7 (OÆcial Journal 1983 L 173/1). By contrast, as will be explained below,
agreements preventing parallel imports into the sales area (i.e. imports not going through the
'oÆcial' channels) have never been exempted.
17This could even be the case when the clauses which caused the agreement to fall outside the
relevant block exemption regulation did not infringe Article 85(1) in the rst place (Goyder, 1996).
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distribution agreement not enjoying the benet of the corresponding block exemption
regulation (and therefore being considered void under Article 85(2)) merely because
the agreement contained a clause giving the manufacturer the right to buy back all
remaining stocks after termination of the agreement18. More importantly perhaps, the
fact that there existed block exemption regulations for certain types of distribution
agreements (e.g. franchise systems19) but not for others (e.g. selective distribution
systems20) meant that companies tended to frame their distribution systems into those
specically approved by one of the block exemption regulations.
Against the background of these institutional arrangements for the enforcement
of Article 85 as a whole, the role of economic analysis in the application of Article
85(1) - in the sense of Chapter 2: analysing the eects enhancing competition and
those restricting competition - has been fairly limited. Rather, the main accent of
economic analysis within competition policy lied in the application of Article 85(3),
the exemption procedure. This does not mean, however, that the broad interpretation
of the concept 'restriction of competition' under Article 85(1) was, in some way, an
arbitrary choice made without reference to any competition theory. The Commission's
thinking refers, of course, to the classic notion of competition as a process of rivalry
among economic agents who act independently21. It also refers, however, to a specic
school of thought which has been particularly inuential in the development of post-
war competition policy in Europe, the Freiburg School22. This school of thought will
be briey discussed in the next section.
18Barendrecht and Van Peursem (1997) discuss this example in their comment on the judgment
of the Court of Rotterdam in the case Novem/Johnson, 11 March 1994, rolnr. 5748/92.
19In a franchise agreement, the supplier (the franchisor) licenses the distributor (the franchisee) to
sell goods under the supplier's trade mark, usually within a standardised and detailed commercial
framework. A franchise agreement often involves the transfer of a substantial amount of know-how.
20Selective distribution systems are distribution systems on the basis of 'approved' distributors
who agree not to supply unauthorised dealers outside the network.
21Cf. Van den Bergh (1997). The classic notion of competition relates to the behaviour of in-
dividual sellers aiming to sell their merchandise by oering better conditions than their rivals (or
buyers oering better prices than rival buyers). Competition was viewed as a force which would
lead individually acting persons to take actions in line with the common interest (cf. Adam Smith's
(1776) 'invisible hand').
22See Deacon (1995), Van Gerven e.a. (1997) or Fasquelle (1993).
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3.3 On the role of competition
Conceptually, one can look at the role of competition in free market economies in two
dierent ways. One may regard competition as being an (almost) absolute condition
for economic prosperity and competition as being a means to achieve it (Fasquelle,
1993)23.
In the rst conception, competition is viewed as the essential carrier of economic
progress and, indeed, a prerequisite for economic progress. Accordingly, the legal sys-
tem should aim at repressing all market arrangements and forms of market behaviour
which lead to a reduction of competition. In such a case, competition policy is all
about determining the criteria that allow for the identication of market arrangements
and behaviour which are in restraint of competition.
In the second conception, competition is equally looked upon as the ordinary way
to achieve economic progress, but it is not an absolute priority. As such, competition is
a means to foster economic progress, but possibly one among many. By consequence,
a more general value judgement is appropriate for market arrangements and market
behaviour.
The notion of a social market economy (soziale Marktwirtschaft) elaborated by
German scholars closely related to the University of Freiburg probably provides one
of the clearest examples of the second way of perceiving competition, i.e. as a means
rather than a condition. Leading representatives of the so-called Freiburg School24,
such as Eucken, Bohm and Muller-Armack, emphasized that the specic way in which
an economic process develops is dependent upon the kind of economic system that
prevails (the property right system, the monetary system, the organisation of markets,
...)25. In the view of the Freiburg School, the free market economy and the competitive
process should be understood as elements of an economic constitution, the object
of which is to achieve sustained economic performance and stability. According to
23This section draws upon Fasquelle (1993), Souty (1996) and Hildebrand (1998).
24The Freiburg School is also known as the 'ordoliberal' school of thought.
25Many leading German political gures were associated with the Freiburg School. Ludwig Er-
hard, a student of Walter Eucken, was one of the architects of German post-war economic policy,
notably in his function of Minister of Economic Aairs and, later, Chancellor. During his term, he
was one of the driving forces behind the 1957 Act against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen
Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, GWB). Similarly, Walter Hallstein (one of the founders of the Euro-
pean Communities and the rst president of the European Commission) and Hans von der Groeben
(one of the drafters of the 'Spaak Report' and the rst Commissioner for competition policy of the
European Commission) are often associated with the Freiburg School.
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Eucken: 'This principle of the economic constitution does not only require that certain
measures of economic policy are avoided, such as public subsidies, the creation of
state monopolies, the control of prices or import prohibitions. Neither is it by itself
suÆcient to prohibit cartels. The principle is not in the rst place a negative one.
What is necessary is an economic policy that aims at the development of competition
in all domains and that hence contributes to the fundamental principle of an economic
constitution'26. The Freiburg School agrees with earlier conceptions of liberalism in
considering a competitive economic system to be essential for a prosperous, free and
equitable society. Nevertheless, it added new legal and social dimensions to the liberal
tradition. As such, the Freiburg School clearly viewed competition as an important
element but placed it in a wider perspective.
As for the European context, it is clear that the notion of 'competition as an
instrument' is the one reected in the EC Treaty (Hawk, 1989; Fasquelle, 1993). Arti-
cles 2 and 3 EC set out the principles of the Treaty. Under Article 2, the Community
has as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively approximating
the economic policies of member states, to promote throughout the Community a
harmonious development of economic activities, a continued and balanced extension,
an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer
relations between the member states. One of the means of obtaining these goals, set
forth in Article 3(g) of the Treaty, is 'the institution of a system ensuring that compe-
tition in the common market is not distorted'27. Other instruments mentioned in the
Article include the co-ordination of the economic policies of the member states, the
establishment of a common external trade policy and a common agricultural policy.
In the European context, therefore, it appears that fostering competition is not
an end in itself, but a means to achieve the broader objectives of the EC Treaty.
Several opinions can be found in the literature as to what the main objectives and
instruments exactly are. However, when it comes to comparing competition and
market integration (in the sense of the free movement of goods, services, capital and
persons), the latter clearly stands out as the most important instrument. Deacon
(1995) and Paulis and Peeperkorn (1998) in this respect even speak about a 'quasi
droit acquis' or 'inalienable right' of consumers or their agents to purchase wherever
26W. Eucken 'Grundsatze der Wirtschaftspolitik' Bern-Tubingen, 1952. Reproduced in Souty
(1996).
27Article 3(g) was renamed to Article 3(1)(g) on 1 May 1999, following the Treaty of Amsterdam.
In the original EC Treaty it was Article 3(f).
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they want. This, of course, refers to a particular interpretation of the concept of
market integration, but the principle is clear28.
As to competition policy itself, the Freiburg School had a fairly tough attitude in
the sense that the model of perfect competition (diusion of market power) was re-
garded as the appropriate substantive standard for competition law (Van den Bergh,
1997). According to their representatives, history had demonstrated that competition
tended to collapse because enterprises preferred private (i.e. contractual) regulation
of business activities rather than competition and because enterprises were frequently
able to acquire such high levels of economic power that they could eliminate com-
petition (Hildebrand, 1998). Competition law was viewed as a means of preventing
this degeneration of the competitive process. In line with its reservations to private
(contractual) regulation of business activities as opposed to (perfect) competition, the
Freiburg School has tended to equate restrictions of economic freedom with 'restric-
tions of competition'. This strict interpretation of the concept 'restriction of competi-
tion' is also the one that has been adopted in European competition policy (Deacon,
1995; Hawk, 1995), though more in the approach of the European Commission than
in that of the European Courts - as will show from the next sections29.
3.4 The European Courts on Article 85(1)
As indicated, Article 81(1) EC - formerly Article 85(1) - prohibits all agreements and
concerted practices 'which may aect trade between Member States and which have as
their object or eect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market'. In this section a number of leading cases will be discussed in order to
obtain an understanding of what the European Courts have considered to amount to a
'restriction of competition'. Unfortunately, as Goyder (1993) points out, it is diÆcult
to refer to a 'rule' in the interpretation of the term 'restriction of competition' in the
context of Article 85(1). Rather, '[w]hat is important for a clear understanding of
these words is knowledge of the way in which the Commission and, more importantly,
the European Court and the Court of First Instance have interpreted them in a variety
28The next section, Section 3.4, will further explore the relation between the two instruments
(competition and market integration) in EC policy, in the context of a number of specic competition
cases.
29It is worth noting that the strict interpretation of the concept 'restriction of competition' has
been only partially retained in the German Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB), as is
illustrated by the distinct treatment of vertical and horizontal agreements under this law.
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of dierent contexts'30. It emerges from the review of cases that a number of phases
and approaches can be identied, starting from the early cases of the 1960s to the
introduction of the notion of 'appreciability', the introduction of the European 'rule of
reason' and the development of the so-called cumulative eect doctrine. In the below
sections, the various approaches will be presented and compared to one another, as
well as to the economic test of balancing the positive and negative consequences of
vertical restraints on competition.
3.4.1 The early cases of the 1960s
A rst case relevant to the interpretation of the expression 'restriction of competi-
tion' in Article 85(1) is Societe Technique Miniere (STM) v. Maschinenbau Ulm of
196631. This was a case in which the Court of Justice was asked by a French court to
give a preliminary ruling (a ruling on questions of law concerning the interpretation
of the EC Treaty) on a case between the above mentioned parties32. The case con-
cerned an exclusive supply contract, by which STM enjoyed the exclusive rights to sell
certain equipment produced by Maschinenbau Ulm in France. The contract did not
insulate the French territory, STM could sell the goods outside France and parallel
imports could be obtained from other countries. In its ruling, the Court started o
by indicating the general principle that
'In order to be prohibited as being incompatible with the com-
mon market under Article 85(1) of the Treaty, an agreement
between undertakings must full certain conditions depending
less on the legal nature of the agreement than on its eects
on 'trade between member states' and its eects on 'competi-
tion'. Thus as Article 85(1) is based on an assessment of the
eects of an agreement from two angles of economic evaluation,
30Goyder (1993).
31Case 56/65 Societe Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm, judgment of 30 June 1966, (1966)
ECR 235.
32As the name indicates, a preliminary ruling of the European Court is not a nal ruling on the
case itself (in casu the dispute between STM and Maschinenbau Ulm). Rather, it is a ruling on
questions of law asked by the national court concerning the interpretation of the EC Treaty. After
the preliminary ruling of the European Court, it is up to the national court to decide on the outcome
of the case itself, in the light of the clarications given by the European Court. In the literature on
European competition law, much attention is paid to the preliminary rulings, but the nal rulings
tend to be ignored. This is a pity, since the nal rulings are part of EC law just the same.
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it cannot be interpreted as introducing any kind of advance
judgment with regard to a category of agreements determined
by their legal nature'.
In this ruling, it became clear that the reference made in Article 85(1) to the
words 'object' and 'eect' is of particular importance. First, the Court specied that
for an agreement to be caught by the prohibition contained in Article 85(1) it must
have either as its object or as its eect a restriction of competition. Consequently,
these are alternative and not cumulative requirements. The Court also appeared to
make a distinction as to the factual elements which are necessary to establish that an
agreement has the object or eect of restricting competition.
'The fact that these are not cumulative but alternative require-
ments, indicated by the conjunction 'or', leads rst to the need
to consider the precise purpose of the agreement, in the eco-
nomic context in which it is to be applied. This interference
with competition referred to in Article 85(1) must result from
all or some of the clauses of the agreement itself. Where, how-
ever, an analysis of the said clauses does not reveal the eect
on competition to be suÆciently deleterious, the consequences
of the agreement should then be considered (...)'.
The Court has claried in later rulings that this means that if the purpose (the
object) to restrain competition is evident, then the agreement itself, or at least any
anti-competitive clause in the agreement, constitutes a restriction of competition 'by
its very nature'33. In such a case, there is no need to take further account of the
concrete eects of an agreement for the purposes of applying Article 85(1). The
analysis of the eect, on the other hand, is designed to establish whether an agreement
whose purpose is not anti-competitive, is nevertheless liable to aect competition in
the specic market context. The Court further specied that:
'The competition in question must be understood within the
actual context in which it would occur in the absence of the
33Joined cases 56/64 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v. Commission of 13 July 1966, (1966)
ECR 299. Case 19/77 Miller International Schallplatten GmbH v Commission of 1 February 1978,
(1978) ECR 131. Case C-306/96 Javico International and Javico AG v Yves Saint Laurent Parfums
SA (1998) ECR I-1983. It follows from these cases that the concepts of restriction by object and
restriction by nature are synonymous (Woods and Filipponi, 1999).
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agreement in dispute. In particular it may be doubted whether
there is an interference with competition if the said agreement
seems really necessary for the penetration of a new area by an
undertaking. Therefore, in order to decide whether an agree-
ment containing a clause 'granting an exclusive right of sale'
is to be considered as prohibited by reason of its object or of
its eect, it is appropriate to take into account in particular
the nature and quantity, limited or otherwise, of the products
covered by the agreement, the position and importance of the
grantor and the concessionnaire on the market for the products
concerned, the isolated nature of the disputed agreement or,
alternatively, its position in a series of agreements, the sever-
ity of the clauses intended to protect the exclusive dealership
or, alternatively, the opportunities allowed for other commer-
cial competitors in the same products by way of parallel re-
exportation and importation'.
In principle, therefore, the Court stated that some sort of economic analysis should
play a role in establishing whether an agreement has as its object or its eect a restric-
tion of competition. It must be said however that, in practise, the Court contented
itself with much more limited analyses than what might be expected from the above
quotation, especially in the assessment of restrictions by object (Fasquelle, 1993)34.
This appears clearly in another landmark case of 1966, Consten and Grundig35.
In Consten and Grundig, the Court had to a rule on an appeal against a Com-
mission decision concerning a distribution agreement between Grundig, the German
manufacturer of radio and television sets, and Consten, a French wholesaler. Grundig
had appointed Consten as its exclusive distributor in France. In turn, Consten agreed
not to sell goods which competed with the Grundig range of products and also agreed
that it would not make deliveries into other sales territories, after having received
an assurance from Grundig that similar restrictions had been placed on Grundig dis-
34As indicated before, a preliminary ruling of the European Court is not a nal ruling on the case
itself. I am not aware of the nal ruling of the French court in the case STM v. Maschinenbau Ulm
or of any literature discussing the nal outcome.
35Joined cases 56/64 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v. Commission, judgment of 13 July 1966,
(1966) ECR 299.
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tributors in other countries. Following a complaint made by a French distributor36,
the Commission issued a decision in which it declared that the agreement violated
Article 85(1) on the basis that the arrangements were intended to protect Consten
from competition by other distributors of Grundig products. As a matter of fact,
the Commission had completely focused its examination on the distribution system
of Grundig products, i.e. on intrabrand competition. The Commission was of the
opinion that as customers may nd it diÆcult to compare prices for branded products
such as Grundig, intrabrand competition is important for preserving the possibility
for customers to obtain low cost supplies of Grundig products.
Consten and Grundig appealed against the Commission's decision at the European
Court. During the proceedings, the German government intervened in support of the
arguments made by Grundig and Consten. While acknowledging that the agreement
restricted competition between the distributors of Grundig products, the applicants
and the German government maintained that the main source of competition was to
be found at the level of the producers of dierent brands. Specically, they were of
the opinion that 'since the Commission restricted its examination solely to Grundig
products the Decision was based upon a false concept of competition and of the
rules on prohibition contained in Article 85(1), since this concept applies particularly
to competition between similar products of dierent makes; the Commission, before
declaring Article 85(1) to be applicable, should, by basing itself upon the 'rule of rea-
son', have considered the economic eects of the disputed contract upon competition
between the dierent makes'.
The 'rule of reason', to which the applicants and the German government referred,
is a concept that takes a central position in American antitrust law. In American
antitrust, the rule of reason entails an assessment of the net eect of the agreement on
competition, implying a comparison between the pro-competitive and anti-competitive
eects in the light of the prevailing market circumstances, without reference to any
other elements having no bearing with competition (Van Gerven e.a., 1997). As such,
the American rule of reason is about 'balancing' the positive and negative eects on
competition. In this balancing, interbrand competition - competition at the level of
36The French distributor, UNEF (a predecessor of the well-known French retail chain FNAC), was
denied rst-tier access to Grundig products, as a result of the exclusive relationship between Consten
and Grundig.
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the producers - has tended to dominate the analysis37.
In addition, Grundig and Consten (again supported by the German government)
held the view that there is a 'presumption that vertical sole distributorship agree-
ments are not harmful to competition and in the present case there is nothing to
invalidate that presumption. On the contrary, the contract in question has increased
the competition between similar products of dierent makes'. The applicants in this
respect referred to the 'free rider' argument38 and the need to protect investments as
a justication for the use of exclusive territories.
Advocate-General Roemer, who delivered his opinion on the case, was also very
critical of the approach taken by Commission: 'Doubtless it is undeniable that in
a given market situation competition between several sellers of a single product can
also take on great importance, that it may be indispensable for the normal play of
competition on the market. But the Commission is wrong in taking account of this
last-mentioned internal competition exclusively and in neglecting completely in its
considerations competition with similar products. In fact, it is perfectly possible
that there exists between dierent products or rather between dierent producers
such sharp competition that there remains no appreciable margin for what is called
internal competition in a product (for example in relation to price and servicing). The
Commission considers that it does not have to take into consideration this competition
between dierent manufacturers except for simple mass product articles. That does
not seem to be correct, if it is desired to judge economic phenomena realistically. It
must rst be said that the Commission came to its conclusion on the export prohibition
after considering only its abstract aim, without examining its concrete repercussions
on the market. In so doing, in my opinion, it did not apply Article 85(1) correctly'.
37See Appendix B to this chapter for a fuller presentation of the American rule of reason. Two
remarks can be made at this point. First, the rule of reason is often put as the opposite of a per
se rule. In the US context, this is not entirely accurate (Fasquelle, 1993; Hawk, 1995). Rather, the
per se approach is nothing but an aspect of the rule of reason in its proper sense (i.e. balancing
the eects on competition), special to certain types of agreements which are regarded to be usually
detrimental to competition. Second, as regards the balancing of the eects on competition: it is
only since the Sylvania decision of 1977 that economic eÆciency became the (main) standard of
competition law (in line with the ideas of the Chicago School). Before that, the stricter Harvard
views prevailed.
38Cf. Chapter 2. When several retailers sell the same product, every retailer will benet from it
when other retailers make eorts to advertise the product or promote it by giving pre-sale advice.
In such cases the incentives for retailers to make these kinds of eort may be too low (from the
viewpoint of the vertical structure as a whole) as competitors which do not make these expenses can
accordingly compete with sharp prices, while at the same time beneting from the eorts made by
other retailers.
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The Court of Justice, however, endorsed the Commission's approach. First of
all, it recalled what it had already indicated in earlier decisions (such as the above
mentioned STM v. Maschinenbau Ulm), namely that Article 85(1) refers both to
agreements between parties at the same level in the economy (horizontal agreements)
and agreements between parties at dierent levels (vertical agreements). In particular,
it said:
'The principle of freedom of competition concerns the various
stages and manifestations of competition. Although competi-
tion between producers is generally more noticeable than that
between distributors of products of the same make, it does not
thereby follow that an agreement tending to restrict the lat-
ter kind of competition should escape the prohibition of Article
85(1) merely because it might increase the former'.
So, the Court was very aware that vertical agreements could work out very well
for competition, in this case for competition between brands. Nevertheless it ruled
that the concept of 'competition', which is not dened in further detail in Article
85, should be understood as relating to competition at the distribution level as well.
As a matter of fact, the emphasis of the judgment was laid on exactly this type of
competition; the very purpose of the distribution agreement between Grundig and
Consten, preventing competition by other importers, led the Court to prohibit the
agreement under Article 85(1). The Court did not hide one of its prime motivations
for taking this tough line:
'[A]n agreement between producer and distributor which might
tend to restore the national divisions in trade between Mem-
ber States might be such as to frustrate the most fundamental
[objectives] of the Community. The Treaty, whose preamble
and content aim at abolishing the barriers between states, and
which in several provisions gives evidence of a stern attitude
with regard to their reappearance, could not allow undertak-
ings to reconstruct such barriers. Article 85(1) is designed to
pursue this aim (...)'.
Because the Court thus made use of the freedom of interpretation oered by Article
85, distribution agreements tending to restore the compartmentalization of markets
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along national lines came, in principle, to fall under Article 85(1) and that was also
what the Court was after. The priority of Community policy was on lowering trade
barriers, both those erected by member states and those erected by private parties,
and the private barriers were especially found at the level of resale. Still, even from
the viewpoint of market integration, there is much to say for the arguments brought
forward by the parties, in particular the free-rider argument. After all, if entering a
new (national) market requires substantial investments from the side of a local dis-
tributor, it may be necessary to grant this distributor protection against intrabrand
competition (e.g. from parallel importers)39. Woods and Filipponi (1999) note, how-
ever, that one should not forget that in the 1960s progress towards the establishment
of the single European market was nowhere near as advanced as it is today. For exam-
ple, the landmark decisions of the Court of Justice on the free movement of goods in
the Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon cases only occurred in the mid to late 1970s40. In
a sense, the Court still had to build a 'culture' of European integration, an objective
perhaps best pursued by recognizable policies such as the one chosen in Consten and
Grundig.
As for the necessary analysis to be performed, the Court conrmed its position
that for the purpose of applying Article 85(1), there is no need to take account of the
concrete eects of an agreement once it appears that it has as its object a restriction
of competition (in the sense of EC competition law).
'Therefore the absence in the contested decision of any analysis
of the eects of the agreement on competition between similar
products of dierent makes does not, of itself, constitute a de-
fect in the decision. It thus remains to consider whether the
39Cf. Sections 2.2.2 (on controlling externalities between distributors) and 2.2.5 (on transaction
costs).
40Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoit and Gustave Dassonville, judgment of 11 July 1974, (1974)
ECR 837; case 120/78 Rewe Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein ('Cassis de
Dijon'), judgment of 20 February 1979, (1979) ECR 649. In Dassonville, the Court determined that
all trading rules enacted by member states which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly,
actually or potentially, intra-community trade are to be considered as measures having an eect
equivalent to quantitative restrictions in the sense of Article 30 EC (nowadays Article 28) and thereby,
in principle, forbidden. In Cassis de Dijon the Court narrowed down the exception possibility
provided by Article 36 EC (now Article 30), by establishing the principle of mutual recognition of
national product regulations concerning, for instance, food safety. These two judgments constituted
a breakthrough in a context in which national product regulations often acted as barriers to trade
and EU harmonization of such regulations was a very slow process (cf. Kapteyn and VerLoren van
Themaat, 1995).
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contested Decision was right in founding the prohibition of the
disputed agreement under Article 85(1) on the restriction on
competition created by Grundig products alone'.
In the following, the Court did mention the market context and specied on one
occasion that Grundig is 'a very well-known brand'. However, rather than relating this
observation to the eect that the agreement might have on interbrand competition, it
used it as an argument in support of the Commission's choice to restrict its analysis
to intrabrand competition (within the Grundig distribution system), basing itself on
the same arguments as the Commission had used. As the Commission had clearly
established that the distribution system aimed at isolating the French market for
Grundig products, the Court found that it was therefore proper for the contested
decision to hold that the agreement constituted an infringement of Article 85(1). The
Court added:
'No further considerations (...) and no possible favourable ef-
fects of the agreement in other respects, can in any way lead,
in the face of the abovementioned restrictions, to a dierent
solution under Article 85(1)'.
It would appear, therefore, that the Court in this case did not apply the detailed
indications that it had given in STM v. Maschinenbau Ulm (even though these ap-
peared to relate to restrictions by object as well41), but simply categorised absolute
territorial protection as a restriction of competition. This supports the hypothesis
that the standard of proof is dierent for restrictions by object than for restrictions
by eect42. According to Hildebrand (1998), the case Consten and Grundig should
41Recall that in STM v. Maschinenbau Ulm the Court stated: 'Therefore, in order to decide
whether an agreement containing a clause 'granting an exclusive right of sale' is to be considered as
prohibited by reason of its object or of its eect, it is appropriate to take into account in particular
the nature and quantity, limited or otherwise, of the products covered by the agreement, the position
and importance of the grantor and the concessionnaire on the market for the products concerned, the
isolated nature of the disputed agreement or, alternatively, its position in a series of agreements, the
severity of the clauses intended to protect the exclusive dealership or, alternatively, the opportunities
allowed for other commercial competitors in the same products by way of parallel re-exportation and
importation' (emphasis added).
42In this respect, one should also keep in mind that the circumstances of the two cases were
dierent. Whereas the case STM v. Maschinenbau Ulm concerned the attribution of an exclusive
distribution right as such, in Consten and Grundig the distributors had, in addition, committed to
prevent trade between member states in the products concerned (Van Gerven e.a., 1996).
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not be perceived as rejecting economic analysis within Article 85(1), but rather as
indicating that such an analysis cannot serve to validate absolute territorial protec-
tion. This is consistent with the idea that, in the EC Treaty, competition is to be
considered a means rather than an end and that market integration, in the sense of
the free movement of goods, is given priority (see Section 3.3).
In a later decision, Brasserie de Haecht of 1967, the Court re-emphasized that in
judging the eects of vertical agreements one should take into account the legal and
economic context within which these agreements apply43. The Court, being asked
to give a preliminary ruling on the subject of exclusive dealing agreements, specied
that where agreements combine with others, they may have a cumulative eect on
competition.
'In fact, it would be pointless to consider an agreement, Decision
or practice by reason of its eects if those eects were to be
taken distinct from the market in which they are seen to operate
and could only be examined apart from the body of eects,
whether convergent or not, surrounding their implementation.
Thus in order to examine whether it is caught by Article 85(1)
an agreement cannot be examined in isolation from the above
context (...). The existence of similar contracts may be taken
into consideration for this objective to the extent to which the
general body of contracts of this type is capable of restricting
the freedom of trade'
3.4.2 The notion of appreciability
The Court also applied its reference to the surrounding market context to agreements
of minor importance. In the case Volk/Vervaecke of 1969 it established the require-
ment of appreciability44. This case was about an exclusive distribution agreement
between Volk, a small German manufacturer of washing machines, and the Belgian
distributor Vervaecke, by which the latter was granted absolute territorial protection
in Belgium and Luxemburg. After stating that the question whether an agreement has
as its object or eect the restriction of competition and whether it may aect trade
43Case 23/67 Brasserie de Haecht v Wilkin, judgment of 12 December 1967, (1967) ECR 407.
44Case 5/69 Volk/Vervaecke, judgment of 9 July 1969, (1969) ECR 295. As explained below, the
rst traces of this requirement were already present in STM v. Maschinenbau Ulm.
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between member states should be understood by reference to the actual circumstances
of the agreement, the Court concluded that
'an exclusive dealing agreement, even with absolute territorial
protection, may, having regard to the weak position of the per-
sons concerned on the market (...), escape the prohibition laid
down in Article 85(1)'.
The Court itself did not elaborate on the relation between this judgment and
its judgment in Consten and Grundig, where it had held that there is no need to
take account of the concrete eects of an agreement once it appears that it has the
restriction of competition as its object. Both the Commission, who in fact supported
the idea of leaving minor agreements out of the scope of Article 85, and the Advocate-
General referred in their submissions to the fact that the Court had referred in STM
v. Maschinenbau Ulm to the eect on competition being 'suÆciently deleterious' (in
the context of restrictions by object) or 'appreciable' (in the context of restrictions by
eect). According to the Advocate-General, this amounted to saying that the change
in competition must not be merely theoretical, but must be fairly widespread. In
this context, he recalled that the Court had mentioned in Consten and Grundig that
Grundig is a very well-known brand. As indicated, the Court itself did not further
comment on this.
The requirement of appreciability has become known as the de minimis approach45.
At rst sight, one might interpret this approach as the reection of some substantive
economic reasoning, namely that agreements concluded between parties with little
market power cannot be endangering the process of competition. This, however, ap-
pears not to have been the background (Fasquelle, 1993; Ritter e.a., 1993). The
requirement of appreciability was not intended to be a substantive criterion for the
appraisal of vertical agreements, but rather to be a jurisdictional criterion, i.e. to set
45The Commission would soon after, in 1970, issue a Notice concerning Decisions and Practices
of Minor Importance, in which it indicated that, in principle, it would consider agreements between
companies with a market share below 5% (and not too high a turnover) as not appreciably restrict-
ing competition. In the latest revision of this Notice in 1997, the turnover threshold was abandoned
and the market share gure was increased towards 10% for vertical restraints. The Notice indi-
cates, however, that it cannot be ruled out that agreements which are below the thresholds may
still fall under Article 85(1). This is so in the case of 'particularly serious restrictions on competi-
tion' (such as restrictions on parallel imports and resale price maintenance). Nonetheless, plainly
insignicant agreements of this type can escape the prohibition of Article 85(1) as well, in view of
the Volk/Vervaecke judgment.
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the limits for the application of Community law in the context of agreements between
companies. Even though the contested agreement constituted by its character a re-
striction of competition, its market dimension was such that the Court said: this is
not a case for the Community, but for the member states46.
In this perspective, the requirement of appreciability does not enter into the heart
of the concept 'restriction of competition' but is rather an element in the margin. This
is not to say, however, that later commentators (e.g. Hawk, 1995) have not identied
the concept of appreciability as a possible vehicle for the introduction of substantive
economic analysis into Article 85(1). Before elaborating on this, we will rst describe
another major innovation in European competition law, namely the introduction of a
'rule of reason' under Article 85(1).
3.4.3 The European 'rule of reason'
In 1977, the Court issued the judgment Metro I, the rst judgment about the valid-
ity of selective distribution systems (systems on the basis of 'approved' retailers)47.
SABA, a German producer of hi- equipment and television sets, had established a
distribution network in Germany and other European countries which involved the
appointment of specialist dealers only. Department stores and discounters could,
therefore, not obtain appointment. The necessary qualications related to the nature
of the premises, the training of the sta and the acceptance of substantial sales tar-
gets. Furthermore, those selling SABA products undertook not to supply resellers
outside the SABA system.
Clearly there is an issue of restricting the freedom of economic action of the con-
tracting parties within a selective distribution system as appointed dealers are allowed
46Furthermore, in subsequent judgments the appreciability requirement appears not to have been
consistently applied to both the 'trade' component of Article 85 and the 'competition' component.
According to Woods and Filipponi (1999), the appreciability of the restriction appears to be assumed
in the case of restrictions by object, with the analysis of appreciability in such cases concentrating
upon the eect on trade between member states. This thesis nds support in case 19/77 Miller
International Schallplatten GmbH v Commission of 1978 (1978) ECR 131, in which the Court said
that 'by its very nature, a clause prohibiting exports constitutes a restriction on competition' and
in which it discussed appreciability only in the context of trade between member states. Not all
commentators agree with this view, however (Faull and Nikpay, 1999). Ritter (1993) observes that
the risk that the court will nd a restriction to have appreciable eects on trade and competitive
conditions rises in direct proportion to the anti-competitive nature of the restriction.
47Case 26/76 Metro SB Gromarkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission, judgment of 25 October
1977, (1977) ECR 1875.
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to supply goods only to end-users or to other appointed dealers. That is why the Com-
mission had concluded that the distribution system was caught by 85(1)48. Still, as it
also considered that the system led to an improvement in distribution, it had granted
an exemption under Article 85(3). It was against this decision that Metro, a German
cash and carry wholesaler, brought an appeal to the European Court.
In its judgement, the Court started from the consideration that selective distribu-
tion systems constitute, together with others, an aspect of competition which accords
with Article 85(1), provided that resellers are chosen on the basis of objective criteria
of a qualitative nature (relating to the technical qualications of the reseller and his
sta and the suitability of his trading premises) and that such conditions are laid down
uniformly for all potential resellers and are not applied in a discriminatory fashion.
It inferred from this that objective restrictions which are necessary for the system
to be realized and maintained, such as the above mentioned qualitative criteria and
the obligation on resellers not to sell to non-approved resellers, are no restrictions of
competition in the meaning of 85(1). This approach, which implied a departure from
the Commission's rigid interpretation of the concept of 'restriction of competition',
has become known as the European 'rule of reason'49. It refers to the analysis of
restrictive clauses to ascertain whether they are necessary to secure the realisation or
implementation of an agreement which 'accords with Article 85(1)'.
In explaining its choice, the Court referred for the rst time to the notion of
'workable competition':
'The requirement contained in Articles 3 and 85 of the EC
Treaty that competition shall not be distorted implies the exis-
tence on the market of workable competition, that is to say the
degree of competition necessary to ensure the observance of the
basic requirements and the attainment of the objectives of the
Treaty, in particular the creation of a single market achieving
conditions similar to those of a domestic market. In accordance
48To be precise, the Commission held that the obligations on wholesalers and dealers not to supply
dealers not approved by SABA had 'as their object and eect the restriction of competition within
the common market to a perceptible degree'. By contrast, to the extent that admission to the system
was based on general, justiable qualitative criteria and all dealers fullling these criteria were in
fact appointed as SABA dealers, no restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 85(1)
would arise. Commission Decision SABA, OÆcial Journal 1976, L 28, p.19.
49As will be discussed later, the European rule of reason is markedly dierent from the rule of
reason as it is applied in US antitrust. See also Appendix B to this chapter.
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with this requirement the nature and intensiveness of competi-
tion may vary to an extent dictated by the products or services
in question and the economic structure of the relevant market
sectors'.
More specically on selective distribution systems the Court indicated that:
'It is true that in such systems of distribution price competition
is not generally emphasized either as an exclusive or indeed as
a principal factor (...)'.
However,
'For specialist wholesalers and retailers the desire to maintain a
certain price level, which corresponds to the desire to preserve,
in the interests of consumers, the possibility of the continued
existence of this channel of distribution in conjunction with
new methods of distribution (...) forms one of the objectives
which may be pursued without necessarily falling under the
prohibition contained in Article 85(1) (...)'.
The Court claried in a later ruling on the same subject, Metro II, that some
limitation on price competition is to be regarded as inherent in any selective dis-
tribution system, because the prices applied by specialist dealers necessarily remain
within a much narrower margin than would be expected if there were competition
between specialist dealers and non-specialist dealers50. It stated that that limitation
was counterbalanced by competition as regards the quality of the services supplied
to customers, which was not normally possible in the absence of an adequate prot
margin covering the higher costs entailed by such services.
Whereas, in principle, selective distribution systems were not prohibited under
Article 85(1), the Court indicated that there could be circumstances in which Article
85(1) would apply. As it explained in Metro II,
50Case 75/84 Metro SB Gromarkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission of 22 October 1986, (1986)
ECR 3021. This case concerns an appeal by Metro against the Commission decision to extend the
exemption of SABA's selective distribution system (the one which was the subject of the Metro I
decision). Metro was of the opinion that this extension was not justied, in view of the changing
market situation.
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'there may nevertheless be a restriction or elimination of compe-
tition where the existence of a certain number of such systems
does not leave any room for other forms of distribution (...)
or results in a rigidity in price structure which is not counter-
balanced by other aspects of competition between products of
the same brands and by the existence of eective competition
between dierent brands'.
As to the role of economic analysis under Article 85(1), the Metro judgment of
the Court was very important. Not only did it imply a departure from the Commis-
sion's rigid interpretation of the concept of 'restriction of competition', it also carried
a number of pertinent economic reasonings to determine whether or not an agreement
could infringe Article 85(1). For example, the explicit reference to the need for spe-
cialist wholesalers and retailers to maintain a certain price level is a clear reference
to the various 'free rider' arguments justifying vertical restraints. As we have seen
in Chapter 2, when several retailers sell the same product, every retailer will benet
from it when other retailers make eorts to advertise the product or promote it by
giving pre-sale advice. In such cases the incentives for retailers to make these kinds
of eort may be too low (from the eÆciency viewpoint), given that competitors who
do not make these expenses can accordingly compete with sharp prices, while at the
same time beneting from the eorts made by other retailers. Selective distribution
systems, as they limit competition in terms of prices and distribution format, may
have the eect of restoring such incentives.
Similarly, the Court refers to the possibility of too much 'rigidity' in prices which
may result from the co-existence of a number of selective distribution systems. As
described in Chapter 2, the limitation of intrabrand competition by means of exclusive
or selective distribution systems can be used by established producers as a strategic
instrument in order to make competition among them 'softer'. In these forms of
distribution systems, producers are facing a sales volume that reacts less strongly to
rises in their own producer prices as dealers with some market power are inclined to
partially absorb such rises; as a result nal demand will drop by less than otherwise
might have been the case. This may make producers feel more inclined to carry
through price rises, amounting to a 'softening of competition'. The Court, in its
reference to 'price rigidity' in the Metro judgments, does appear to recognise such an
aspect.
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The rule of reason was further developed and extended in various later judgments.
The case Nungesser of 1982 concerned an exclusive licensing agreement between a
French research institute and a German distributor for a new maize seed51. The
Commission had found that the agreement infringed Article 85(1) on the following
grounds. First, the Commission held that by licensing a single undertaking in a given
territory the licensor would deprive himself of the ability to issue licences to other
undertakings in the same territory. Further, by committing not to produce or market
the product himself in the territory covered by the contract the licensor would likewise
eliminate himself as a supplier in that territory. Finally, the fact that third parties
would not be able to import the seed under licence from other Community countries
into Germany (or export from Germany to other Community countries) would lead
to market sharing.
The Court again applied a rule of reason in this case. It considered that exclusive
licences can have an objective compatible with Article 85(1) and that, by consequence,
the restrictions on economic freedom necessary for such licenses to be realized and
maintained are not caught by Article 85(1):
'In fact, in the case of a licence of breeders' rights over hy-
brid maize seeds newly developed in one Member State, an
undertaking established in another Member State which was
not certain that it would not encounter competition from other
licensees for the territory granted to it, or from the owner of
the right himself, might be deterred from accepting the risk of
cultivating and marketing that product; such a result would be
damaging to the dissemination of a new technology and would
prejudice competition in the Community between the new prod-
uct and similar existing products'.
Notwithstanding this reasoning, the Court did stress that exclusive licence agree-
ments could only escape the prohibition of Article 85(1) to the extent that they do not
prevent parallel imports (with reference to the case Consten and Grundig). Therefore,
the European 'rule of reason', while allowing for economic arguments to play a role
in Article 85(1), had its limits.
51Case 258/78 L.C. Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v Commission, judgment of 8 June 1982,
(1982) ECR 2015.
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In the context of vertical agreements, the judgment Pronuptia of 1986 is of further
interest52. This judgment, a preliminary ruling, was the rst judgment about the
validity of franchise networks. A German court had asked the European Court a
few questions of law that arose in the context of proceedings between Pronuptia de
Paris, a French company supplying wedding dresses and related articles, and one of
its franchisees in Germany. Under the contested franchise contract, the franchisor
granted the franchisee the exclusive right to use the Pronuptia trade-mark in respect
of a specic territory, undertook not to open any other Pronuptia shops in the territory
(or to provide goods or services to third parties) and to give the franchisee various
forms of commercial and technical assistance. In turn, the franchisee, who was to
remain sole proprietor of the business and take all the risks, would operate under the
Pronuptia trademark and make the sale of bridal fashions its main purpose; sell the
goods only in the premises specied in the contract; purchase most of its requirements
for wedding dresses from the franchisor and refrain from opening a similar business
or transferring know-how to third parties.
The Court took a fairly favourable view on franchise systems as such and held that
certain provisions necessary to their establishment do not fall under Article 85(1). A
franchise system was considered to be a means for a company, which had established
itself in one market and thus developed certain business methods, to expand into
other markets and to derive nancial benet from its expertise. At the same time,
the system would give traders, who did not have the necessary experience, access
to methods which they could not have learned without considerable eort and would
allow them to benet from the reputation of the franchisor's business name. Therefore,
the Court held that a franchise system does not in itself interfere with competition.
Having established the principle, the Court was of the opinion that in order for a
franchising system to work, two conditions must be met.
'First, the franchisor must be able to communicate his know-
how to the franchisees and provide them with the necessary
assistance in order to enable them to apply his methods, with-
out running the risk that that know-how and assistance might
benet competitors, even indirectly. It follows that provisions
which are essential in order to avoid that risk do not constitute
52Case 161/84 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis, judgment of
28 January 1986, (1986) ECR 353.
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restrictions on competition for the purposes of Article 85(1)'.
This applied to the clause prohibiting the franchisee from opening a shop of a
similar nature (under a dierent name) and from transferring know-how to third
parties.
'Secondly, the franchisor must be able to take the measures
necessary for maintaining the identity and reputation of the
network bearing his business name or symbol. It follows that
provisions which establish the means of control necessary for
that purpose do not constitute restrictions on competition for
the purposes of Article 85(1)'.
This applied to the franchisee's obligation to apply the business methods developed
by the franchisor and to use the know-how provided. Furthermore, as it would be
impractical to lay down objective quality specications for the distribution of fashion
articles, the provision obliging the franchisee to sell only products supplied by the
franchisor (or by suppliers selected by him) could be considered necessary for the
protection of the network's reputation as well53.
On the other hand, the Court emphasized that, far from being necessary for the
protection of know-how or the maintenance of the network's identity and reputation,
certain provisions are caught by Article 85(1) as they restrict competition between
the members of the network, especially those provisions which share markets between
franchisees or which prevent franchisees from engaging in price competition with each
other. The Court particularly referred to the provision which obliges the franchisee
to sell the goods in question only in the premises specied in the contract and to
the exclusivity granted by the franchisor. According to the Court, these provisions
restricted competition within the network as they prohibited the franchisee and the
franchisor from opening other Pronuptia shops. In this respect, it recalled that
'As is clear from the judgment of 13 July 1966 (joined cases
56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission (1966) ECR
299), a restriction of that kind constitutes a limitation of com-
petition for the purposes of Article 85(1) if it concerns a busi-
ness name or symbol which is already well-known. It is of course
53One may note that the particular justication given for the purchasing obligation very much ts
into the incomplete contracts framework (cf. Chapter 2).
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possible that a prospective franchisee would not take the risk
of becoming part of the chain, investing his own money, paying
a relatively high entry fee and undertaking to pay a substantial
annual royalty, unless he could hope, thanks to a degree of pro-
tection against competition on the part of the franchisor and
other franchisees, that his business would be protable. That
consideration, however, is relevant only to an examination of
the agreement in the light of the conditions laid down in Arti-
cle 85(3)'.
Therefore, while the Court applied the rule of reason to a number of apparently
'restrictive' clauses in the franchise agreement, it did not go so far as to allow a clear
territorial restriction of intrabrand competition under Article 85(1). One may note of
course the qualier 'if it concerns a business name or symbol which is already well-
known', but this appears to hint at the requirement of appreciability, rather than an
issue of market power at the interbrand level (Fasquelle, 1993).
More recently, in December 1994, the rule of reason was applied in the context
of a buying cooperative54. This case concerned the statutes of a Danish cooperative
association of distributors of agricultural basic products which said that a member of
the cooperative was not allowed to be a member of another buying cooperative at the
same time. The Commission had thought that this condition restricted competition
(as the statutes prevented the members from freely obtaining supplies elsewhere), but
not in an appreciable way. With it, the clause did not fall under Article 85(1). The
Court, too, held the latter opinion, but for a dierent reason. According to the Court,
in a market where product prices vary according to volume of orders, the activities of
cooperative producing associations may, depending on the size of their membership,
constitute a signicant counterweight to the contractual power of large producers
and make way for more eective competition. Therefore, while acknowledging that
the clauses preventing the members from obtaining supplies elsewhere might have
adverse eects on competition, the Court held that in so far the clauses are necessary
for the proper functioning of the cooperative and for an eective bargaining position
in relation to producers, they did not fall within the prohibition of 85(1). Another
application of the rule of reason.
54Case C-250/92 Gttrup-Klim Grovvareforening and others v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab
AmbA (DLG), judgment of 15 December1994, (1994) ECR I-5671.
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The rule of reason can be seen as another important track in the jurisprudence
of the Court which, at rst sight, could be called well founded in economic respect.
After all, the Court clearly states that the actual or intended eects of an agreement
should be analyzed in the light of the market conditions with a view to establishing
whether the agreement accords with Article 85(1). However, the rule of reason as
applied by the European Court appears still a long way from the rule of reason as it
is applied in the United States, in the sense of a purely competition based analysis
(with a view to establishing whether an agreement or practice promotes or reduces
economic eÆciency55).
First of all, the Court has expressed its continued sensitivity towards agreements
involving absolute territorial protection - also in the realm of the rule of reason -
whereas there is no reason to assume that absolute territorial protection is always bad
for competition or welfare. In Europe, however, the rule of reason has been placed
in the context of 'workable competition', i.e. 'the degree of competition necessary to
ensure the observance of the basic requirements and the attainment of the objectives of
the EC Treaty, in particular the creation of a single market achieving conditions similar
to those of a domestic market'. The Court's sensitivity clearly shows in its judgments
on licensing agreements (Nungesser) and franchising agreements (Pronuptia) but also
on selective distribution systems (Metro). For the latter type of distribution system,
the Court has held that objective restrictions which are necessary for the system
to be realized and maintained, such as qualitative criteria to appoint resellers and
an obligation on resellers not to sell to non-approved resellers, are no restrictions
of competition in the meaning of Article 85(1). By contrast, quantitative criteria
relating to the number of eligible resellers and restrictions on resellers supplying other
appointed resellers are considered restrictive of competition. Woods and Filipponi
(1999) explain this choice by pointing out that arbitrage by network dealers is the
only feasible mechanism to ensure parallel trade in a selective distribution network.
The tighter the control which a supplier has over its distribution network the greater
the potential to block parallel trade between network members56
Secondly, as Faull and Nikpay (1999) point out, the practical usefulness of the
55In the eÆciency test as applied in the US, the emphasis lies on the eects on price and output
levels (allocative eÆciency). Even when companies achieve considerable cost savings (productive
eÆciency), the question remains whether some of these savings are passed on to consumers.
56While a qualitative system could be used for the same purpose, in theory the higher number of
potential network dealers would limit the control exercised over individual network dealers and the
potential for isolation of national markets.
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European rule of reason is limited by the insistence of the Court on analysing the re-
strictive clauses in agreements falling outside Article 85(1) to ascertain whether they
are necessary to secure the realisation or implementation of a lawful agreement57. In
this sense, the European rule of reason is still very much an approach of ancillary
restraints, restraints which are directly related to a lawful agreement and objectively
necessary for its existence, but which remain subordinate in importance to the main
object of the agreement58. Even though such an appraisal may be partly based on eco-
nomic issues as well (such as the free rider problem), it diers from a true competition
analysis weighing pro- and anticompetitive eects. In particular, as Gonzalez-Diaz
(1995) points out, many restrictive clauses of the type discussed in this section are
restraints which are necessary for the full preservation or full transfer of value in
a transaction (the value embodied in the brand image of the supplier, intellectual
property rights, know-how, etc.). The full preservation or transfer of such value of-
ten logically entails certain obligations on the part of distributors. Such restrictions,
though based on economic considerations, do not require a market analysis to qualify
for clearance under Article 85(1)59 60. Finally, as indicated by Goyder (1993), the
European rule of reason would not apply for clauses which are not necessary for the
existence or implementation of agreements even when these are, in the end, not re-
stricting competition. These elements of the European rule of reason appear, however,
less present in the more recent approach taken by the Court in the recent cases on
foreclosure issues. These will be discussed in the following subsection.
57The name 'European rule of reason' is used here for consistency reasons. Faull and Nikpay
(1999) do not use this name.
58Commission Notice concerning the assessment of co-operative joint ventures pursuant to Article
85 of the EEC Treaty, 1993 OÆcial Journal C43/2.
59There are some clauses that are borderline, such as the commitment not to resell to unauthorised
dealers in the case of selective distribution. In principle, such a restriction automatically qualies as
ancillary. However, the restriction falls under Article 85(1) where the existence of a certain number
of selective distribution systems does not leave any room for other forms of distribution or results in
too much rigidity in prices. Such an appraisal clearly requires a market analysis.
60Along the same lines, Gonzalez-Diaz (1995) argues that the distinction between qualitative and
quantitative restrictions in the context of selective distribution systems is perhaps best explained by
the fact that the former do not normally require a market analysis to qualify for clearance under
Article 85(1), whereas the latter do, since it is diÆcult to establish from the outset whether or not
quantitative restrictions are objectively necessary for the realisation or implementation of a selective
distribution system.
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3.4.4 The cumulative eect doctrine
Of particular interest for the role of economic analysis within the framework of Article
85(1) are the judgments of the European Court with regard to the foreclosure problems
in exclusive dealing agreements61. With respect to such agreements there is some
concern that the distributors present in a market should not be tied too much to the
producers (in number or duration), in order to keep it possible for new producers to
nd distributors willing to carry their product. The Court expressed a clear opinion
on the issue of foreclosure in the case Delimitis of 199162. In this case, the Court
was asked to give a preliminary ruling concerning a contract dispute between a pub
tenant, Mr. Delimitis, and the German brewer Henninger Brau. Building on the
judgment Brasserie de Haecht of the 1960s, the Court indicated
'If an examination of all similar contracts entered into on the
relevant market and the other factors relevant to the economic
and legal context in which the contract must be examined shows
that those agreements do not have the cumulative eect of deny-
ing access to that market to new national and foreign com-
petitors, the individual agreements comprising the bundle of
agreements cannot be held to restrict competition within the
meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty. They do not, therefore,
fall under the prohibition laid down in that provision'.
If, on the other hand, such examination would reveal that it is diÆcult to gain
access to the relevant market, then it is necessary to assess the extent to which the
agreements entered into by the brewery in question contribute to the cumulative eect
produced in that respect by the totality of similar contracts found on that market.
'Under the Community rules on competition, responsibility for
such an eect of closing o the market must be attributed to the
61The terms 'exclusive dealing' and 'exclusive purchasing' will be used interchangeably, even though
they are, strictly speaking, not synonymous (see also recital 10 of the Court's judgment in case
Delimitis discussed further below). Under EC competition law, exclusive purchasing refers to an
obligation to purchase the goods that are traded under the contract from the supplier only. In
economics, exclusive dealing refers to an obligation not to distribute goods which are competing
with those of the supplier in question. In practice, the two will often go hand in hand (but not for
selective distribution systems).
62Case C-234/89 Delimitis S. v Henninger Brau, judgment of 28 February 1991, (1991) ECR 935.
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breweries which make an appreciable contribution thereto. Beer
supply agreements entered into by breweries whose contribution
to the cumulative eect is insignicant do not therefore fall
under the prohibition under Article 85(1)'.
In other words, an exclusive dealing contract only falls within 85(1) if the cumu-
lative eect of all similar agreements together results in the situation that access to
a market is limited and the agreements of the producer in question contribute to this
to some degree. In other cases, the agreement is not caught by Article 85(1). What
is noteworthy, is that in this respect no specic reference was made to the exclusivity
clauses being necessary to attain certain goals to be achieved63.
The judgment is also interesting in other respects, such as the emphasis the Court
placed on the need to determine the relevant market and to fully assess whether the
existence of several beer supply agreements impedes access to the market. The Court
did not just refer to elements such as the existing proportion of tied pubs and the
length and nature of the exclusive agreements, but equally to the question whether
there are real concrete possibilities for a new competitor to penetrate into the bundle
of contracts by acquiring a brewery already established on the market (together with
its network of sales outlets) or to circumvent the bundle of contracts by opening new
pubs.
As Delimitis made clear, an exclusive dealing contract can be caught by Article
85(1) if the cumulative eect of all similar agreements together results in the situation
that access to a market is foreclosed and the agreements of the producer in question
contribute to this to some degree. Some uncertainty remained about the question
how the cumulative eect doctrine interacted with the requirement of appreciability.
This is illustrated by the approach taken by Commission in the cases Langnese-Iglo
and Scholler of 1995, on exclusive dealing contracts for ice cream in Germany64. The
Commission had maintained that it is only where the network of similar agreements
concluded by the producer concerned does not by itself have any appreciable eect
that the rules developed by the Court in Delimitis require an examination of the
63Rather, by way of introduction, the clauses were described as an inherent feature of the co-
operation between reseller and supplier, based on their shared interest in promoting sales of the
products.
64Case T-7/93 Langnese Iglo GmbH v Commission, judgment of 8 June 1995, (1995) ECR II-1533.
Case T-9/93 Scholler Lebensmittel GmbH & Co v Commission, judgment of 8 June 1995, (1995)
ECR II-1615.
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cumulative eects of parallel networks65. This particular way of interpreting Delimitis
was, however, not accepted by the Court. On the other hand, also on the issue of
appreciability, the Court specied that if a bundle of contracts of a producer is found
to restrict competition, this implies that all individual contracts with its distributors
are caught by Article 85(1), the small ones as well as the large ones.
3.4.5 Towards a real competition balance ?
In the jurisprudence of the Court we can nd (at least) three important tracks which,
at rst sight, could be called well founded in economic respect: the requirement of
appreciability, the European 'rule of reason' and the approach towards foreclosure.
So, possible starting points for further economic analysis under Article 85(1) can be
considered to be present in the jurisprudence. On the other hand, it is diÆcult to main-
tain that these three approaches are amounting to the rule of reason as it is applied
in the United States, in the sense of a purely competition based analysis, weighing
positive and negative eects on competition. As explained above, the requirement of
appreciability has been intended to separate agreements with a Community interest
from those which had better be left to the member states. The European rule of
reason is still very much an approach of ancillary restraints, restraints necessary for
the implementation of a lawful agreement. Finally, the cumulative eect doctrine is
more about establishing that certain agreements are not restricting competition (e.g.
because they leave suÆcient market access), rather than an approach open to a true
balancing of possible positive and negative eects.
However, it is fair to say that in a growing number of cases, the European Courts
have looked beyond the negative elements of agreements in their analysis under Arti-
cle 85(1) and have sought to determine what the actual or potential economic impact
on the market could be. In this respect, a nal comment deserves to be devoted to
the recent judgment European Night Services, in which the Court appears to have
65Given that both Langnese's and Scholler's market shares surpassed the Commission's benchmark
of appreciability set out in its de minimis Notice, the Commission had held that the agreements were
caught by Article 85(1). Hawk (1995) characterises the Commission's explanation of the Delimitis
judgment in these cases as another example of the Commission being reluctant in taking on board
indications given by the Court. Also Korah (1998) observes that the Commission has considered a
number of agreements to fall within Article 85(1), of which the Court had ruled that such agreements
did not restrict competition.
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further rened the scope of application of Article 85(1)66 67. This case did not con-
cern a vertical agreement as such, but a joint venture agreement between European
rail companies and some related agreements (for the provision of the necessary in-
frastructure and services), which the Commission had exempted under Article 85(3)
under fairly strict conditions. In response, the parties to the agreement brought an
appeal against this decision, claiming among other things that the agreements did not
infringe Article 85(1) in the rst place.
As regards the overall assessment of the agreement, the parties were of the opin-
ion that 'the Court of Justice has consistently held that the pro-competitive eects
of an agreement must be weighed up against its anti-competitive eects', referring
specically to the cases STM v. Maschinenbau Ulm, Consten and Grundig, Metro
I, Nungesser, Pronuptia and Delimitis. They added: 'If the pro-competitive eects
outweigh the anti-competitive eects and the latter are necessary in order to imple-
ment the agreement, then the agreement cannot be regarded as having as its object
or eect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common
market within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty'. The UK government, in
intervention, submitted that in applying Article 85(1) the Commission had failed to
take account of the economic context and, in particular, of the state of competition
that would exist in the absence of the agreements. These would not restrict competi-
tion because they were designed to facilitate, and were necessary for, the introduction
of a service which is not currently operating and which none of the parties could
reasonably be expected to introduce by itself.
The Commission submitted that, while the analysis of an agreement must take
account of its economic context, it did not follow that the rule of reason should be
used. According to the Commission that conclusion was not negated by the Court's
judgment in the Danish buying cooperative case, which only concerned the validity
of ancillary restrictions in the specic context of cooperative organisations and could
not, therefore, be regarded as the expression of a general principle. Consequently, the
Commission held that balancing the competitive benets and harms of an agreement
should take place under Article 85(3) and not under Article 85(1).
In its wording, however, the Court appears to have left open the possibility for such
a 'rule of reason' approach where restrictions by eect are involved (Faull and Nikpay,
66Joined cases T-374/94, T-375/95, T-384/94, T-388/94 European Night Services (ENS) v Com-
mission, judgment of 15 September 1998, (1998) ECR II-3141.
67Cf. Woods and Filipponi (1999) and Faull and Nikpay (1999).
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1999). It did so, by expressly excluding the weighing up of the pro-competitive eects
of an agreement against its anti-competitive eects only where restrictions by object
are involved:
'(...) it must be borne in mind that in assessing an agreement
under Article 85(1) of the Treaty, account should be taken of
the actual conditions in which it functions, in particular the eco-
nomic context in which the undertakings operate, the products
or services covered by the agreement and the actual structure of
the market concerned (...), unless it is an agreement containing
obvious restrictions of competition such as price-xing, market-
sharing or the control of outlets (...). In the latter case, such re-
strictions may be weighed against their claimed pro-competitive
eects only in the context of Article 85(3) of the Treaty, with a
view to granting an exemption from the prohibition in Article
85(1)'
3.5 Towards a new enforcement system
Throughout the years, there have been regular calls for a more economics based anal-
ysis of the concept 'restriction of competition' under Article 85(1), among others from
commentators such as Korah (1981), Waelbroeck (1987) and Hawk (1989, 1995) 68.
They expressed criticism on the Commission's formalistic approach and on the Com-
mission's reluctance to take on board the signals given by the European Court of
Justice in its various judgments. As Hawk (1995) notes, the Court's use of the rule of
reason and the requirement of appreciability could be used as doctrinal vehicles for a
more economics based analysis under Article 85(1).
Opponents to this view, in particular from the side of the Commission, have indi-
cated that the emphasis of economic analysis lies on Article 85(3) rather than Article
85(1). The Commission itself has traditionally held that 'Article 85 provides an appro-
priate legal framework for a balanced assessment, recognising the distinction between
anticompetitive and procompetitive eects. Article 85(1) covers those agreements
which appreciably restrict or distort competition. Article 85(3) allows for the exemp-
68Cf. Van Gerven e.a. (1997).
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tion of such agreements provided that they have suÆcient eÆciency benets'69. In
this respect, the structure of Article 85 is 'such as to prevent greater use of the rule of
reason being made: if more systematic use were made under Article 85(1) of an anal-
ysis of the pro- and anticompetitive aspects of a restrictive agreement, Article 85(3)
would be cast aside, whereas any such change could be made only through revision
of the Treaty'70. Furthermore, as Fasquelle (1993) points out, a further development
of the rule of reason under Article 85(1) would be contradictory to the spirit of Reg-
ulation 17, which gave to the Commission the exclusive power to make an economic
assessment under the criteria of Article 85(3).
In a way, it does not really matter a lot where the economic analysis takes place,
as long as it does take place and in a way not too much burdening the business com-
munity. As described in the introduction to this chapter, precisely this appears to
haven been the main thrust in the criticism on the Commission's policy in the past.
The notication system together with the strict interpretation of Article 85(1) led to a
considerable administrative burden resulting from the fact that too many agreements,
also utterly innocent ones, ended up in the net of the European competition proce-
dures. At the same time, the traditional group exemptions were very closely dened
and, hence, little exible. By this, the formation of distribution systems adapted
to the needs of the companies involved was not particularly encouraged. Strangely
enough, the block exemptions equally applied to agreements concluded by companies
with very strong market positions. In this sense, the Commission's policy was not
very eÆcient in making a distinction between the competition enhancing eects of
vertical agreements and the eects restricting competition.
Whether it has been under the inuence of the criticisms made, the indications
of the Court as regards the necessity of economic analysis under Article 81/85(1) or
otherwise, the Commission has changed opinion on its course of policy in the mean-
time. In 1997, it issued a Green Paper (a consultation document) on EC competition
policy in the domain of vertical restraints71. In this Green Paper, a prominent place
69Commission Notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para 1 (OÆcial Journal C 291, 13 Oc-
tober 2000, p.21; old numbering for Article 81 retained). Similarly, one can read in para 112 of the
Guidelines that a vertical restraint falls under Article 81(1) when it is 'likely to have an appreciable
negative eect on competition'. According to Wils (2000), Article 85(3) is nothing but the codi-
cation of the (American) rule of reason in European competition law. This view is, however, not
uncontested (cf. Wesseling, 1999).
70European Commission: White Paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85
and 86 of the EC treaty, 28 April 1999. See also Marenco (1999).
71Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, 22 January 1997, COM(96) 721
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was given to an overview of the main insights from the economic science as regards
the eects of vertical agreements. Main element: it depends on the circumstances of
the case in question, particularly on the presence or absence of suÆcient interbrand
competition, whether a vertical agreement is harmful or not. In a follow-up, the Com-
mission concluded that it is only when interbrand competition is weak and market
power exists, that it becomes important to control vertical agreements72.
In 1999, the Commission put these conclusions into eect by issuing a new Block
Exemption Regulation (BER)73. In principle, this Regulation applies to all distribu-
tion agreements (including selective distribution) and thereby seeks to avoid a bias
towards any of them74. According to the Commission, the BER is meant to create a
'safe harbour' for vertical agreements concerning the sale of goods and services which
are concluded by companies with less than 30 percent market share, except for a lim-
ited number of so-called 'hard-core' restraints such as restrictions on parallel imports
and resale price maintenance. Additionally, even when the market share threshold is
not exceeded, there is a number of conditions which must be met if the agreements
are to benet from the block exemption. These relate principally to exclusive dealing
contracts (they should be limited to 5 years), post-term non-compete obligations and
to 'too prescriptive' selective distribution agreements75 76.
nal.
72Communication from the Commission on the application of the Community competition rules
to vertical restraints - Follow-up to the Green Paper on vertical restraints. COM(98) 544.
73Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2790/99 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to
categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 336, 29 December 1999, p. 21.
74There are a few exceptions. For the moment, motor vehicle distribution and agency agreements
are not covered by the Regulation. Furthermore, while it is 'one Regulation for all', there are specic
provisions for the specic types of distribution agreements. For example, in selective distribution
agreements obligations to sell or not to sell competitors' products imposed by a supplier on its
distributors are not exempted by the Regulation.
75The B.E. Regulation contains the condition that a supplier may not impose an obligation on
the appointed dealers to sell or not to sell specied brands of competing suppliers. This condition
is meant to avoid horizontal collusion through the creation of a selective club of brands from the
leading suppliers as well as foreclosure of market access.
76In addition to these conditions, the Commission and, in some cases, the national competition
authorities are empowered to withdraw the benet of the block exemption for a particular agree-
ment when the cumulative eect of parallel networks of similar vertical agreements practiced by
competitors leads to foreclosure of the market or a restriction in competition ('withdrawal' of the
block exemption). In addition, if such parallel networks cover more than 50 percent of a relevant
market, the Commission can exclude them from the scope of the block exemption. In this case, the
measure will be addressed not to the individual companies but to all undertakings whose agreements
come within the scope of application of the block exemption ('disapplication' of the block exemption
regulation). See Kmiecik (2000) for a detailed overview.
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Above the threshold of 30% or if the stipulated conditions are not met, vertical
agreements will not be presumed to be illegal but may need individual exemption. For
this purpose, the BER is accompanied by a detailed set of Guidelines which set out
the policy that the Commission will adopt in applying the competition rules in these
circumstances77. These Guidelines are, in general, reecting the types of arguments
described in Chapter 2 and a recognition of the fact that it is only when market power
exists that vertical agreements can have negative eects on competition. By contrast,
if an agreement contains a 'hard-core' restriction, it is almost sure to be considered
illegal (provided that the agreement is not de minimis).
In order not to punish rms which make unintentional mistakes in the assessment
of their market positions, legislative changes have been instituted so that vertical
agreements may be exempted retrospectively from the prohibition in Article 81(1)78.
The Commission hopes that these measures will reduce the number of notications,
since the failure to notify an agreement containing vertical restraints upfront will not
mean that the agreement is unenforceable, if an exemption can be granted79.
Starting from the observation that vertical agreements can only be harmful when
interbrand competition is limited, these proposals are a clear improvement. Although,
of course, the criterion of market share remains a somewhat imperfect indicator for
the existence of suÆcient interbrand competition. This is especially so, given that - as
Nazerali and Cowan (1999) describe it - working out the relevant market is not an exact
science. The Commission has traditionally tended to dene the relevant market rather
narrowly, both in the product dimension and in the geographic dimension (Bishop and
Walker, 1999). For the new system to work it is essential that the Commission adopts
a clear and reliable approach to market denition. Only in this way will companies be
able to apply the block exemption themselves in the rst instance and not be facing
excessive legal uncertainty.
On a more general level, GriÆths (2000) is of the opinion that despite the rhetoric
77Commission Notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OÆcial Journal C 291, 13 October 2000.
78Council Regulation (EC) No 1216/1999 amending Regulation No 17 (OÆcial Journal C 291). In
eect since 18 June 1999.
79Whether this hope is justied remains to be seen. After all, in the event that the Commission
would refuse an exemption or make it conditional upon changes being made to the agreement, this
would oblige the contracting parties to renegotiate their agreement. This may be a very delicate
matter, since the bargaining positions may have changed quite substantially since the moment the
original contract was concluded (cf. the literature on asset specicity and incomplete contracts
discussed in Chapter 2). From this perspective, companies would be advised to notify where there
is any doubt as to the compatibility with competition rules.
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of the Commission in relation to the abandonment of a formalistic approach, the
Regulation is still plagued by an ignorance of economics in that the black list of
prohibited clauses is too long and that there is an over-emphasis on the importance
of market share evaluation. In this respect, he characterises the BER as no more
signicant than an extension of the de minimis Notice with the market share threshold
being raised to 30%. He refers in particular to the fact that the European Courts have
indicated that also agreements of the type excluded from the Regulation need not fall
under Article 81(1) in the rst place.
It does appear that the question whether European competition policy will remain
formalistic depends more on the way the Commission is going to deal with agreements
which do not fall under the BER, rather than on the wording of the Regulation itself.
The Guidelines themselves are not always completely reassuring in this respect. For
example, 'in case the market share of the manufacturer is above 30% (...) foreclosure of
price discounters may make the selective distribution system diÆcult to exempt (...)'80.
In view of the fact that the Commission has a history of treating agreements which are
over and above the de minimis threshold of 10% as almost automatically restricting
competition (cf. the Langnese-Iglo and Scholler cases), GriÆths' scepticism is not
unfounded.
Finally, from a pure competition perspective, the continued strict treatment of
absolute territorial protection remains a downside, even though there are some im-
provements81. Not that absolute territorial protection is necessarily a good thing, but
a per se prohibition is not very appropriate from the eÆciency viewpoint. But then,
as discussed in Section 3.3, the EC rules on competition are to be seen in the overall
context of the Treaty with its historic emphasis on bringing down conventional im-
pediments to trade between member states. This justication does however not exist
for resale price maintenance, which also continues to be treated as per se prohibited
(unless de minimis).
80Commission Notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para 190 (OÆcial Journal C 291, 13
October 2000).
81By way of exception, in the case of the introduction of a product in a new geographic market, a
fairly high degree of territorial protection is allowed for two years: a supplier can oblige its existing
resellers not to sell to unoÆcial resellers in the new geographic market. Absolute territorial protec-
tion is not allowed, however: a supplier cannot prevent its resellers from making passive sales (i.e.
unsollicited sales) to end-users from the new geographic market. Of considerable importance is the
fact that internet sales are normally considered by the Commission to be passive sales.
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3.5.1 The proposal for a new 'Regulation 17'
In the same year as in which it adopted the new Block Exemption Regulation, in
1999, the Commission also embarked upon a dierent, far reaching operation, namely
to reform Regulation 17 (the enforcement system of Article 81) altogether82. In an
attempt to increase the role of national competition authorities and national courts
in enforcing Article 81, the Commission proposes to replace the current centralised
notication and exemption system by one in which not only the Commission but
also the national authorities and courts will be able to apply Article 81 as a whole.
To this end, the Commission submitted on 27 September 2000 a proposal for a new
Regulation to the Council of Ministers83.
The fact that national competition authorities and courts will be able to apply
Article 81 as a whole does not mean that they will be able to grant exemptions. As
a matter of fact, exemptions as we know them will cease to exist, as will notications
for that matter (Wils, 2000). The new competition law system will be a prohibition
system with a directly applicable exception rule whenever the criteria of Article 81(3)
are met. This means that in all proceedings in which the relevant authorities84 are
called upon to apply the prohibition rule of Article 81(1), they are called upon to apply
Article 81(3) as well, if at all necessary. This contrasts with the current authorisation
system which is based on the principle that the prohibition contained in Article 81(1)
can be lifted only by a (preceding) act of a public authority empowered to do so
(under Regulation 17, this is the Commission). In other words, Article 81 is to be
applied as a single legal norm, establishing a principle of prohibition unless certain
conditions are met.
The main reason why the Commission insists on this reform is that it feels that
a single institution - the Commission - cannot on its own ensure that the EC com-
petition rules are complied with. The Commission expects that a decentralisation
of law enforcement leads to a more eective enforcement system and a dissemina-
tion of knowledge of the EC competition rules towards a level closer to the business
82The Commission initiated this policy reform by issuing the so-called White Paper on moderni-
sation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (Commission Programme No.
99/027).
83Proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down
in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, COM(2000) 582 nal.
84Pursuant to the new Regulation, these are the Commission, the national competition authorities
and the national courts. Article 81(1) was already directly applicable by the national courts under
Regulation 17 (cf. Section 3.2).
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community and the consumers. For example, it is hoped that the reform will foster
meaningful litigation activity before the national courts. Furthermore, the abolition
of the current notication and exemption system is supposed to enable the Commis-
sion to free up resources and to start targetting the most serious restrictions such as
price xing cartels or market sharing agreements.
>From a legal perspective, the Commission explains this policy step by observing
that the 'current division between paragraph 1 and paragraph 3 in implementing
Article 81 is articial and runs counter to the integral nature of Article 81, which
requires economic analysis of the overall impact of restrictive practices'85. Eectively,
it emerges clearly from the development of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice
as described in Section 3.4 that the distinction between agreements not restricting
competition in the sense of Article 81(1) and agreements exemptable under Article
81(3) has become increasingly blurred. From a practical perspective, the widening
of the scope of the block exemption system to the majority of vertical agreements
concluded between parties with less than 30% market share has put the distinction
further into the background. After all, it is only when the block exemption regulation
does not apply, that the distinction becomes a live issue. In these respects, viewing
Article 81 as a single legal norm is a logical and welcome step.
These policy initiatives are not uncontested. Especially the German competition
authorities, the Bundeskartellamt and the Monopolkommission, have expressed some
erce criticisms86. These refer in the rst place to the compatibility of the proposed
reform with the EC Treaty itself, in that the wording of Article 81 would suggest
that an agreement can only benet from Article 81(3) following the authorisation by
some authority. It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to comment on the debate
concerning the original intentions of the authors of the EC Treaty, except to say that
it is a most interesting one.
Further, opponents raise the question whether Article 81(3) is really suited for
direct applicability, i.e. whether its criteria are suÆciently precise in order to have
a direct eect. The Commission has indicated that 30 years of case practise and
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice provide suÆcient guidance to take
the proposed initiative. Leaving aside the question whether the jurisprudence is com-
85White Paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty
(Commission Programme No. 99/027), para 49; new numbering inserted.
86Cf. Ehlermann (2000).
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pletely clear and consistent87, the fact remains that one of the determining factors
behind the interpretation of Article 81(1) has been the particular division of compe-
tences between the Commission and the member states and that exactly this division
is now disappearing. Even in case the dierent sets of arguments which can be relied
upon under the two paragraphs are clear88, the distinction between Article 81(1) and
81(3) remains relevant, given that the resulting burden of proof diers. According
to Article 2 of the proposed Regulation, the burden of proving an infringement of
Article 81(1) in any national or Community proceedings rests on the party alleging
the infringement. A party claiming the benet of Article 81(3) shall bear the burden
of proving that the conditions of that paragraph are fullled89.
A decentralized application of Art. 81 is intended to bring an additional number
of cases before the national courts. This is also the reason why the Commission has
not opted for a partial decentralisation involving the national competition authorities
only90. However, it is not to be taken for granted that each and every national court
has suÆcient expertise in and knowledge about competition cases. One may even
raise the question whether the national courts themselves have the time, resources
and interest in dealing with competition cases. Wolf (2000) refers in this respect to
the proverbial 'judge in Palermo'. As a matter of fact, it is only very recently that in
the Netherlands a specic competition authority was founded, among other reasons
because it was felt that competition cases were typically not given much priority in
the courts supposed to deal with them91. Apart from this, there is a certain risk that
busy judges or 'economically illiterate' judges may choose to hang on to the clear-cut
market share benchmarks of the BER (which will continue to exist as a way to declare
certain agreements compatible with Article 81), bringing again a certain formalism in
87For example, Goyder (1993) indicates that referring to a 'rule' in the context of Article 85(1)
leads to 'confusion rather than clarity'. Faull and Nikpay (1999) describe the denition given to
ancillary restraints under European competition law as 'imprecise'.
88There is a continuing debate as to whether or not Article 81(3) provides room for policy objectives
which are unrelated to competition or market integration. Cf. Wesseling (1999) and Wils (2000).
89As for its own policy, the Commission has stated that there is not a presumption of illegality
outside the scope of the regulation, and that the burden of proof will lie on itself to demonstrate the
contravention of Article 81(1). As GriÆths (2000) observes, if this demonstration occurs in a loose
way similar to past practise, then the burden will not remain on the Commission for a long time.
90This could have been achieved by leaving the current enforcement system intact but sharing the
power to apply Article 81(3) with the national competition authorities and not with the national
courts.
91Netherlands Ministry of Economic Aairs, 'Nieuwe regels omtrent de economische mededinging
(Mededingingswet)', proposal for a new competition law, May 1996. To be precise, the argument
related to public law enforcement rather than civil law enforcement.
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the application of the EC competition rules92.
Another major concern is the need for a uniform, Community-wide application of
the EC competition rules. With many national competition authorities and courts
applying Article 81 as a whole, there is a certain risk of divergences occurring in their
approach towards restrictive agreements. Several safeguards are envisioned to avoid
such divergences from happening. First, as already noted, the notion of exemption
will become very dierent. In the new system, no authority or court, European or na-
tional, will have the power to adopt positive decisions which immunize an agreement
against attack by other competition authorities or other courts (Wils, 2000). For de-
cisions requiring that an infringement be brought to an end, accepting commitments
or withdrawing the benet of a block exemption, national competition authorities are
required to consult the Commission. The Commission can then take over the pro-
cedure by initiating proceedings itself. Further, the new Regulation foresees a right
for the Commission (acting in the Community public interest) to make written or
oral submissions in national proceedings. Finally, a number of provisions on informa-
tion sharing and case attribution are to bring about a real 'network' of competition
authorities.
Wolf (1999) makes two further criticisms which are worth mentioning. One of
the main reasons to start this reform is to alleviate the administrative burden faced
by companies which had to notify their agreements under Regulation 17 in order to
qualify for an exemption. Wolf wonders whether one can really speak of alleviating
a burden when companies must in the future go to law rms in order to obtain a
competition law assessment of their agreements, because the Commission no longer
gives binding statements. One might counter this argument by observing that the
Commission did not issue many binding statements anyway, in view of the sheer
number of notications and the resulting backlog. In this respect, as Fasquelle (1993)
notes, the Commission system had, to some extent, discredited itself.
Secondly, Wolf (1999) is worried by another aspect of enforcement, namely the
possibility of ning companies who have enacted agreements in breach of Article 81.
Under the old system, if companies enacted 'audacious' agreements without notifying
92Still, the Guidelines (if properly used) should loosen up things. Furthermore, it is comforting
that the new regulation foresees a right for the national competition authorities and the Commission
(acting in the Community public interest) to make submissions to national courts in written or oral
form. Similarly, national courts will, as before, be able to request a preliminary ruling form the
European Courts. This, however, will require resources from their side just the same.
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them, there was a certain presumption of illegality in view of Regulation 17's clear
obligation to notify agreements if they are to be exempted. With the new system, it
will become more diÆcult to negate the parties' natural claim that they were living
in the opinion that the agreement did not infringe Article 8193. Wolf submits that it
will therefore become more diÆcult for the Commission to impose nes, leading to a
possible reduction of adherence to competition law. Doubtlessly, much will depend
on the way in which the Commission is going to deal with this issue and even more
so on the question whether the European Courts will provide support for it.
3.6 Concluding remarks
At this very moment, many developments are taking place in the policy eld towards
vertical restraints. From the viewpoint of evaluating the pro- and anticompetitive
eects of vertical agreements under Article 81, a number of good changes have been
started up. On the substantive side, the new Block Exemption Regulation can be
seen as increasing the role for economic analysis in the application of Article 81.
The more exible and permissive character of the new Regulation is to be welcomed.
Nonetheless, it would appear that also the new policy has a certain procedural avour,
this time through the extensive use of market share thresholds. The fact that the
European Commission decides to shape the changes in substance into a 'procedural
jacket' is, for the purpose of legal certainty, far from wrong. The point is that the
jacket should not be unnecessarily tight.
An important role in this respect is given to the determination of the relevant
product markets and their geographic dimensions. After all, it is on the basis of this
determination that the market shares are calculated and compared with the legal
thresholds. The Commission has traditionally tended to dene the relevant market
rather narrowly, both in the product dimension and in the geographic dimension. In
my opinion, if the adoption of the new economic approach towards vertical restraints
is to have its full eect, it is not enough to change a Block Exemption Regulation.
It is also necessary to be careful in determining the relevant product markets and
geographic markets. This does require suÆcient discipline form the side of the Com-
mission.
93Wolf (1999) made this remark in the context of horizontal agreements, rather than vertical
agreements. After all, the obligation to notify vertical agreements for exemption has already become
less pressing in view of the fact that they can be exempted retrospectively (since 1999).
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The Commission's proposal to share the enforcement of Article 81 with the member
states is a good proposal. It is not very realistic to assume that one institution can
on its own monitor a market with more than 350 million consumers. The fact that
national courts will be called upon to apply not just Article 81(1), but also Article
81(3), will bring the EU competition rules a lot closer to a level where they are
seen to exist. At the same time, also the substantive distinction between agreements
not restricting competition in the sense of Article 81(1) and agreements exemptable
under Article 81(3) had become increasingly blurred, in view of the jurisprudence of
the Court of Justice. In these respects, viewing Article 81 as a single legal norm is a
logical and welcome step.
There remains a practical problem, however, with the application of Article 81.
The burden of proving an infringement of Article 81(1) rests on the party alleging
the infringement. A party claiming the benet of Article 81(3) shall bear the burden
of proving that the conditions of that paragraph are fullled. As for its own policy,
the Commission has stated that there is not a presumption of illegality outside the
scope of the Block Exemption Regulation, and that the burden of proof will lie on
itself to demonstrate the infringement of Article 81(1). Much will depend on the
Commission's own style in market denition and the actual assessment of vertical
restraints, whether this burden is at the requisite level.
This brings us back to the main theme of the chapter: the inuence of the European
Courts on the Commission's policy on vertical agreements in the course of the years.
In case too much formalism were to develop in the Commision's new policy, there is
still the European Court of Justice to turn to. Possibly that with arguments of an
economic nature - of which we have seen many examples - things can be given the
necessary exibility. After all, as far as economic argumentation is concerned: the
Court has often been responsive to it.
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Article 81 of the EC Treaty (ex Article 85)
1.The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and con-
certed practices which may aect trade between Member States and which have as
their object or eect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly x purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2.Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automati-
cally void.
3.The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case
of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to pro-
moting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benet, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to
the attainment of these objectives;
(b) aord such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products in question.
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3.8 Appendix B: the American 'rule of reason'
The rule of reason is a concept that takes a central position in American antitrust law.
In American antitrust, the rule of reason entails an assessment of the net eect of the
agreement on competition, implying a comparison between the pro-competitive and
anti-competitive eects in the light of the prevailing market circumstances, without
reference to any other elements having no bearing with competition (Van Gerven e.a.,
1997).
The American rule of reason, as we know it today, is to be seen in the context of
the general prohibition principle imposed by the Sherman Act of 1890. Section 1 of
the Sherman Act states that 'every contract (...) in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States (...) is hereby declared to be illegal'. Already at an early
stage, and fully in line with the principles of the anglo-saxon Common Law system94,
the Surpreme Court took the view that the qualication 'every' could impossibly mean
that, without exception, every restraint of trade between contracting parties should
be presumed a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Therefore, in Addyston
Pype (1899), the Surpreme Court declared that restraints necessary for a commercial
deal to come about ('ancillary restraints') are not a violation of Section 1 if this deal
has a lawful (neutral) eect on the state of competition95 96. Still, to allow any other
94The adoption of the Sherman Act, though being of great importance, was not by itself a shift in
the approach towards restraints of trade (Fasquelle, 1993; Marenco, 1999). The restraints of trade
doctrine had since long been applied by the local courts, in the tradition of the Common Law system.
According to Senator Sherman: 'The purpose of this bill is to enable the courts of the United States
to apply the same remedies against combinations which injuriously aect the interests of the United
States that have been applied in the several States to protect local interest' (Congress Rec. 1890,
Vol. 21, p. 2456). Neither was the initial application of the 'rule of reason' a change with the past.
The restraints of trade doctrine and the 'rule of reason' go, in fact, much further back in history
and have their origin in the English Common Law tribunals of the late Middle Ages (Van Gerven
e.a., 1997). At the time, the English jurisdictions considered that the freedom to trade had to be
protected and that contract clauses restricting the freedom of individuals were at odds with this
principle. It was however impossible for the judges to apply this principle without any nuance. A
distinction was therefore being made between contractual restrictions which were 'reasonable' and
those which were not. Requirements for a contractual restriction to be 'reasonable' was that it made
sense in the context of the agreement (e.g. that it protected the value of a business to be sold) and
that there was a 'consideration' for the party (parties) taking up the restriction, i.e. something in
return. In a sense, the rule of reason was a means to put into eect a general principle of prohibition.
95In U.S. v Joint TraÆc (1898), the Supreme Court had indicated that the wording 'restraint of
trade' should be understood as 'restraint of competition'.
96Addyston Pype and Steel Co v. United States 166 US 211 (1899) 'No conventional restraint of
trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a
lawful contract and necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of
the contract, or protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party'.
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restraints to benet from the rule of reason would be to 'set sail on a sea of doubt'.
A fundamental widening of the scope of the rule of reason amounting to what is now
known as the 'modern' rule of reason (Fasquelle, 1993) came with three cases, Standard
Oil (1911), American Tobacco (1911) and Board of Trade of Chicago (1918)97. In
Standard Oil the Surpreme Court explicitly narrowed down the scope of application
of Section 1 to 'every undue or unreasonable restraint of trade'. In American Tobacco,
the Surpreme Court claried that the term 'restraint of trade' only embraces acts or
contracts which operate 'to the prejudice of the public interest by unduly restricting
competition' or which 'either because of the inherent nature or eect or because of the
evident purpose of the acts' injuriously restrain trade. Finally, in Board of Trade of
Chicago, it stated 'The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question, the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied;
its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of its restraint
and its eect actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the purpose and end sought to be attained, are all relevant factors. This is
not because of a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation of the
reverse; but because knowledge of intend may help the court to interpret the facts
and to predict consequences'. The main thrust of these judgments - the emphasis on
competition and the proposed test of legality - are generally regarded as the origin
of the current American rule of reason, one that entails the determination of the
'competition balance' of an agreement to see whether it is pro- or anticompetitive.
The actual implementation of the American rule of reason has changed remarkably
over the years. In order to avoid confusion, it must be noted that some categories of
agreements, while subject to the rule of reason, have been viewed as 'per se unrea-
sonable' (Van Gerven e.a., 1997; Fasquelle, 1993). In this respect, most changes in
attitude have occurred in the domain of vertical restraints. The benchmark case is
the Sylvania case of 197798. In that case, the Supreme Court rejected the per se con-
demnation of purely vertical restraints in favour of a full rule of reason standard. In
particular, it adopted the view that vertical restraints can have the 'redeeming virtues'
of helping manufacturers increase interbrand competition by solving free-rider prob-
97Standard Oil Co of New Jersey v. United States 221 U.S. 1 (1911), United States v American
Tobacco 221 U.S. 106 (1911), Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
98Continental TV Inc. v GTE Sylvania 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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lems (Salop, 1993). The ruling reversed the 'per se unreasonable' approach adopted
in the 1967 Schwinn case, which in turn had reversed the previous full rule of reason
standard99.
Since the Sylvania decision, economic eÆciency has become the main substantive
standard of US antitrust law (in line with the ideas of the Chicago School): agreements
or business practices which restrict competition are those which reduce economic
eÆciency. In this regard, the emphasis has come to lie on the eects on price and
output levels (allocative eÆciency). Even when companies achieve considerable cost
savings (productive eÆciency), the question remains whether some of these savings
are passed on to consumers through price reductions (Hirsch, 1979; Baker, 1999).
99United States v Arnold Schwinn and Co 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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Chapter 4
Resale price maintenance in a
spatial market with xed
transportation costs
4.1 Introduction
A contentious topic, in antitrust and in economics, continues to be the use of (mini-
mum) resale price maintenance. Under this practice, a manufacturer requires retailers
not to sell its products below a certain minimum price. Equally, a manufacturer's uni-
lateral policy not to deal with 'discounters' can be considered a kind of resale price
maintenance.
Several explanations for the use of resale price maintenance (RPM) have been
given in the economic literature. As has been discussed in Chapter 2, there are,
broadly speaking, two opposing views on the impact of resale price maintenance on
competition which can be identied. The malign view regards such an arrangement
as anti-competitive, serving to reduce intrabrand competition (competition among
distributors of the same brand) or even interbrand competition (competition between
brands). The alternative view is that minimum resale price maintenance can resolve
certain contracting or principal-agent problems, thereby enhancing eÆciency in distri-
bution. For example, RPM can be used to prevent discount retailers from free-riding
on product-specic presale services provided for by traditional dealers.
One eÆciency rationale that has received little recent attention is the so-called
outlets hypothesis, articulated by Yamey (1954) and elaborated upon by Gould and
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Preston (1965). The outlets hypothesis assumes that nal demand for the manufac-
turer's product is a function both of the retail price and the number of retail outlets:
the price-demand schedule for a product shifts outward if the number of retailers
carrying the product increases. One of the informal arguments for this positive rela-
tionship is that the inconvenience of shopping (e.g. travelling) is reduced when retail
density is higher. Gould and Preston then argue that price oors, by raising the retail
margin above the competitive level, lead to an increase in the number of retail outlets
in a free entry market equilibrium and, because of the positive impact of this increase
on nal demand, to higher prots for the manufacturer.
It is not entirely clear why the outlets hypothesis seems to have dissappeared from
the foreground of antitrust economics. According to Reagan (1986), this oversight is
explained partly by the lack of a formal model supporting the claim that minimum
resale prices can be protably used by a manufacturer to establish its preferred retail
outlet density. It is even the case that two articles which have evaluated Gould
and Preston's argument in a spatial context, Mathewson and Winter (1983) and
Bittlingmayer (1983), provide theoretical support only for the use of price ceilings, not
for price oors! Their results are obtained using a model of spatial retail competition
in which the number of retailers and their locations are xed in the short run but
variable in the long run. More specically, their models consist of three stages: in
the rst stage, a monopolistic producer decides on the sales conditions vis-a-vis the
retailers (wholesale price, possible minimum or maximum prices and/or franchise
fees). In the next stage, retailers decide whether or not to establish a retail outlet
in a (circular) city, given the sales conditions of the producer. Retailers will enter
the market if the prospective prots from sales are suÆcient to cover the xed costs
associated with setting up the retail outlet1. In the last stage, the established retailers
compete with each other in prices. The (fully informed) consumers are assumed to
have a downward sloping demand curve and to buy at the retailer whose 'eective
price' (the sum of the retail price and the unit transportation cost, which depends on
the distance to the retail outlet) is lowest.
In determining the optimal number of retail outlets, the manufacturer has two
1A tempting interpretation of the xed costs is that they represent the opportunity costs of shelf
space (prots foregone by having the product concerned in the shelves and not some other product).
However, this interpretation implies a multiproduct setting, a setting to which the model developed
in this chapter does not seem very applicable. In particular, the symmetry assumption, needed for
a tractable analysis, will become very diÆcult to justify.
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opposite eects to take into account. Firstly, the higher the number of retail outlets
entering the market in equilibrium, the higher the sum of xed costs involved (to be
covered through the retail mark-up). On the other hand, an increase in the number
of retailers may go with a decrease in the 'eective price' faced by consumers as the
average travelling distance for consumers decreases. For a given wholesale price, a
drop in the 'eective price' benets the producer as the total quantity of goods sold
increases. Therefore, the reduction in transportation costs incurred by the consumers
may allow the producer to capture a larger part of the consumer surplus. In the
constellations of Mathewson and Winter (1983) and Bittlingmayer (1983), the rst
eect - as evaluated at the equilibrium without vertical restraints - appears to always
dominate the second eect. The essence of this result is that in the absence of vertical
restraints, there is a strong 'business stealing eect' (Tirole, 1988): retailers, when
deciding to enter the market, do not take into account the negative eect of entry
on the prots of the other retailers. From the viewpoint of the vertical structure,
this leads to a certain bias towards excess entry. It also renders the result that price
ceilings, and not price oors, are called for if the producer wants to maximize prots
by inuencing the number of retail outlets in the long run2. In a dierent constellation,
that of Vickrey(1964)/Salop (1979)/Dixit (1983) with inelastic demands, it is shown
that the producer is able to achieve the optimal outlet density by using the wholesale
price only. These ndings have led Reagan (1986) to the conclusion that there is 'no
substantive role for minimum resale prices in the long-run'3.
In this chapter, I will verify whether the above 'negative' results for the outlets
hypothesis are due to the particular transportation cost assumptions of the underlying
models. In line with the majority of spatial models of retail competition, these models
have assumed that transportation costs depend linearly on the quantity of products
actually bought at the retail outlet. By contrast, I will assume that customers only
incur a xed cost when visiting a retail outlet, i.e. a cost irrespective of whether they
buy several products or nothing at all. This assumption, rst put forward in spatial
models by Holton (1957) and supported by Stahl (1982, 1996), seems quite justied
when the size or quantity of the goods transported is relatively small (in terms of
2Note that the use of a price ceiling is also benecial in view of the double marginalisation problem.
As equally eective instruments exclusive territories or two-part taris can be used.
3As retailers choose whether or not to enter the market before price competition takes place, the
entry decision can be interpreted as a decision for the long run. Reagan does provide an interesting
short term model (without the possibility of entry, taking the locations of the retailers as given),
with which she derives a result supporting the use of price oors.
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travel expenses it does not seem to matter a lot whether a customer buys, say, either
one or two bottles of coke, or either one or two packets of aspirine in a drug store) or
transportation costs are looked upon as opportunity costs associated with the time
spent on shopping and not on other activities (after all, it is not obvious why buying
several products at the same time would generally lead to more inconvenience than
buying just a single product).
An interesting feature of the fact that transportation costs are not dependent on
the quantity bought is that it changes the analysis of where a consumer will buy.
The larger the quantity consumers want to buy, the more they will get interested in
going to a remote shop with a low price, rather than going to the shop closeby with
high prices. In a way, the choice of where to buy also depends on the choice how
much to buy. The xed transportation cost structure thus appears to bring about
more competitive retail conditions than the linearly dependent transportation cost
structures. In principle, this may reduce the extent of the excess entry bias of spatial
models and, therefore, lead to price oors being more attractive as a means to foster
entry by retailers.
However, despite this feature it is found that also with the xed transport cost
specication, the producer does not nd it protable to impose price oors. Again,
the better capture of consumer surplus appears not to weigh up against the increase
in xed costs involved with the larger retail network. As in Mathewson and Winter
(1983) and Bittlingmayer (1983), the business stealing eect (retailers enter without
taking into account the eect on the other retailers in terms of reduced prots) is de-
terminative: an integrated rm internalizes this externality by reducing the number
of retail outlets. The co-ordination problems that exist within the vertical structure
(the double marginalisation problem and the co-ordination problem on market cover-
age) can either be tackled using a dierent pricing instrument (price ceilings, two-part
taris) or are not strong enough to oset the business stealing eect.
The next section, Section 4.2, presents the assumptions of the model and charac-
terises the retail market equilibria. Section 4.3 derives the equilibrium for the case
where the producer does not impose vertical restraints and for the case it does. In Sec-
tion 4.4, the welfare implications of the model are considered. Concluding comments
and a short discussion are oered in Section 4.5.
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4.2 The basic model
The role of resale price maintenance will be studied in a spatial competition framework
with free entry by retailers. I will use a constellation similar to Mathewson and Winter
(1983), Bittlingmayer (1983) and Dixit (1983) but introduce one important distinctive
feature regarding the nature of the transporation cost.
The model consists of three stages:
 stage I: the manufacturer decides on the (uniform) sales conditions vis-a-
vis the retailers, i.e. on a wholesale price pw, a possible franchise fee A
and on whether or not to use price restrictions (price oors, price ceilings
or full resale price maintenance);
 stage II: given the manufacturer's choice in stage I, retailers decide simul-
taneously whether or not to enter the market;
 stage III: given the retailers' locations, retailers compete in prices.
The following assumptions are made, some of which are standard in the spatial
competition literature.
(i) Consumers are uniformly distributed with density v along a circle with circum-
ference 1. Hence, spatial retail competition is in one dimension only;
(ii) Consumers have a common travel cost t per unit distance.
(iii) The manufacturer of the product enjoys some market power in the sense that
it faces a downward sloping consumer demand for its product. It will be convenient
to think of the manufacturer as a monopolist. The manufacturer incurs a constant
unit cost of production, c. There are no costs involved in the transportation of the
goods to the retail outlets.
(iv) Each retailer incurs a xed cost F associated with setting up the retail outlet.
There are no variable costs in retailing (apart from purchasing the products at the
wholesale price pw).
(v) There is free entry into the retail market, implying that retailers will continue
to enter the market until prots are driven down to zero. The number of retailers
entering is, for the moment, supposed to be large enough to be treated as a continuous
variable.
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(vi) Retailers locate symmetrically along the retail market4.
(vii) Each consumer buys at the retail outlet where its utility ends up highest5,
provided that the utility level is positive. Utility increases in the quantity of products
obtained but decreases in the total expenses made (being the sum of buying expenses
and travel expenses). To keep things as simple as possible, it will be assumed that
consumers have a common utility function that is quasi-linear:
U(q; x) = u(q)  p  q   t  x;
Here, q denotes the quantity of goods obtained, u(q) the utility associated with
consuming this quantity, x the distance from the consumer's location to the retail
outlet where the products are bought, and p the retail price at the retail outlet. As is
well known, quasi-linear utility functions have the characteristic that income eects
are absent, which allows us to write demand of a consumer (who decides to visit a
retail outlet) as a function of the retail price only6. In line with Mathewson and
Winter (1983), we take an exponential demand function: q(p) = e p, which is in fact
equivalent to taking the specication u(q) = q  q  ln q. Hence, if a consumer located
at a distance x from a retail outlet buys from this outlet, he will derive a utility level
equal to
U(q(p); x) = e p   e p  ( p)  p  e p   t  x
= e p   t  x
Observe that this expression is identical to the dierence between the (net) con-
sumer's surplus of consuming q(p) at a price p and the transportation cost7.
4Obviously a model in which rms choose whether or not to enter and also the locations at which
they will enter would be more appropriate. However, in order to keep computations tractable, it
will prove necessary to make the assumption. Furthermore, the specic objective of the model is to
study the extent of entry rather than the particular choice of locations (cf. Tirole, 1988).
5In the setting of Mathewson and Winter (1983) and of most other works, it is assumed that the
transportation cost t is per unit distance per unit quantity purchased. This implies that a consumer
at a distance x from a retail outlet faces a (constant) eective retail price equaling p = p + t  x.
Maximizing utility then coincides with going to the retail oulet whose eective retail price (or 'delivery
price') is lowest.
6The absence of income eects only applies as long demand for a product is not constrained by
a (low) income level. Hence, it is assumed that income is large or, equivalently, expenditures made
on the product under consideration are small relative to the income level.
7Allowing for dierent positive demand elasticities, e.g. by taking the specication q(p) = e ap,
q(p) = a  p or q(p) = p  (a;  > 0), yields identical results.
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On the basis of the above elements, it is now possible to derive the perceived
demand curves for a single retailer, conditional on the prices set by the other re-
tailers. Three possible price segments of a retailer's perceived demand curve can be
distinguished: following Salop (1979), I will call them the 'monopoly' segment, the
'competitive' segment and the 'supercompetitive' segment. The monopoly segment
consists of prices at which the retailer's entire market area consists of consumers who
are only interested in his shop as a visit to any other shop would yield negative utility
(because of the high prices charged by the other shops or because the other shops are
simply located too far away). The competitive price segment of the demand schedule
consists of those prices at which also consumers who are, in principle, willing to go to
other shops, decide to come to his retail outlet. For these consumers the retailer will
have to compete directly with the other retailers. This is equivalent to saying that
the potential market areas (the market areas that could be served if there were no
competitors) of the retailers are overlapping. Because of the interfering presence of
other retailers, demand on the competitive segment will start reacting less elastically
on price decreases, rendering a 'kink' in the demand curve at the price at which the
market areas of the retailers start to touch each other. The supercompetitive price
segment, nally, is related to prices which are that low that the immediate competi-
tors of the retailer are left with no customers at all (this segment will be ignored for
the moment). In Figure 4.1, the two typical segments of a retailer's demand curve
are depicted.
Let us derive the demand schedules for the two price segments in turn. Suppose
that retail outlets are located symmetrically at a distance R from each other. Consider
a rm i whose retail price is pi and let the price of retailer i's neighbouring rivals be
p i. As mentioned, on the competitive segment of the demand curve it will be the
case that the retailer competes with the neighbouring retailers for consumers who
will choose that retail outlet where their utility ends up highest. The market area of
retailer i is then given by the location x of the so-called 'indierent consumer', who
is indierent between buying at i and buying at its neighbour:
U(q(pi); x) = U(q(p i); R  x)
or
e pi   t  x = e p i   t(R  x)
leading to













 (e pi   e p i + tR)
As the indierent consumer derives non-negative utility from visiting a retail outlet
(U(q(pi); x)  0), consumers located nearer to the outlet will do so as well and, hence,
market demand faced by retailer i on the competitive price segment is given by








 (e pi   e p i + tR)  e pi
On the monopoly segment of the demand schedule, retailer i serves a market area
which entirely consists of consumers who derive negative utility from going to other
shops. Then, the location of the consumer who is just willing to purchase goods
from i, xmax, denes the boundary of the market area served by retailer i. From
U(q(pi); xmax) = 0, it follows that xmax = (1=t)  e pi so that in the case of separated
market areas demand for retailer i is equal to
4.2. The basic model 119










In the next section we will derive retail market equilibria given that the manufac-
turer sells its products at a wholesale price pw and does not impose any other sales
conditions on the retailers.
4.2.1 Conditions characterising the possible types of equilib-
ria
A symmetric free entry retail market equilibrium is characterised by the requirement
that (i) prices and locations are symmetric, (ii) given the prices of the competitors,
the best a retailer can do is to stick to its price and (iii) each retailer earns exactly a
zero prot.
Three possible types of equilibrium congurations can be distinguished (see also
Figure 4.2). The rst type is the 'competitive equilibrium', i.e. the equilibrium
conguration in which the potential market areas are overlapping. The second type
is the '(free entry) monopoly equilibrium', where it is the case that retailers are not
directly competing with each other for customers (the potential market areas are not
overlapping). The third type are the 'kinked equilibria', where the prices are such
that the market areas (the actual as well as the potential market areas) just touch.
These equilibria involve corner solutions in the prot maximization problem of the
retailers. It will turn out that for low levels of the wholesale price, the resulting retail
equilibria are the competitive equilibria, for intermediate levels the resulting equilibria
are the kinked equilibria and that for a high wholesale price a free entry monopoly
equilibrium will be the result.
We will start with a characterisation of the competitive equilibria. For expositional
reasons, part of the maths underlying the respective propositions is outlined in the
text. The details of the proofs are relegated to the appendix.




















Figure 4.2: The three possible types of retail equilibria (curve AC represents the
average cost curve).
The competitive equilibria
In a competitive equilibrium, the potential market areas of the retailers turn out to
overlap. Suppose that the manufacturer has set its sales conditions in stage I and that
n retailers have entered in stage II. In the last stage, stage III, these retailers compete
in prices, given each other's locations and given the producer's wholesale price. In
a Nash price equilibrium, each retailer maximizes its prots given the prices of the
other retailers:
c(pi; p i;R) = (pi   pw)  qc(pi; p i;R)  F
The rst order condition of prot maximization is
@
@pi
c(pi; p i;R) = 0
Assuming symmetry in prices, pi = p i = p, the rst order condition boils down to:
(p  pw)  (e p + tR)  tR = 0 (4.1)
which determines equilibrium price p as an (implicit) function of pw, the wholesale
price, and R, the distance between the retailers. The corresponding prots are then
c(p; R) = R  v  e p  (p  pw)  F
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In stage II, the stage preceding the above price competition stage, retailers choose
whether or not to enter the market. How large the distance between shops, R, will
turn out to be is determined by the number n of retailers deciding to enter: R = L
n
.
As we have assumed free entry, the number of retailers will be such that the above
prots are driven down to zero:
(p; R) = R  v  e p  (p  pw)  F = 0 (4.2)
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) determine, implicitly, the unique combination of price
and retail area (p(pw); R(pw)) in the free entry competitive equilibrium
8, for each
wholesale price pw:(
v  e 2p  (p  pw)2 + tF  (p  pw) = tF




It is fairly straightforward to observe, by implicitly dierentiating the above expres-
sions, that as the wholesale price pw increases, both the retail price and market area
of each retailer in the competitive equilibrium increase. Hence, if the wholesale price
increases, outlet density in the competitive case decreases.
That only implicit results can be obtained is slightly unfortunate, but appears
almost inevitable in models of this kind. In any case, it will prove useful to iden-
tify, by eliminating wholesale price pw from equations (4.3), that the set of possible








By dierentiating this expression we observe that in a competitive equilibrium, price
and retail area are positively related (f 0(R) > 0) and that f is concave in R (f
00
(R) <
0). The intuition is that as the wholesale price increases, rms will, given the retail
price, no longer be able to recover their xed costs and, hence, the outlet density that
is sustainable in equilibrium will decrease. Both the higher wholesale price and the
reduction in the degree of price competition (due to larger distances between outlets)
have the eect of raising the equilibrium retail price. Obviously, this cannot go on
indenitely: if the values for retail price p and retail area R implied by expression
(4.3) become too high, the consumer located furthest away from the retail outlet, the
indierent consumer, will derive negative utility from visiting the outlet and hence
8Locally and globally, the second order condition is satised: see appendix.
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not come to the outlet at all. Therefore, for relation f to be a valid representation of
the competitive equilibria, it must be that:
U(q(p); x(p))  0
Note that, with symmetry, x = 1
2





Dixit (1983) calls this condition the requirement of 'compatibility with demand'. It
simply tells us that for a given price, the market area that can be served is limited.
Accordingly, the interpretation of the inverse function g 1 is that it equals, for a
given price, the potential market area of a retailer (being two times the distance of
the consumer who derives exactly zero utility from going to the shop, i.e. 2 xmax(p)).
Function g is downward sloping: the larger the retail price, the smaller the potential
market area.
Figure 4.3 provides a plot of the curves f and g in order to exhibit the cases
in which combinations (p; R) on f are indeed possible competitive equilibria. The
requirement of compatibility with demand implies that the only relevant competitive
equilibrium combinations (p; R) are beneath curve g.
Observe that the price-area relation f is parameterized by v, t and F : the price-
area curve shifts outward when F increases, v decreases or t decreases. If xed costs
F increase, then given the retail price, the quantity sold (the retail area) will have to
increase for the shops still to break even. With smaller consumer density v, the retail
area will also have to increase as demand from the original retail area does no longer
suÆce. If the cost of transportation t decreases, then, given the locations of the shops,
retail competition will become more intense, causing a loss to the retailers. The zero-
prot condition then implies enlarged retail areas. The requirement of 'compatibility
with demand' g is only parameterized by the transportation cost t: if t increases, the
potential market area decreases (for given prices).
In each competitive equilibrium the market is fully covered and the potential
market areas are overlapping ( f 1(p) < g 1(p)). At the point at which the curves
f and g intersect, the potential market areas just touch each other. At this point,












Figure 4.3: Price-area relation f and the requirement of compatibility with demand
g.




As mentioned above, it is straightforward to observe that as the wholesale price
increases, both the retail price and the market area in the competitive equilibrium
increase. Therefore, the maximum wholesale price that still leads to a competitive
equilibrium is the wholesale price that supports equilibrium9 S. Inserting the values










The ndings of this section are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 For each wholesale price pw < p
S
w
, there is a unique competitive equilib-
rium (p; R) that satises zero prot condition (4.2), p = f(R) and p < g(R). In this




9Strictly speaking, S itself is no longer a competitive equilibrium, but a kinked equilibrium (the
equilibrium potential market areas are adjacent; see section 2.1.3). Therefore, the obtained pSw is in
fact a supremum value for the wholesale prices leading to competitive equilibria.
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The free entry monopoly equilibrium
In a free entry monopoly equilibrium, retailers turn out to be not directly competing
with each other. Prots for a local monopolist if it sets price p are
m
i
(p) = qm(p)  (p  pw)  F




(p) = 0, gives10










 e 2pw 1   F
which are a decreasing function of pw. The only free entry monopoly equilibrium













can be seen as the maximal wholesale price at which a retailer
who is able to act as a local monopolist can still break even. The retail price prevailing












These results are briey summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2 The unique free entry monopoly equilibriumM is given by pM = ln(
p
v=F t)
and RM = 2
p





10The second order condition is satised: see the appendix.
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The kinked equilibria
The third type of equilibria is the 'kinked equilibria'. In a kinked equilibrium, the
prices and market areas are such that, starting from the equilibrium, any increase in
the price brings demand on the monopoly segment (i.e. the potential market areas
become separated), and any price decrease brings demand on the competitive segment
(i.e. potential market areas start to overlap). Because of this feature, the rst order
condition of prot maximization must hold as an inequality. This requirement and the
requirement that each retailer makes zero prot characterise the kinked equilibria. As
in a kinked equilibrium the potential market areas just touch each other, it is implied
that Rk = 2  xmax(pk), which is equivalent to pk = g(Rk). Combining this with the






  pw)  F = 0 (4.5)
Expression (4.5) denes implicitly kinked equilibrium market area Rk as a function
of wholesale price pw. Implicit dierentiation of (4.5) reveals that when the whole-
sale price increases, the equilibrium market area increases as well, but the price level
drops: in the region of the kinked equilibria, the induced increase in the market area
goes along with a stronger exploitation of scale economies (lower prices), an eect
that dominates the market power eect due to greater spatial dierentiation. Fur-
thermore, each rm in the kinked equilibrium would, in principle, prefer to decrease
its price and charge the monopoly price, but is refrained from doing so because of the
presence of other competitors; a price decrease enlarges the actual market area by less
than the potential market area. In the limit, when the wholesale price goes towards
pM
w
, the kinked equilibrium coincides with the free entry monopoly equilibrium. Cor-
respondingly, market area Rk is smaller than area RM . The next lemma summarizes
the main results.
Lemma 4.3 For each wholesale price pw 2 [pSw; pMw ), there is a unique kinked equi-
librium (p; R) that satises p = g(R) and zero prot condition (4.5). The number of




In Figure 4.4 the possible equilibria are depicted for three cases. For low wholesale
prices, the resulting equilibria are the competitive equilibria (Lemma 4.1), for inter-
mediate wholesale prices the resulting equilibria are kinked equilibria (Lemma 4.3)
and for pw = p
M
w
the free entry monopoly equilibrium will be the result (Lemma 4.2).









Figure 4.4: Possible retail equilibria; one for each wholesale price pw.
4.2.2 A comparison with the case of per-unit transportation
costs
In the introduction it was stated that two leading articles studying vertical integration
in spatial models of retail competition (Mathewson and Winter (1983) and Bittling-
mayer (1983)) assume that transportation costs depend linearly on the quantity of
products actually bought at the shop. If t is the transportation cost per unit dis-
tance, per unit bought, this implies that a consumer at a distance x from a shop faces
a (constant) eective retail price equaling p+ t  x. Maximizing utility then coincides
with going to the shop whose eective retail price (or 'delivery price') is lowest. In the
introduction, it was also asserted that the xed transportation cost structure of the
current model brings about more competitive retail conditions than the linearly de-
pendent transportation cost structures. Let us quickly verify this assertion. For given
retail locations (for given R), prot maximization in the per-unit transportation cost




Note that in this framework, demand of a consumer located at a distance x equals
quantity ve (p+tx), which is positive for all distances x (in other words, xmax(p) =1).
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Hence, with per-unit transportation costs the market is always completely covered:
there are only competitive equilibria, no kinked equilibria nor monopoly equilibria.











the retail conditions are more competitive in the xed transportation cost framework
than in the framework with per-unit transportation costs, in the sense that for a
given distance between retail outlets, the retail margins are lower. The same holds
for parameter values for which the retail equilibria in the xed cost set-up are either
kinked or monopolistic. The next section will consider whether these more 'competi-
tive' retail conditions reduce the extent of the excess entry bias of the spatial model
and lead to price oors being a protable means to foster entry by retailers.
4.3 The choice of the manufacturer
In stage I, preceding the entry decision of the retailers, the producer decides on the
sales conditions vis-a-vis the retailers with the objective of maximizing its prots.
In this section we explore the following instruments that the producer can use: the
wholesale price, possible minimum or maximum prices and/or franchise fees. However,
I shall rst characterise the 'rst-best' result, i.e. the result that maximizes prot for
the vertically integrated structure. This will serve as a benchmark with which the
performance of the respective instruments can be assessed.
4.3.1 Vertically integrated distribution
When the number of operating retailers is n, prots of the vertically integrated struc-
ture are
int(p; R) = vL  q(p)  (p  c)  nF
= L[v  e p  (p  c)  F=R] (4.6)
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provided that the market is covered, p  g(R). Inspection of the prot function
learns, that for each given price p, int is strictly increasing in R, so that it is optimal
for the vertically integrated rm to choose R as large as possible while assuring that
the market remains covered. Hence, the optimum is to be found on the line p = g(R).
This result is not surprising: provided that consumers come to a shop, the quantity
they buy is not inuenced by the extent of their travel expenses. The best thing a
vertically integrated structure can do is to minimize on the number of retail outlets (in
order to save xed costs) and to position the shops in such a way that the customers
who are located furthest away from them derive exactly zero utility from purchasing.
The optimal value for the control variable R can be derived taking the rst deriva-













This expression determines, albeit implicitly, the optimal market area for the inte-
grated rm, RI . The corresponding optimal price is pI = g(RI).
4.3.2 Maximizing producer's prots in the absence of vertical
restraints: the non-integrated optimum
If a producer cannot use vertical restraints or franchise fees, the only decision variable
is the price at which it sells to the retailers, the wholesale price. Let p(pw) denote
the price that arises in the retail market equilibrium for a given wholesale price pw,
n(pw) the number of entering retailers and R(pw) the corresponding market areas.
The prots for the producer can be written as
prod(pw) = vL  q(p(pw))  (pw   c)
(note that the xed costs of the outlets are paid for by the retailers themselves). A
property of the free entry retail market equilibrium is that prots at the downstream
level are zero (otherwise more retailers would enter). This implies that, in each retail
market equilibrium, the prots of the vertical structure seen as a whole (int) fully
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accrue to the producer:
prod(pw) = vL  q(p(pw))  (pw   c)
= vL  q(p(pw))  (p(pw)  c)  n(pw)  F
 n[vR  q(p(pw))  (p(pw)  pw)  F ]
= vL  q(p(pw))  (p(pw)  c)  n(pw)  F
= int(p(pw); R(pw))
as vR  q(p(pw))  (p(pw)   pw)   F = 0 in the free entry retail market equilibrium.
This implies that the producer's prots are maximal when the downstream variables
(p(pw); R(pw)) 'end up' being equal to (p
I ; RI), the optimal price-area combination for
the vertically integrated structure. Hence, the question when the wholesale price is
the only available instrument is: is there a wholesale price pw such that the resulting
pair (p(pw); R(pw)) equals (p
I ; RI)? If not, what is the best possible result? The
answer to these questions is stated in the following propositions.
Proposition 4.1 The non-integrated optimum is given by the free entry monopoly
equilibrium for large xed costs F and by a competitive equilibrium for small values
of F .
Proposition 4.2 The retail price and outlet density of the non-integrated optimum
are too high from the viewpoint of the manufacturer/the vertical structure (unless the
xed costs are that large that even a vertically integrated rm would only just be able
to break even in its operations; then the non-integrated optimum and the integrated
optimum coincide).
Proofs. See appendix.
Recall from the previous section that three possible equilibria may arise. For low
wholesale prices, the resulting equilibria are competitive equilibria, for intermediate




free entry monopoly equilibrium will be the outcome.
Let us rst compare the free entry monopoly equilibrium and the kinked equilibria.
It follows immediately that the former dominates the latter from the viewpoint of the
manufacturer: for all kinked equilibria consumer demand is lower than in the free entry
monopoly equilibrium (pk > pM), whereas the wholesale margin for the manufacturer




). The kinked equilibria are therefore never optimal.
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Let us now consider the free entry monopoly equilibrium with the integrated opti-
mum (pI ; RI). The free entry monopoly equilibrium resembles the integrated optimum
in that the customers who are located furthest away from a shop are left with exactly
zero utility (it holds that p = g(R)). In terms of the appropriation of consumer
surplus, this speaks in favour of the free entry monopoly equilibrium. Nonetheless,
because of the double marginalisation problem, each monopoly equilibrium goes with
higher prices and, hence, smaller retail areas than is optimal for the vertical structure
as a whole. The only exception is when pM
w
= c, in which case there is no double
marginalisation problem and the free entry monopoly equilibrium attains the rst
best. As pM
w
is, by denition, the highest possible wholesale price at which a local
monopoly is still able to break even, the case pM
w
= c occurs when the xed costs are
that large that even a vertically integrated rm would only just be able to break even
in its operations (we will call this level Fviable). The conclusion is that whenever a free
entry monopoly equilibrium is optimal for the manufacturer it will involve a retail
price and, correspondingly, an outlet density that is too high (unless F = Fviable).
What remains is to compare the overall prots in free entry monopoly equilibrium
M with those of the best possible competitive equilibrium, which we call C. Equi-
librium C is represented in Figure 4.5 by the point where the iso-prot curve of the
vertical structure (not drawn) touches the segment of possible competitive equilibria.
As with the kinked equilibria, we can readily say that all competitive equilibria
that lead to a retail price above the monopoly equilibrium price pM are less protable
than the free entry monopoly equilibrium: consumer demand is lower and so are the
wholesale margins. One is left to consider competitive equilibria associated with low
retail prices. Can they be more protable than the free entry monopoly equilibrium?
Recall again the denition of wholesale price associated with the monopoly equili-
birum, pM
w
. This wholesale price is, by denition, the highest possible wholesale price
at which a local monopoly is still able to break even. It follows that when the xed
costs are (very) small, having the retailers obtain a zero prot in a monopoly situation
requires (very) high wholesale prices pw. In fact, when F  0, both pM and pMw go
towards innity, leaving zero prot for the manufacturer. Hence, even though the free
entry monopoly equilibrium resembles the industry optimum in that some customers
are left with zero utility, it simply requires too high wholesale and retail prices when
the costs of setting up a shop are, in fact, low. When the xed costs of setting up a
retail outlet are low, it will be a competitive equilibrium that is optimal.










Figure 4.5: Comparing the free entry monopoly equilibrium M and the best compet-
itive equilibrium C.
When the xed costs are low, how does the resulting retail price-area pattern
compare with that of the integrated optimum? Inspection of the derivative of the
producer's prot along the f -curve ( d
dR
prod(f(R); R)), evaluated at p = p
I , tells us
that this derivative is positive. In other words, the optimal competitive equilibrium
involves too small retail areas from the viewpoint of the producer (and the vertical
structure). Potentially, several eects are at play. First, there is the business stealing
eect: retailers enter without taking into account the eect on the other retailers in
terms of reduced prots. An integrated rm would internalize this externality and
reduce the number of retail outlets. On the other hand, retailers do not take into
account the positive externalities on the manufacturer either: more entry leads to a
lower mark-up and, hence, to an alleviated double marginalisation problem. Here, an
integrated rm could solve this problem independently of the number of outlets, viz.
by the pricing instrument. Finally, there can be a marketing eect: retailers being at
a smaller distance increases the scope for a better capture of consumer surplus. This
eect is present in the current model, but not really in the competitive equilibria as
such. The reason is that with a xed transport cost structure, the amount that each
consumer buys does not depend on the distance to the shop; only the decision whether
to come to the shop depends on it. Given that in each competitive equilibrium, the
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indierent consumer derives positive utility from going to a shop, decreasing the
distance to be covered by consumers does not bring extra demand. Neither does it
allow for a better capture of consumers' surplus (at least, not marginally speaking;
for contemplated large price increases things may be dierent). The marketing eect
principally plays a role where consumers are on the edge of buying or not buying, in
particular in the kinked equilibria and the free entry monopoly equilibrium. However,
for the free entry monopoly equilibrium (and the kinked equilibria) we already saw
that it involves smaller retail areas than optimal for the vertical structure as a whole.
The conclusion of this section is that the best possible non-integrated equilibrium
(be it a competitive or a monopoly equilibrium) involves too high prices and too high
an outlet density from the perspective of the vertical structure.
4.3.3 Price restraints
In general, the wholesale price will not suÆce to generate the preferred price-area
combination (pI ; RI): the producer will have to rely on other instruments as well. In
this section we will see whether price restraints (resale price maintenance, price oors,
price ceilings) vis-a-vis the retailers can do the job.
If the producer is in a position to set the retail price itself, then the only equilibrium
condition for the retail market is the zero-prot condition (??). For a specic choice
of p, the zero-prot condition denes retail area R as a function of wholesale price pw:
R(p; pw) =
ep  F
(p  pw)  v
This function has range [ e
pF
(p c)v ;1), given that wholesale prices will not be taken
smaller than c (in the absence of franchise fees, pricing below marginal cost would
result in a loss for the producer). This implies that, once the retail price p is set,
any equilibrium distance R that is larger than e
pF
(p c)v can be obtained by taking the
appropriate wholesale price. Hence, any point in the price-area space (as long as
R  e
pF
(p c)v ) can be attained using the price and wholesale price instruments.
As we have seen, the best equilibrium that the producer can choose in the absence
of vertical restraints involves too high prices and too high an outlet density from







4.4. Welfare assessment 133
is therefore a suÆcient instrument to bring about the equilibrium (pI ; RI). Note that
whenever F < Fviable, we have pw > c. The use of this vertical restraint brings about
a reduction in prices (pI < pN ; pM) and in outlet density (RI > RN ; RM).
4.3.4 Two-part taris
The model also provides a useful framework to study the role of two-part taris
(franchise fee plus wholesale price). Imposing a franchise fee amounts to increasing
the xed costs that each retailer faces and has the eect of shifting outward curve
f and shifting the kinked equilibria and the free entry monopoly equilibrium along
curve g.
One way to obtain the rst best by means of a franchise fee is to insure that the
xed cost perceived by the retailer (the xed cost F plus the franchise fee A) leads
to a free entry monopoly equilibrium that coincides with I. For which value of the
perceived xed cost (F + A) is it the case that the free entry monopoly equilibrium
M coincides with the integrated optimum I? Inserting the retail area RM we can



















The level of the franchise fee for which this derivative is zero is the level that leads to





). In fact, one could equally choose one of the kinked equilibria using an appropriate
franchise fee and wholesale price.
Like a price ceiling, a franchise fee has the eect of reducing the number of retailers
entering in equilibrium. The saved entry costs accrue to the manufacturer.
4.4 Welfare assessment
In determining the welfare eects of the vertical restraints we take welfare to be the
sum of producer's surplus (prots) and consumers' surplus:
W (p; R) = (p; R) + CS(p; R)
Consumers' surplus CS(p; R) can be written as n times the surplus of the con-
sumers that visit a particular shop. The latter is
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Realizing that, in equilibrium, n = L
R
and using (4.6), we obtain
W (p; R) = Lv  e p  (p  c) 
L
R











By taking the rst derivatives w.r.t. p and R and checking whether p < g(R), we nd






The fact that pW = c is a very familiar result. Note that, as can be expected,
RW is increasing in F and decreasing in v and in t. It is easily veried that in the
integrated optimum I (the preferred situation of the producer), retail prices are too
high and outlet density is too low from the welfare perspective. The rst result is
again very familiar; the second stems from the fact that the producer is only interested
in whether or not consumers come to the shops, not in the distance they have to cover.
When the xed costs of setting up a retail outlet (F ) are large, the free entry
monopoly equilibrium is the point of reference with which optimum I should be com-
pared. By the use of the price ceiling, outlet density becomes lower (which is bad for
welfare, since RW = RM < RI), but prices come down as well (good for welfare). The
overall welfare eect is ambiguous.
The same holds when xed costs are low and the best competitive equilibrium is
the proper point of reference. By using resale price maintenance a producer is able to
decrease retail margins (good for welfare) but to decrease outlet density (undetermined
welfare eect, since RC < RW < RI).
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter analysed the role of resale price maintenance in sales contracts between
a producer and its distributors, using a model of spatial competition in which the op-
portunity costs of shopping are distance-dependent (as in the usual Hotelling setting)
but not quantity-dependent: for each visit to a shop, a consumer incurs a certain cost
which is independent of the quantity bought. As in dierent settings (Mathewson
and Winter (1983), Bittlingmayer (1983), Dixit (1983)), it was found that the opti-
mal non-integrated equilibrium involves too high a retail price and too small retail
areas, from the viewpoint of the manufacturer and the vertical structure as a whole.
As in Mathewson and Winter (1983) and Bittlingmayer (1983), the business steal-
ing eect (retailers enter without taking into account the eect on the other retailers
in terms of reduced prots) is determinative: an integrated rm internalizes this ex-
ternality by reducing the number of retail outlets. The co-ordination problems that
exist within the vertical structure (the double marginalisation problem and the co-
ordination problem on market coverage) can either be tackled using a dierent pricing
instrument (price ceilings, two-part taris) or are not strong enough to oset the busi-
ness stealing eect. In fact, in the competitive equilibria, the market coverage eect
is even hardly present. Given that in each competitive equilibrium, the indierent
consumer derives positive utility from going to a shop, decreasing the distance to
be covered by consumers does not bring extra demand (in any case, not marginally
speaking). This is probably a driving force behind the result that even though the
retailing conditions in the competitive equilibria appear to be more competitive with
the xed transportation cost structure than with other transportation cost structures,
this model does not reveal a rationale for the 'outlets hypothesis' either11.
None of the models that have looked at the outlets hypothesis in a pure spatial dy-
namic framework has exhibited a rationale for it. Given the very stylized character of
the models (a single product, symmetry assumptions) there is probably need for more
analysis. A natural extension of the current model would be to consider multiproduct
retailers. This line of research is particularly interesting as it is sometimes alleged that
when a product is used as a loss leader (meaning that the product is priced below
cost in order to attract consumers into the retail premises), the size of the distribution
network is put under pressure as the number of retailers willing to carry the product
11An analysis of dierent demand specications, with dierent demand elasticities (q(p) = e ap,
q(p) = a  p or q(p) = p  (a;  > 0)) has yielded the same results.
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concerned reduces. It is, however, not obvious that a tractable model can be found
to study this case as well; existing spatial models for multiproduct competition have
run into serious technical diÆculties (Stahl, 1996).
Another possible course of action is empirical research. Empirical research on the
role of minimum resale prices is relatively scarce. A notable exception are Ippolito
and Overstreet (1996) who have assessed the impact of a Federal Trade Commission's
decision that eectively put an end to the policy of price oors used by Corning Glass
Works, a U.S. manufacturer of kitchenware. They conclude that in the case of Corning
the outlets theory seems a more likely explanation of its past policy of resale price
maintenance than the other pro- and anti-competitive theories. In order to obtain




Proof of Lemma 4.1: competitive equilibria







e pi[ e pi  (2pi   2pw   1) + e pi  (pi   pw   1)
 tR  (pi   pw   1)]
Putting it to zero and assuming symmetry in prices, pi = p i = p, gives us the rst
order condition
(p  pw)  (e p + tR)  tR = 0 (4.8)




c(pi; p i;R) =  
v
t
e pi[ e pi  (2pi   2pw   1) + e pi  (pi   pw   1) 
 tR  (pi   pw   1)] +
v
t
e pi[ e pi  (2pi   2pw   1) 
 e pi + e pi   tR]
Let us evaluate this expression for relation f : f(R) = ln vtR
2 F
FtR
. As p = f(R) is
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 (pi   pw   2)] (4.9)
Locally, at pi = f(R), the second order condition for prot maximization is satised:




c(f(R); f(R); R) =  
FtR
vtR2   F
[(vtR  F )2 + vtR2 + F ] < 0
(as f(R) > 0, we have vtR2 F > 0). Locally, therefore, the second order condition
to the prot maximization problem is satised by prices and market areas satisfying
the rst order condition (4.1). In fact, a suÆcient condition for prot function c(:)
to be concave on the entire relevant price interval is that R >
p
2F=vt, since an
upperbound on the relevant prices is pw + 1, the equilibrium price under Loschian
spatial competition12 for given wholesale price pw; therefore, for all relevant prices
pi   pw   1 < 0 and pi   pw   2 < 0 in expression (4.9). Expression (4.9) is not
conclusive on the concavity of the prot function when R <
p
2F=vt. However, in
the next sections it will be shown that the case R <
p
2F=vt can be disregarded: it
implies low price levels p = f(R), levels that turn out not to be optimal from the
viewpoint of the manufacturer (or the vertical structure).
The above calculations have relied on the situation being 'competitive', i.e. re-
tailers are competing with their neighbours for the indierent consumer located in-
between. Apart from marginally increasing or decreasing its price, each retailer also
has the possibility of 'drastically' increasing or decreasing its price. Concerning the
rst possibility: let us check whether a retailer can increase its equilibrium prots
(i.e. obtain a prot greater than zero), by raising its price by such an extent that the
relevant market frontier is no longer determined by the indierent consumer x but by
location xmax. In other words, can a retailer get positive prots by picking a point on
its monopoly segment? A rst observation is that the retailer, in order to arrive on
its monopoly segment, will have to pick a price which is at least as high as the price
associated with the kink in the demand curve. As prots on the monopoly segment
are a concave function of the price, a retailer would either choose the monopoly price
pm(pw) or, if this price is not on the monopoly segment, the lowest price which is, i.e.
the price associated with the kink. The latter price, p0, is determined by
xmax(p
0) = R  xmax(p)




12Under Loschian spatial competition, each outlet assumes that its market area is invariant to
changes in its price. In other words, each outlet assumes that neighbouring outlets will match any
price change. This amounts to maximizing vR  e p(p   pw), which gives p = pw + 1. See also
Mathewson and Winter (1983), Capozza and Van Order (1977) or Losch (1938).
4.6. Appendices 139




Note that a kink price only exists when R >
p
2F=vt. (when R <
p
2F=vt, we
have that R < xmax(p), so that the location of each retailer is in fact included in the
potential market area of the competitors: no monopoly segment of the demand curve
exists in such a case). As the kink price 'connects' the competitive segment with the
monopoly segment of each rm's demand curve and we have already established global
concavity of the competitive segment for R >
p
2F=vt, we can conclude that choosing
the kink price is no protable option. Let us consider choosing the monopoly price.
In a free entry monopoly equilibrium, retailers turn out to be not directly competing
with each other. Prots for a local monopolist if it sets price p are
m
i
(p) = qm(p)  (p  pw)  F
where qm(p) = 2v
t
 e 2p. Prot maximization gives13:
pm(pw) = pw +
1
2


















> 0, i.e. when
R <
p
2F=vt. In other words, whenever a monopoly segment exists (R >
p
2F=vt),
the price that an unconstrained local monopolist would like to set (pm(pw)) is not
part of this segment (on relation f , price pm(pw) gives rise to overlapping, not disjoint
potential market areas; cf. Salop (1979; gure 6)). The best the rm can then do is
to choose the lowest price which is on the monopoly segment, i.e. the price associated
with the kink, but this price does not give (as outlined above) a higher prot than
the best competitive price.
Let us now consider 'drastic' price cuts, in particular 'mill price undercutting':
setting the price so low that the competitor's (eective) price at its own retail outlet
is undercut. At this price level there is a discontinuity in the demand curve: for prices
slightly above the level, the market area is dened by the indierent consumer located
inbetween; for prices slightly below, the entire market area previously served by the
competitor is now served by the undercutting rm (cf. Eaton and Lipsey (1978),
d'Aspremont e.a. (1979) or Novshek (1980)). Retailer i undercuts the mill price of
retailer j when x(p) = R:
13See also the next appendix section.
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1
2t
 (e pi   e pj + tR) = R , i.e. p̂
i
= ln(tR + e pj) 1
Evaluated on pj = f(R), the mill price undercutting price is
p̂
i

















c(p̂i; f(R); R) = v  3R  e p̂i(p̂i   pw)  F












(ln z   z + 1) = 1
z
  1 > 0 for z < 1 and F
vtR2





+ 1 < 0, and hence c(p̂i; f(R); R) < 0: mill price undercutting will not occur
in the competitive equilibrium. A 'no mill price undercutting' assumption, as put
forward by Eaton and Lipsey (1978) or Novshek (1980), is therefore not necessary.
Note, however, that this is due to our assumption of symmetric locations: without
this assumption, the pay-o function would not be dened for small dierences in
location in the rst place.
We conclude that the combinations (p; R) on f , satisfying the requirement of
compatibility with demand (g), represent competitive equilibria.
Proof of Lemma 4.2: the free entry monopoly equilibrium
In a free entry monopoly equilibrium, retailers turn out to be not directly competing




m(pi)  (pi   pw)  F












Putting it to zero gives us the FOC: pm(pw) = pw +
1
2












e 3pi  [ pi + 1 + pw] < 0
as pi < pw+1. The second order condition is therefore satised, at least, for the prices
for which the above demand function specication is appropriate. Let us also check
whether the free entry monopoly equilibrium can be subject to mill price undercutting.
As indicated in the text, the price at the free entry monopoly equilibrium is pM =
ln(
p
v=F t), the market area is RM = 2
p


















Prots for the undercutting rm are then
(p̂i) = v  3RM  e p̂i(p̂i   pw)  F





























We conclude that the free entry monopoly equilibrium is not subject to mill price
undercutting.
Proof of Lemma 4.3: the kinked equilibria
In the third type of equilibria, the potential market areas just touch each other and the
prot maximizing prices are corner solutions. Each wholesale price pw 2 [pSw; pMw ) gives
rise to one equilibrium price that satises p = g(R). Let us check whether mill price
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undercutting can occur. The mill price undercutting price in a kinked equilibrium is
p̂
i




The wholesale price associated with a kinked equilibrium follows from the zero prot







Prots for a mill price undercutting rm are therefore
(p̂i; p; R) = v  3Rk  e p̂i(p̂i   pw)  F






















)  F < 0
as for the kinked equilibria R > RS =
p
3F=vt, so that ln 1
3





No mill price undercutting will occur at the kinked equilibria.
Proof of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2: the non-integrated optimum
Recall from Section 4.2 that three possible equilibria may arise. For low wholesale
prices pw, the resulting equilibria are the competitive equilibria, for intermediate pw




monopoly equilibrium will be the result.
Let us rst consider the kinked equilibria and the free entry monopoly equilibrium.
They resemble the integrated optimum (pI; RI) in that the customers who are located
furthest away from a shop are left with exactly zero utility (it holds that p = g(R)).
It follows immediately that the free entry monopoly equilibrium dominates the kinked
equilibria form the viewpoint of the manufacturer: for all kinked equilibria pk > pM (so




(the wholesale margin for the manufacturer is lower as well).
Let us now compare the integrated optimum (pI; RI) with the monopoly equilib-
rium. It is unfortunate that the explicit coordinates of the integrated optimum I are
not known to us, but this is not problematic. Inspection of int(g(R); R) reveals that
along curve g prot int is increasing for p < p
I and decreasing for p > pI . As we
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as it holds that pM = pm(pM
w
)  pm(c) = c+ 1
2




the monopoly equilibrium M does not coincide with the industry optimum I; M lies
'north-west' of I along the g-curve. It conrms that none of the kinked equilibria
coincides with I and that none of them yield more prot to the producer than the
free entry monopoly equilibrium M (for all kinked equilibria Rk < RM < RI).




(g(R); R) in M is zero (M and I coincide) if and only
if pM
w
= c, i.e. the highest possible wholesale price equals marginal cost. This will
be the case when the xed costs are that large that even a vertically integrated rm
would only just be able to break even in its operations. The level of xed costs for
which this is case is Fviable =
v
t
e 2c+1. The conclusion is that, unless F = Fviable, the
free entry monopoly equilibrium always involves a retail price and an outlet density
that is too high from the viewpoint of the integrated structure.
What remains is to compare the overall prots in free entry monopoly equilibrium
M with those of the best possible competitive equilibrium, C. Equilibrium C is found
by maximizing prod(f(R); R) subject to p  g(R). The derivative of prod w.r.t. R
along relation f :
@prod(f(R); R)
@R







vF tR(vtR2 + F )




  c  1) + 1](4.10)
An interior optimum (where the above derivative is zero) is only implicitly dened. A
suÆcient condition to have a corner solution (prod increasing in R all along relation
f) is that f(R)  c + 1. Then the best competitive equilibrium is given by point S,
where f(R) = g(R). But in this case, we already know that the manufacturer prefers
the monopoly equilibrium (prod(g(R); R) increases in R until R = R
I). Hence, a
suÆcient condition for the free entry monopoly equilibrium to be the non-integrated
optimum is that f(R)  c+1, i.e. that F  4v
3t
e 2(c+1). Note that 4v
3t
e 2(c+1)  Fviable,
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so there exist values of F that satisfy the suÆcient condition.
Let us see whether it is possible that the best competitive equilibrium outperforms
the free entry monopoly equilibrium for small F . This indeed appears to be the case.
Prots in the free entry monopoly equilibrium are
prod(p
M ; RM) = L  v  e p
M











































(using the theorem of de l'Hopital). The reason is that when F  0, in order to
have the retailers obtain a zero prot in a monopoly situation requires ever higher
wholesale prices pw. The resulting retail prices are then way above the optimal level,
pI . In fact, both pM and pM
w
go towards innity, leaving zero prot. When the xed
costs of setting up a retail outlet are almost zero, the free entry monopoly equilibrium
cannot possibly be optimal. The optimum will be a competitive equilibrium, one
implied by the rst order condition based on (4.10). For example, when F  0, the
rst order condition on prot maximization (4.1) and the zero prot condition (4.2)
imply p  pw and R  0, so that prod(p; R)  L  v  e pw(pw   c). The latter is
maximized for pw  c+ 1 and gives a prot prod  L  v  e c 1 > 0.
Supposing that the xed costs are such that the optimum for the manufacturer in
the absence of vertical restraints is a competitive equilibrium, how does the resulting
retail price compare with that of the integrated optimum? For this we only have to
consider the sign of @
@R
prod(f(R); R) evaluated at p = p


























What we can conclude, is that the best possible non-integrated equilibrium (be it a
competitive or a monopoly equilbrium) involves too high prices and too high outlet
density from the perspective of the vertical structure as a whole.
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Chapter 5
Resale price maintenance under
cost uncertainty: a note on 'The
logic of vertical restraints'
5.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, several explanations for the use of resale price
maintenance have been given in the economic literature. The focus of the present
chapter is on the incentive and insurance properties of resale price maintenance in an
uncertain trading environment, a subject that has notably been analysed by Rey and
Tirole in their insightful contribution 'The logic of vertical restraints' (1986, American
Economic Review 76: p. 921-936).
Rey and Tirole (1986) set up a spatial model of retail competition and analyse the
role of resale price maintenance (RPM) when there is uncertainty about future demand
and cost levels. The retailers are better informed (ex post) about the realisation
of nal demand and about their own costs than the manufacturer. The latter is
assumed not to be able to obtain this information, directly or indirectly (one of the
reasons for this is that the retailers can engage in arbitrage, making it impossible
for the manufacturer to follow track of the supplies). Hence, informational problems
prevent the manufacturer from using explicit contracts based on the true performances
(prots) of the retailers.
The basic trade-o in the choice of contract is between the optimal exploitation of
market power and the amount of risk that the retailers are willing to accept. The opti-
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mal exploitation of market power requires that one avoids the double marginalisation
problem associated with linear wholesale pricing, i.e. the problem that nal prices
end up too high from the viewpoint of the vertical structure due to consequent stages
of market power (Spengler, 1950). One way of doing so is to use two-part taris,
involving a xed upfront payment (the franchise fee) and a low marginal wholesale
price. Another method is resale price maintenance, by which the producer directly
imposes the proper nal price on the retailers. If there is no uncertainty, the two
methods yield identical results. However, when there is uncertainty the two may
dier. Whereas free competition between retailers clearly allows better use of local
information than the inexible instrument of RPM, the insurance properties are more
complex: risk averse retailers dislike the possibility of not earning back a franchise
fee, but also RPM exposes them to risks, to the extent that their prot margins are
subject to uctuations. The relative protability of the two instruments depends on
the circumstances in the market1.
One of Rey and Tirole's (1986) more specic results is that when uncertainty
is about costs and retailers are risk averse, free competition between retailers (in
combination with a two-part tari) has good incentive and insurance properties. It
turns out to be a more protable option for the manufacturer than RPM in the three
model specications analysed in the article:
1. the case in which cost uncertainty is market-wide (the costs faced by all
retailers uctuate in the same way) and retailers are non-dierentiated
2. the case in which cost uncertainty is market-wide and retailers are dier-
entiated2 and
3. the case in which cost uncertainty is rm-specic ('idiosyncratic') and re-
tailers are non-dierentiated.
The principal reason for these results is that under cost uncertainty, the retail
margin is particularly volatile under RPM: the retail price is xed but the cost level
varies, a feature for which risk averse retailers need some compensation (e.g. via lower
wholesale prices).
1Rey and Tirole (1986) also consider exclusive distribution arrangements. The focus of this
chapter is on the comparison between competition and RPM.
2Retailers being dierentiated amounts to retailers posessing some (localized) market power:
when, for example, 'shopping costs' are non-zero, proximity dierentiates the retailers from the
viewpoint of the customers.
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The main goal of the current chapter is to show that the result on the favourable
incentive and insurance properties of competition does not generally carry over to the
case of rm-specic cost uncertainty and retailers being dierentiated (i.e. possessing
some market power).
The essential point is that in the absence of retailer dierentiation (as in the case
of idiosyncratic cost uncertainty in Rey and Tirole (1986)), there is only one source
of double marginalisation: the double marginalisation due to cost dierences at the
retail level (when one retailer turns out to be more eÆcient than the other, it obtains
a positive retail margin by just undercutting the price of the other retailer). With
only this source of double marginalisation, the need for a powerful two-part wholesale
tari is not very great: even when retailers are so risk averse that they are not willing
to accept any positive franchise fee at all (because this might result in a loss in some
situations), downstream competition turns out to perform better than resale price
maintenance3.
However, when there is also a double marginalisation problem due to retailer
dierentiation, there is a greater need for a powerful wholesale tari, involving lower
wholesale prices and, correspondingly, a higher franchise fee. But the extent to which
the manufacturer can charge the required franchise fee is limited by the risk that the
retailers are willing to bear: a franchise fee can only be recovered by the retailers
when the retail margin they earn is suÆciently positive (in some average sense)4.
Whereas rm-specic cost uncertainty makes it more diÆcult to charge a franchise
fee to risk averse retailers which are competing in prices, resale price maintenance is
an instrument to protect the retailers against more eÆcient rivals. As a result of this
insurance property, resale price maintenance can be an optimal commercial policy for
a manufacturer. In particular, it is shown that in the case of dierentiated retailers,
RPM is optimal when the cost uncertainty is rm-specic, the retailers are suÆciently
risk averse and the range of possible retail cost levels is not too wide (so as to make
RPM too 'rigid' as an instrument).
The next section, Section 5.2, will describe the model; it involves a specication of
retail dierentiation that is simpler than that of Rey and Tirole (1986), in order to be
3Cf. Rey and Tirole (1986), p. 930. When no franchise fee is imposed, the insurance properties
of free retail competition are necessarily very good: even when the retail margin ends up being zero
(which occurs whenever the competitors are at least as cost eÆcient), the retailers obtain a net prot
equal to zero.
4In a similar fashion, the results of Rey and Tirole (1986) also depend on the specic assumption
made as regards the level of xed costs required to set up a retail outlet.
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able to conduct the analysis. Section 5.2 also characterises the retail market equilibria
for given wholesale prices and the industry optimum. Section 5.3 addresses the optimal
choice of contract from the viewpoint of the manufacturer, when retailers are risk
neutral; Section 5.4 does the same for the case of risk averse retailers. Concluding
comments and a short discussion are oered in Section 5.5.
5.2 The basic model
As indicated in the introduction, the role of resale price maintenance will be studied
in a simple model of retail competition. We assume that a manufacturer supplies its
product to (at most) two retailers. The unit costs of production equal c. The retailers
are dierentiated from the viewpoint of the consumers. If the product is sold by two
retailers, market demand di for retailer i (i = 1; 2) depends negatively on the own
price pi and positively on the price of the competing retailer, pj (j 6= i):
di(pi; pj) = 1  pi +   pj (0   < 1)
The above demand specication5 diers from the spatial competition framework of
Rey and Tirole (1986). This is done in order to keep the analysis tractable, in partic-
ular in order to obtain closed form solutions for the equilibrium price levels and prot
levels in case the retail costs of the retailers are not the same (this appeared impossible
in a spatial competition framework with downward sloping consumer demand).
Each retailer that decides to resell the product incurs a xed investment cost
F  06. The marginal retailing costs of retailer i are denoted by i. In line with Rey
and Tirole (1986), the cost parameters are, ex ante, not known to the retailers or the
manufacturer: it is only common knowledge that they are independently distributed
following a uniform distribution: i; j  U(; ), where 0     < 11    c. The
true values (the 'realisations') are observed by the retailers after they have entered the
market. Subsequently, they can use this information to make their pricing decisions.
By contrast, the cost parameters cannot be observed or inferred by the manufacturer
5See Appendix 5.6.1 for the underlying utility function.
6A tempting interpretation of the xed costs is that they represent the opportunity costs of shelf
space (prots foregone by having the product concerned in the shelves and not some other product).
However, this interpretation implies a multiproduct setting, a much more complex context (cf. Rey
and Verge (1999) for such an analysis in the absence of uncertainty).
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(any obtained information by the manufacturer is at best 'soft')7. It is assumed
that informational problems only allow for the use of a two-part wholesale tari T (:)
(consisting of a xed fee A and a wholesale price pw) and/or the use of resale price
maintenance. The contract oered by the manufacturer is public knowledge8. The
manufacturer is taken to be risk-neutral, an assumption which can be justied by the
assumption that the manufacturer supplies many, statistically independent markets.
Retailers will enter the market if and only if the utility obtained from the prospec-
tive prots is higher than, or equal to zero. As regards the risk attitudes of the
retailers, we consider two extremes: risk neutral retailers and innitely risk averse
retailers. The rst type is willing to enter the market and invest F as soon as the
expected net prot is at least zero. The second type invests only if it is sure that the
net prot is at least zero in every possible state of nature.
The exact timing of the model is as follows:
- stage I: the manufacturer decides on the (uniform) sales conditions vis-a-vis the
retailers, i.e. on a wholesale price pw, on a xed fee (or subsidy) A, and on whether
or not to use resale price maintenance;
- stage II: given the manufacturer's choice, retailers decide simultaneously whether
or not to enter a market; If they enter, they invest an amount F  0:
- stage III: the retailers which have entered a market learn the realisations of the
previously uncertain cost parameters; the manufacturer, however, remains ignorant
about the realized values of the parameters.
- stage IV: the retailers compete in prices (Bertrand competition between dier-
entiated retailers). If only one retailer has entered, it can act as a monopolist.
In stage I, preceding the entry decision of the retailers, the producer decides on
the sales conditions vis-a-vis the retailers with the objective of maximizing its prots.
In doing so, the manufacturer takes into account how its decisions will aect the
retailers' behaviour. As a preliminary step, I will characterise the free retail market
equilibria that arise for given wholesale prices and given cost parameters. Then, I will
characterise the 'rst-best' result, i.e. the result that maximizes prot for the vertically
integrated structure. This will serve as a benchmark with which the performance of
the respective instruments (wholesale price, xed fee, the vertical restraints) can be
assessed.
7As mentioned in the introduction, one explanation for this is that the retailers can engage in
arbitrage, making it impossible for the manufacturer to follow track of the supplies.
8No commitment problems in the sense of Rey and Tirole (1997) or Segal (1999) arise, therefore.
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5.2.1 Characterisation of retail market equilibria for given
wholesale prices and given cost parameters
Consider rst the situation that two retailers have entered in stage II and that the
cost realisations have been learnt in stage III. In stage IV, given that retailer j charges
price pj for the product it sells, the prots for retailer i are
i(pi; pj) = (pi   pw   )  di(pi; pj)  F
= (pi   pw   )  (1  pi +   pj)  F




 (1 +   pj + pw + i) =: Ri(pj)












(1 + pw + i +
1
2
(1 + pw + j)) (5.1)
where the retail equilibrium price p
i
for retailer i (i = 1; 2) is written as a function of
the marginal wholesale price pw charged by the manufacturer. The retailers' prots















(j   i))2   F (5.2)
When, in stage II, only one retailer has entered (say, retailer i), it can act as a
monopolist in the pricing stage. It will then face the demand function10
di(pi) = 1 +    (1  2)  pi














(1 + )(1  (1  )(pw + i))2
4(1  )
  F (5.4)
9The second order condition is satised. It is assumed, for the moment, that the expression for
Ri(pj) is at least equal to pw + i; this point will be adressed later on.
10See the appendix for its derivation from the underlying system of demand curves di(pi; pj) =
1  pi +   pj (i = 1; 2) posited earlier.
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5.2.2 Benchmark case: the vertically integrated structure
In stage I, preceding the entry decision of the retailers, the producer decides on the
sales conditions vis-a-vis the retailers with the objective of maximizing its prots. As
a rst step, I shall characterise the 'rst-best' result, i.e. the result that maximizes
prot for the vertically integrated structure. This will serve as a benchmark with
which the performance of the respective instruments (wholesale price, xed fee, resale
price maintenance) can be assessed. In the next section, the optimal choice for the
manufacturer will be characterised, both for the case that retailers are risk-neutral
and for the case that they are extremely risk averse.
A rst question to answer is: how many outlets would a vertical structure want to
have? One or two? The trade-o is as follows: on the one hand, the more shops the
structure opens, the higher the xed costs involved are. On the other hand, opening
more shops oers more variety to consumers and, hence, more consumer demand.
In comparing the maximally obtainable prots under both options, we obtain the
following proposition (where we have assumed that the vertical structure only cares
about expected prots, just as the risk neutral manufacturer):
Proposition 5.1 A suÆcient condition for the vertically integrated rm to prefer two
retail outlets instead of one is that the investment cost per retail outlet is not too large:
F  1
4
 (1  (1  )(c+ e)), where e = Efig.
Proof. See appendix.
The fact that it is better to have two retail outlets instead of one when the cost of
investment is not too large is intuitive. First of all, consumers value retail variety and
to oer this variety means that the manufacturer can extract more surplus from the
consumers. The possible uncertainty about costs only reinforces the result: for a given
value of the expected marginal retail cost (e), the expected prot for the integrated
structure, both when there is one outlet and when there are two, is increasing in the
spread (   ). More precisely, the prot functions are convex in  and : a drop
in prots following a rise in retail cost is limited as the retail price can be adjusted
optimally, limiting the drop in sales. This holds even more for the case of two rms,
because it entails one more degree of freedom.
In what follows, we will focus on cases in which it is optimal for the industry to
have two retail outlets, as only in these cases there is an issue of idiosyncratic risk to
be studied. When the structure chooses for two retail outlets it maximizes






(pi   c  i)  di(pi; pj)  2F
The (ex post) optimal retail prices and their expected levels are stated, for future
reference, in the following lemma:
Lemma 5.1 The (ex post) optimal retail prices for the integrated rm when it opts
for two outlets are pI
i
= 1






 (1  (1  )(c+ e))
Proof. See appendix.
5.3 The manufacturer's choice: the case of risk neu-
tral retailers
5.3.1 Two-part taris
If a producer cannot use vertical restraints, the only decision variable is the price (or
price schedule) at which it sells to the retailers, the wholesale tari. In this section,
we will consider the outcomes that a two-part wholesale tari can produce. If q is
the quantity sold to the retailer, the latter pays wholesale tari T (q) = A+ pw  q,
where A is the franchise fee and pw the unit wholesale price. We will not explicitly
consider the case of a traditional linear tari as it is, rst, just a special case of a
two-part tari (the franchise fee being zero) and, secondly, unlikely to bring about
an optimal outcome, given the problem of double marginalisation: since the retailers
are dierentiated, there will be some double marginalisation and because consumer
demand is elastic, it brings about the usual demand distortion.
Let us suppose that the producer aims at having two retailers carrying its product.
This amounts to assuming that the xed cost of investment is not too large (this
assumption will be checked later in the appendix). When the retailers are risk neutral
they are willing to accept the sales conditions of the manufacturer whenever it gives
them an non-negative prot in expectation. So, the manufacturer chooses franchise
fee A and unit wholesale price pw so as to solve the following program:




s.t. A  Efi(pw)g
where prod(pw) is the producer's operating prot (excluding the franchise fee) when
it charges marginal wholesale price pw,




and i(pw) is retailer i's prot (excluding the franchise fee) given by expression (5.2).
The maximum franchise fee that the manufacturer can charge is such that the retailers
are left without prot, in expectation. This maximal fee is also the optimal one: it is
not optimal for the producer to leave prot in the hands of the retailers. Hence, the




We state the following lemma:
Lemma 5.2 (Risk neutral retailers). With competing retailers, the optimal marginal
wholesale price for the manufacturer is given by pA
w
= c + 1
2
( 1
1    c   
e), the
optimal franchise fee is A = Efi(pAw)g: The manufacturer eliminates the double
marginalisation problem in expectation (Efpig = EfpIg) but, generically, not ex post.
The manufacturer's expected prot does not attain that of the integrated optimum.
Proof. See appendix.
Note that, in this case, the optimal marginal wholesale price is larger than the
marginal cost of production, c: the wholesale price is, as it should be, chosen to
reect the (expected) opportunity cost of selling one more unit to one of the retailers.
After all, if one more unit is sold to a retailer, there is not only a marginal cost
of production c to the structure, but also the eect that every extra unit sold by a
retailer depresses the price that the other retailer can charge to the consumers. In
fact, the term 1
2
( 1
1    c   
e) in Lemma 5.2 represents the partial derivative of
the expected prot of retailer i with respect to the quantity sold by retailer j 11.
In expectation, the potential double marginalisation problem associated with retail
market power is avoided by taking a marginal wholesale price that gives just the
11The partial derivative of the expected prot of retailer i with respect to the quantity sold by
retailer j is @
@qj
(Ef(pi(qi; qj)  c  i)  qig), where pi(:) is the inverse demand curve for retailer i.
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right pricing incentives to the retailers from the ex ante viewpoint of the industry.
However, the expected prot for the manufacturer does not attain the rst best level
as the retailers do not face the right marginal cost from the industry's perspective
when the retail costs are dierent from the expected ones: the wholesale price is based
on the expected opportunity cost 1
2
( 1
1    c  




1    c  i).
The franchise fee serves to capture the entire resulting expected surplus at the
retail level (leaving the retailers with an expected operating prot just enough to
cover the xed cost F ). As the retailers are risk neutral, there are no specic insurance
constraints and the producer is not hindered in choosing a franchise fee that captures
all prots in expectation.
5.3.2 Resale price maintenance
With resale price maintenance, one of the sales conditions is that the product must
be resold at the price that the producer has indicated. Denote this price by ~p. Let
the wholesale tari again be T (q) = A+ pw  q, where A is the franchise fee, pw the




Efprod(~p; pw)g+ 2 A
s.t. A  Efi(~p; pw)g
where prod(~p; pw) is the producer's operating prot when it sets retail price ~p and
charges marginal wholesale price pw,




and i(~p; pw) is the corresponding retailer's prot (excluding the franchise fee):
i(~p; pw) = (~p  pw   i)  di(~p; ~p)  F
The opportunity for the manufacturer to use a franchise fee turns out to be im-
material in this case. For a given choice of retail price ~p, it can just choose pw large
enough to take away, in expectation, all surplus at the retail level. (A and pw are inde-
terminate, as long as retailers obtain a non-negative prot in expectation). Hence, for
the manufacturer, the problem comes down to choosing ~p so as to maximize industry
prot






(~p  c  i)  di(~p; ~p)g   2F
We obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3 (Risk neutral retailers). Under resale price maintenance, the manufac-
turer optimally imposes a retail price equal to the expected price level of the rst
best: pRPM = EfpIg.
Proof. See appendix.
By comparing the prot levels of the manufacturer under both regimes, the fol-
lowing proposition follows:
Proposition 5.2 When retailers are risk neutral, the manufacturer adopts a policy
of free retail competition and two-part taris.
Proof. See appendix.
Close inspection of the prot functions reveals that the prot obtained under re-
sale price maintenance (EfRPMg) falls short of the prot obtained under free retail
competition using two-part taris by an amount proportional to ( )2. This reects
the point that under free retail competition local cost information is used, whereas
under resale price maintenance, the producer chooses a retail price ex ante and that,
therefore, local information in the hands of the retailers remains unused. Naturally,
the performance of resale price maintenance becomes worse as the variability of the
cost parameters increases. In expectation, the retail prices under resale price mainte-
nance and free retail competition are the same, but it is the use of local information
that makes free retail competition better from the viewpoint of the manufacturer.
5.3.3 Welfare assessment
As long as the xed costs of investment (F ) are not too large, it is welfare optimal to
have two retail outlets: consumers value retail variety. As for the welfare comparison
between the regime of free retail competition and resale price maintenance, we can
rst note that in terms of the expected retail price, there is no dierence between
the two (as mentioned above). However, it is only under free retail competition that
the quantity sold (i.e. consumption) varies: it goes up with lower retail costs  and
goes down with higher retail costs. Not only is this better for the industry (free
retail competition gives a higher pay-o than resale price maintenance does), also
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consumers prefer this variability. Let us have a precise look at the consumers' surplus.
Total consumers' surplus is just the mathematical sum of the surpluses derived from
consuming products i and j sold by the two retailers12: CS = CSi+CSj. The surplus













a familiar expression for the case of linear demand. Hence, in expectation, consumer
surplus is





g = (Efqig)2 + V fqig
In short, consumer surplus increases with the average level of consumption Efqig and
with the variance of consumption (the consumer surplus is convex in consumption).
The conclusion is that with risk neutral retailers, total welfare is higher under free
retail competition than under resale price maintenance. The private incentives of the
manufacturer in its choice of distribution system are, therefore, in line with the social
optimum13. We summarize the result of this section in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.3 When retailers are risk neutral, the manufacturer adopts a policy
(free retail competition) which also results in the highest welfare.
5.4 The manufacturer's choice: the case of risk averse
retailers
5.4.1 Two-part taris
Let us again suppose that the producer aims at having two retailers carrying its
product (this assumption will be checked later in the appendix). When the retailers
are innitely risk averse they are only willing to accept the contract oered by the
manufacturer when it gives them a non-negative prot also in the worst case scenario.
Under idiosyncratic cost uncertainty, the worst case scenario for retailers is that their
12In general, this need not be true, but here it is because the demand functions exhibit no income
eect (Tirole, 1988, p.9). A more general condition would be that the cross-partial derivatives of the
demand functions are equal, a condition that is also met.
13Of course, the actual price level is still to high from the viewpoint of welfare maximization.
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competitors turn out to be very agressive (their cost eÆciency is strong, ), whereas
they themselves are very ineÆcient (their cost parameter is ). Let us denote by

i
(pw), the lowest prot retailer i can possibly get. It is obtained from expression
(5.2) by inserting i = ; j = .
In order to obtain a maximum prot, while inducing the retailers to participate,





s.t. A  
i
(pw)
The maximum franchise fee that the manufacturer can charge is such that the
retailers are left without prot, in the worst case scenario. This maximal fee is also
the optimal one: it is not optimal for the producer to leave prot in the hands of the
retailers and it cannot ask for more. Hence, the maximization problem reduces to
max
pw
Efprod(pw)g+ 2  i(pw)
We state the following lemma:
Lemma 5.4 (Innitely risk averse retailers) Under free retail competition, the opti-
mal tari induces an expected retail price that is too high from the industry's point
of view: Efpig > EfpIi g. Further, the manufacturer obtains a prot that is smaller
than the one obtained when retailers are risk neutral.
Proof. See appendix.
The reason is simple. Because the retailers are risk averse, the manufacturer has
to be considerate of the risk that they incur when a franchise fee is imposed on them.
This impairs the manufacturer to impose the powerful tari structure found in the
preceding section that ensured optimal pricing incentives (in expectation) and allowed
the manufacturer to capture the entire industry surplus. Under this tari scheme, the
manufacturer eectively 'sold out' the business to the retailers: the manufacturer
obtained the entire expected industry surplus by an upfront payment (the franchise
fee) and let the retailers take all the risk. With risk neutral resellers, this is no
problem, with risk averse retailers it is.
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5.4.2 Resale price maintenance
What outcome can be attained by the manufacturer when it applies resale price
maintenance? Denote by ~p the price that the manufacturer imposes. Let the wholesale
tari again be T (q) = A+ pw  q. Now, the manufacturer solves
max
A;pw;~p
Efprod(~p; pw)g+ 2 A





(~p; pw) is the worst possible outcome that a retailer can have under the
current regime: it is i(~p; pw) = (~p  pw   )  di(~p; ~p)  F . The opportunity for the
manufacturer to use a franchise fee turns out to be immaterial in this case as well.
It may just as well choose the wholesale price such that the retailer is left with zero
prot in the worst state of nature14. Let us take pw = ~p      F=di(~p; ~p). Now, for






  c)  di(~p; ~p)
We obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5 (Innitely risk averse retailers) Under resale price maintenance, the
manufacturer imposes a retail price equal to pRPM = 1
2(1 )  (1   (1   )(c + )) >
EfpI
i
g. The manufacturer obtains a prot that is smaller than the one obtained when
retailers are risk neutral.
Proof. See appendix.
A comparison with the prot obtained under risk neutrality reveals that the man-
ufacturer eectively focuses on the worst possible cost situation , rather than on the
expected cost situation e.
The following proposition states the main result of the current chapter.
Proposition 5.4 When cost uncertainty is idiosyncratic but moderate (the spread
    is smaller than a cut-o level ) and retailers are innitely risk averse, the
manufacturer prefers resale price maintenance to free retail competition.
14Things are dierent when there is also demand uncertainty at play. In that case, the franchise
fee is optimally zero. After all, the manufacturer can then choose the highest possible wholesale
price pw thats puts the retailer's net prot equal to zero in the worst case scenario (0 = i(~p; pw)),
which has the advantage of also increasing the manufacturer's prot in other states of nature (states
in which demand turns out to be high).
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Proof. See appendix.
Two eects are at play. The fact that retailers are risk averse makes it diÆcult
for the manufacturer to impose a franchise fee on them, a fee which would counter
the double marginalisation problem. The problem is that, with a substantial fee, the
retailers may not break even when the competitor turns out to be very eÆcient. Resale
price maintenance does not have this insurance problem, because it automatically
neutralizes the adverse eect of a competitor being more eÆcient: every retailer is
required to charge the same price whatever the realisation of cost. However, the larger
the cost variability (the larger the dierence  ), the more the inexibility of resale
price maintenance becomes a weak point. Local information is not used under resale
price maintenance, which implies a poor exploitation of market power.
It turns out that for small cost variability, the insurance argument dominates
(rendering resale price maintenance the most protable instrument) and that for large
cost variability, the exibility argument dominates (making free retail competition the
more protable instrument). The reason for resale price maintenance to be superior
for small cost variability is not trivial and may be traced back to the following. When
there is no uncertainty at all, free retail competition and resale price maintenance
yield exactly the same prot. In the case of free retail competition, the introduc-
tion of a little bit of uncertainty (a small dierence    ) necessitates a reduction
in the franchise fee for both retailers: the price schedule becomes less powerful for
both retailers. Resale price maintenance, on the other hand, may imply a retail price
that is somewhat too large for one retailer and too low for the other, but the overall
performance is to be preferred to the sure loss in franchise fees under direct competi-
tion. It is only when the cost variability is large, that the inexibility of resale price
maintenance starts to count.
5.4.3 Welfare assessment
As long as the xed costs of investment, F , are not too large, it is welfare optimal
to have two retail outlets15. Further, we can derive that, in expectation, the (xed)
15Given that the retailers are risk averse, one cannot simply add up consumer surplus and the
prots of the vertical structure to characterise total welfare. The welfare optimum can, however, be
thought of as the situation which would be chosen by a social planner. In the case of risk averse
retailers, the social planner would choose to maximize the sum of consumer surplus and prots,
while totally insuring the retailers through redistribution. In this sense, as long as the xed costs of
investment are not too large, it is welfare optimal to have two retail outlets.
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retail price under resale price maintenance is lower than that of direct competition: in
expectation it does a better job in tackling the double marginalisation problem than
direct competition. This speaks in favour of resale price maintenance, both from the
viewpoint of the industry (see Proposition 3) and that of the consumers. However,
again, it is only under direct competition that the quantity sold (i.e. consumption)
can vary: it goes up with lower retail costs  and goes down with higher retail costs.
This is better both for the industry and for consumers. It follows that as long as retail
cost variability is small, total welfare is larger under resale price maintenance than
under direct competition. Let us call the level of the cost uncertainty under which
the two regimes lead to equal welfare w. We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 5.5 When retailers are innitely risk averse, there are cases in which
the manufacturer's preference for resale price maintenace is welfare optimal (for small
cost uncertainty,     < w) and when it is not (for intermediate levels, w <
    < ). Whenever the manufacturer adopts a policy of free retail competition,
that policy also results in the highest welfare.
Proof. See appendix.
It follows that as long as retail cost variability is small enough,     < w,
total welfare is larger under resale price maintenance than under direct competition.
In that case, the private incentives of the manufacturer are in line with the social
optimum. The result that for intermediate levels the producer chooses resale price
maintenance whereas this is not welfare optimal, has to do with the fact that the
producer does not internalize the eects of its policy on consumers and retailers (who
both value variability in prices).
5.5 Discussion
The main conclusion of this chapter is that when retailers face idiosyncratic cost
uncertainty, it is conceivable that the use of resale price maintenance is a way to
increase the manufacturer's prots. Necessary conditions under which this is the case
are that 1) the retailers possess market power 2) the retailers are suÆciently risk averse
and 3) the cost variability is not too large. As for the rst element: the presence of
market power necessitates, in the case of retail competition, the use of a powerful two-
part tari (a positive franchise fee and a low wholesale price) to counter the double
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marginalisation problem due to retailer dierentiation. When retailers are risk averse
(element 2), it is diÆcult to impose a fee on them and to eectively counter this
problem. Therefore, it is resale price maintenance that serves best to exploit market
power and to insure the retailers, as long as the loss of exibility under resale price
maintenance is not too important (element 3). The above reasoning also applies even
more so, when retailers need to invest before they can start their enterprise. After all,
from the viewpoint of the retailers, a franchise fee and a xed cost of investment are
not dierent: both must be regained in the market place16.
In fact, the argument made in this chapter bears an analogy to a dierent case that
has been considered by Rey and Tirole (1986), that of market-wide uncertainty about
demand conditions. Whereas RPM and free retail competition under two-part taris
turn out to be equally eective when (risk averse) retailers are non-dierentiated,
RPM outperforms free retail competition when they are dierentiated. The reason
is, again, that retailer dierentiation requires a powerful two-part tari in the case of
competition to counter the double marginalisation problem. The necessary franchise
fee exposes the retailers to an additional risk, for which they must be compensated.
RPM, in their model specication, does not entail this risk, making it more easily
employable for the manufacturer17.
A natural extension of the current model would be to consider multiproduct re-
tailers (cf. Rey and Verge (1999)) in an uncertain context. This line of research is
particularly interesting as it is sometimes alleged that when a product is used as a
loss leader (meaning that the product is priced even below cost in order to attract
consumers into the retail premises), the size of the distribution network is put under
pressure as the number of retailers willing to carry the product concerned is reduced.
Extrapolation of the results in this chapter would suggest that as resale price mainte-
nance protects retailers from the risk that other retailers use the product in question
16In a parallel paper, Verouden (1997) 'Resale price maintenance and outlet density' mimeo Cen-
tER, Tilburg University, the case of inelastic demands, spatial competition (localized market power)
and positive xed costs of investment is studied. In that setting, resale price maintenance is found
to be optimal when, for a given cost dierential, the worst case scenario is an 'exception' rather
than the rule. In that case, the loss arising from the inexibility of resale price information is fairly
limited. The reasoning is, therefore, similar to the reasoning in the case of small cost variability
considered here.
17In the setting of Rey and Tirole (1986), RPM allows the manufacturer to set the retail margin
to zero, which is clearly optimal from a retailer insurance perspective. The zero margin is specic to
the assumption that the xed costs of setting up a retail outlet are zero. When there are xed costs
however, the retail margin cannot be set to zero, unless the manufacturer can use negative franchise
fees (e.g. subsidies).
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as a loss leader, it may induce retailers to carry the product in their shops and enable
a good exploitation of market power. Indeed, uncertainty in this case is more about
whether or not price cutting will occur than about the true cost of retailing. This
feature may go into the direction of satisfying condition 3) mentioned above. It is
recognized by the author that more specic research is necessary to see whether this
inferrence is indeed valid.
5.6. Appendices 167
5.6 Appendices
Derivation of consumer demand when there is no retail variety
The consumers value retail variety. If the product is sold by two retailers, market
demand di for retailer i (i = 1; 2) is modelled as
di(pi; pj) = 1  pi +   pj (j 6= i; 0   < 1) (5.5)
What is the proper demand specication when there is only one retail outlet selling
the manufacturer's product? Suppose that there is a representative utility function
U(:) underlying the demand specication (5.5). Let us take it quasi-linear in money,
m:
U(q1; q2) = m+ u(q1; q2)
Under a budget constraint m + p1  q1 + p2  q2  y, where y is disposable income,
utility maximization comes down to
max
q1;q2
u(q1; q2)  p1  q1   p2  q2
This yields the following rst order conditions (assuming that the expenses made on
the product are small in comparison with budget y):
@u
@qi
= pi (i = 1; 2) (5.6)





(1 +    qi     qj) (i = 1; 2; j 6= i) (5.7)




((1 + )q1  
1
2




If good 2 is not present, the consumers maximize
max
q1
u(q1; 0)  p1  q1
This gives demand specication
di(pi) = 1 +    (1  2)  pi (i = 1; 2)
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Proofs of Proposition 5.1 and Lemma 5.1
Suppose the structure opens one outlet. For given cost parameters, it will maximize
I
one
(pi) = (pi   c  i)  di(pi)  F
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Ex ante, the expected level of pro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g are increasing in




g is minimal for 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(the case of no uncertainty), so we can concentrate on this case in order to obtain a








for given  (=e) gives the condition F  1
4
 (1  (1  )(c+ e))2.
Proof of Lemma 5.2
The manufacturer charges a franchise fee A equal to the retailer's expected prot
Efi(pw)g and chooses wholesale price pw so as to solve the sum of (expected) oper-
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The producer's operating prots are, in expectation,
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where it is used that Efx2g = (Efxg)2 +Vfxg and Vfig = 112(   )
2.
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c   e). This reects the expected inuence of selling one more unit to one retailer
on the retail price (and the prots) of the other retailer. Using expression (5.7),
the system of inverse demand functions corresponding to di(pi; pj) = 1   pi +   pj,





















The optimal wholesale price indeed induces, in expectation, the rst best retail price
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)(c+ e)) = EfpIg
Generically, it does not, however, induce a rst best retail price for every realisation
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Proof of Lemma 5.3




Ef(~pi   c  i)  (1  pi + pj) + (~pj   c  j)  (1  pj + pi)g   F
The rst order conditions give
~pi = ~pj =
1
2(1  )
 (1 + (1  )(c+ e))
Expected prots for the producer:
EfRPMg = RPM =
1
2(1  )
 (1  (1  )(c+ e))2   2F
Proof of Proposition 5.2
By comparing the expected prot level of the manufacturer under the regime of free
retail competition (EfAg) with that under resale price maintenance (RPM), we
obtain:
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)2 > 0
Proof of Lemma 5.4
The maximum franchise fee that the manufacturer can charge when retailers are
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))2   F
The producer's operating prots are, in expectation,





(1  (1  )(pw + e))
The maximization problem is
max
pw
Efprod(pw)g+ 2  i(pw)
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and the corresponding franchise fee
A = 
i









(   ))2   F (5.9)
After tedious calculations and some rewriting, we obtain the resulting total expected
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)2   2F
Proof of Lemma 5.5







  c)  di(~p; ~p)
This correspronds to solving
max
~p
2(~p     c)  (1  (1  )~p)  2F
which gives
~pi = ~pj =
1
2(1  )
 (1 + (1  )(c+ ))
The resulting prots for the manufacturer:
EfRPMg = RPM =
1
2(1  )
 (1  (1  )(c+ ))2   2F
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Proof of Proposition 5.4
Comparing the (expected) prots under free retail competition (two-part taris) and
under resale price maintenance gives
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which is positive if and only if
(1  (1  )(c+ )) 








(   ) > 0
This is the case for a cost variability (   ) that is not too large:









 (1  (1  )(c+ )) =: 
Proof of Proposition 5.5
Let us rst consider the consumers. In expectation, total consumer surplus is





g = (Efqig)2 +Vfqig
Under resale price maintenance, retail price and demand (qi =
1
2
(1  (1  )(c+ 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where pw is given by expression (5.8). In expectation,












Clearly, this expected quantity is lower than the quantity that results under resale
































































































Let us now consider the retailers. Unlike the case of risk neutrality, retailers do
obtain a positive expected rent when they are risk averse. For RPM,

i
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with expression (5.9) substituted for A.
Combining the results for the producer surplus (Proposition 5.4), the consumer
surplus and the surplus of the retailers, we obtain





















 (   )2
which is positive if and only if
   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 (1  (1  )(c+ )) =: w
It is easily veried that w > 0.
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Chapter 6
Cartel formation under incomplete




This chapter is about cartel formation1. It is generally thought that the likelihood
of rms forming a cartel is greater in concentrated industries than in industries with
many rms. Not only because it is, so the argument goes, easier to monitor a cartel
agreement in the relatively surveyable environment of a tight oligopoly (cartel en-
forcement argument) but also because it may be easier or more attractive for fewer
rms to come to terms about the conditions applying to the cartel (cartel formation
argument).
One element that can be a source of diÆculty in the formation of cartels is the
problem of incomplete information with respect to the cost levels of the participating
rms. This information asymmetry may pose a problem at the stage where the cartel
must determine the conditions of the cartel agreement (e.g. production quotas, xed
market shares) for the participants. Obviously, the conditions of the cartel agreement
also bear on the decision to join the cartel in the rst place. For example, a rm
that is relatively eÆcient will typically only be satised with a production quota that
1This chapter is jointly written with Jerôme Pouyet from the University of Toulouse.
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somehow steps up to this fact (in other words, the quota must be relatively large),
otherwise it may just prefer to compete on the market. This, however, should induce
rms which are less eÆcient to overstate their eÆciency in order to obtain a higher
share of the cartel output. But when every rm is saying to be eÆcient (or saying
to have become more eÆcient since the latest negotiations) and claiming large quota,
this will reduce the attractiveness of the cartel for rms which are eectively among
the most eÆcient. An illustration of the ensuing diÆculties is given by Eckbo (1976),
who found that in a sample of international cartels which were temporarily successful
but then broke down, almost half of them were nished due to internal squabbling
over how to share the prots.
The extent to which cartel agreements can overcome the conicting requirements
mentioned above has been the subject of extensive research, cf. Roberts (1985),
Kihlstrom and Vives (1989,1992) and Cramton and Palfrey (1990). In order to char-
acterise the outcomes that a cartel can achieve in situations of incomplete information,
these authors have approached the issue of cartel formation using a standard mecha-
nism design approach: in a (Bayesian) Cournot industry, there is a `cartel manager'
who proposes a cartel arrangement and determines the optimal quotas depending on
the costs each rm announces to have2. Given this scheme, rms decide whether or
not to join and, if they do, they announce their costs. A proposed cartel agreement
is called `eÆcient' when only the rm(s) with the lowest cost produce(s). In order
to form such a cartel, the cartel manager must, according to the well-known Rev-
elation Principle, propose a scheme (possibly involving side payments) that ensures
individual participation (Bayesian individual rationality, BIR) and induces the rms
to individually reveal their cost information (Bayesian incentive compatibility, BIC).
In a setting where the number of possible eÆciency types is limited to two (rms
are either eÆcient or ineÆcient), Kihlstrom and Vives (1989, 1992) have shown that
the formation of an eÆcient cartel is possible, both in the case of a duopoly and in
the borderline case of an industry comprising innitely many rms (modelled as a
continuum of rms). The reason of this latter, rather surprising, result is that in an
2In studying the problems related to cartel formation, the literature abstracts away from the
cartel enforcement problem (and vice versa). Cartel arrangements are assumed to be enforceable,
even though the secrecy of the arrangement implies that there is, for example, no public authority
available to enforce it. The assumption of enforceability is a short-cut to capture in a static context
the reputation of the cartel manager and the rms participating in the cartel which guarantee the
self-enforceability of the arrangement in a dynamic context (e.g. by means of trigger strategies; Folk
Theorem).
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atomistic industry there is no uncertainty about the type of rm that should produce
nor about the fraction of eÆcient rms being present, so that it does not turn out
to be so diÆcult to reconcile all individual participation and incentive requirements.
This result holds for all meaningful probability distributions on the two cost types.
Cramton and Palfrey (1990), however, have shown that if the private information
of the rms can take a continuum of values (ranging from being very eÆcient to
being very ineÆcient), the rst best outcome can only be implemented if there are
not too many rms in the industry. If there are many rms, they show that it
becomes increasingly diÆcult to reconcile all the individual incentive and participation
requirements outlined above. In this sense, their main result is a conrmation of the
general idea that it is easier to form a cartel in an industry with a few rms than in
one with many. Nonetheless, the extent to which their result is driven by assuming
the uniform probability distribution (assigning equal probability to all possible cost
types, even the most extreme values) is not clear. Furthermore, the assumption that
the private information of the rms can take a continuum of values leads to the rather
peculiar result that when less than unanimous consent is needed to ratify the cartel
agreement (only a proportion  < 1 of rms must agree with it), the impossibility
result is lost. In other words, with less than unanimous consent, an eÆcient cartel
can be implementable in industries with many participants3.
The current literature, therefore, does seem to provide some justication for the
generally held belief that cartels are most diÆcult to form in industries with many
rms, but it fails to do so in several constellations, most notably in the context of
a nite number of cost types with general probability distributions. In this chapter
we will again consider the issue of cartel formation in this latter context, but from
a dierent angle: in order to characterise the possible outcomes that a cartel can
achieve, we propose to explore the additional requirement of collusion-proofness. The
above mentioned models of the cartel manager (the principal) trying to obtain the
eÆcient cartel outcome by inducing truthful cost revelation by the rms (the agents)
3Cramton and Palfrey show that when less than unanimous consent is needed to ratify the cartel
agreement, an eÆcient cartel is implementable, especially when the number of rms is very large.
This is due to a special feature of the continuum type model, namely the fact that when the number
of rms grows, the lowest cost rm that is supposed to produce the entire cartel output has an
increasingly small measure (it is one of the many rms). As in the limit, it is only the lowest cost
rm whose participation constraint cannot be met in the face of the incentive requirements with
respect to the less eÆcient rms, this rm will not be able to stop the cartel from going ahead if a
majority rule applies.
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all use the standard assumption that every agent behaves non-cooperatively: no com-
munication is possible between the agents, which is a standard assumption for the
Revelation Principle. The aim of the current chapter is to see whether the obtained
results continue to hold when communication between groups of rms cannot be ex-
cluded and, in particular, when groups of rms try to (secretly) coordinate their cost
announcements in order to obtain a better result.
So as to investigate the role of this possibility, we will model this kind of collusion
following Laont and Martimort (1997, 2000): in a rst stage, the cartel manager (the
principal) proposes a cartel contract (`grand mechanism') (q; t), where q is the vector
of quantities to be produced by the cartel members and t the vector of side transfers
as functions of the cost messages4. If any rm refuses this contract, the rms will
compete a la Cournot. In phase 2, a `mediator' (the third party) proposes to a group
of rms a side contract (; y), where  is the vector of manipulated cost messages
of the considered group to be sent to the principal and y the vector of internal side
payments. Finally, the rms in the group decide whether or not to accept the third
party's program. If not, they will non-cooperatively send messages to the principal.
In the framework of Laont and Martimort (1997, 2000), where, by assumption,
collusion can only happen by all agents together, the implementable contracts can be
characterised using the Collusion-Proofness Principle. This principle states that the
cartel manager can, without loss of generality, restrict the cartel contract which he
proposes to be a mechanism such that no collusion takes place at the equilibrium.
In our setting, where collusion may take place by coalitions of variable size, we will
determine to what extent collusion-proofness is relevant.
The possibility of collusion by subcoalitions is shown to change the set of imple-
mentable rules, but not to change the principal result that eÆcient cartel formation
is possible for any number of rms in the industry. Partly, this is due to the strong
congruence of interest between the cartel manager and the individual cartel mem-
bers: after all, the cartel manager is acting costlessly on behalf of the members, by
maximizing their total expected prots. But there is more to it. Typically, the trans-
fer schemes which are able to implement collusion-proof cartels appear to satisfy a
property which we call partial anonymity: the cartel transfers to the ineÆcient rms
4Instead of an explicit contract, one may also think of an arrangement that is enforceable in a
dynamic context by means of trigger strategies (see footnote 2). The transfers will, for simplicity, be
considered as monetary transfers. In principle, however, they can stand for any kind of compensation,
e.g. promising not to enter a dierent geographical market where the other rms are already active.
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are taken not to depend on the number of ineÆcient rms present in the cartel. The
following intuition is then at the heart of the result: consider an ineÆcient rm which
is instructed by the third party to represent itself to the cartel manager as being
eÆcient. This rm will then get more revenue out of production, but will at the same
time exert a negative externality on all rms that are truly eÆcient, including the
eÆcient rms within the subcoalition (as the cartel output must now be divided over
a larger number of rms). If, furthermore, the cartel transfers are partially anony-
mous, then the eect of the contemplated action is neutral with respect to the other
ineÆcient rms in the subcoalition. So we are left to compare the direct eect on the
pay-o of the particular ineÆcient rm with the negative externality on the eÆcient
rms in the subcoalition. From this it follows that as soon as the ineÆcient rm
is made individually indierent between lying and truthtelling, the group incentive
constraints will be satised. This line of reasoning identies a transfer scheme that
enables the implementation of cartels which are not subject to internal manipulation,
in industries of any size. Finally, we identify cases in which the extra requirement of
collusion-proofness need not have an impact on the minimal level of transfers that is
required to form these cartels.
6.2 The model
We consider the possibilities for cartel formation in an industry with n rms producing





i the total market production. As in Kihlstrom and Vives (1989,
1992) and Cramton and Palfrey (1990), market demand for the good is given by a
linear inverse demand function p(Q) = 1 Q. The rms in the industry can be of two
types: either eÆcient (their unit cost of production is low, c) or ineÆcient (c). Let c
denote the cost dierence c  c. The levels of eÆciency are private knowledge to the
rms, they are not observable to other rms or to the cartel (embodied by the cartel
manager). Nonetheless, it is common knowledgde that the probability of an individual
rm being eÆcient is  2 (0; 1) and that the types are independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d.). The output levels of the individual rms are observable.
The cartel manager proposes the rms a cartel contract fqi; tigi2N , where qi =
qi(~c
N) is the quantity to be produced by rm i and ti = ti(~c
N) is the transfer that rm
i has to give (if ti > 0) or receives from the cartel manager (if ti < 0) as functions of
the cost reports ~cN . The transfers are restricted to be budget balanced in each state
182 Cartel formation under incomplete information
of nature.
The gain of rm i is given by
i(~cN) = [p(Q(~cN ))  ci]qi(~cN)  ti(~cN):
The objective of the cartel manager is to form a cartel that is eÆcient, as dened
as follows:




in each state of nature.
A proposed cartel agreement is eÆcient when only the rm(s) with the lowest cost
produce(s) and the total industry output equals the monopoly output for this cost
level, being qm(c) = argmaxqf(p(q)  c)qg. A symmetric and eÆcient cartel amounts






qm(c) if ~ci = c;
0 if ~ci = c and j 6= 0
1
n
qm(c) if ~ci = c and j = 0
where j is the total number of rms that report to be eÆcient to the cartel manager5.
Let t(j) be the total transfer to be paid by the eÆcient rms (and consequently to be






t(j) if ~ci = c;
1
n j t(j) if ~c
i = c:
Notice that when every rm reports to be eÆcient (j = n) or every rm reports
to be ineÆcient (j = 0), no transfers will occur: t(n) = t(0) = 0. For the rest of the
chapter, we will use the following conventions: all the transfers t(j) are non-negative.
This means that, unless the transfers are zero, the eÆcient rms will pay monetary
transfers to the cartel manager, which are then redistributed to the ineÆcient rms.
This is an innocuous assumption because we are primarily interested in eÆcient cartels
in which only the most eÆcient rms produce and consequently derive gains from
5In a symmetric equilibrium, to characterise the state of nature it is enough to know the number
of eÆcient (or ineÆcient) rms in the cartel.
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production. In order that the ineÆcient rms are willing to take part in the cartel,
they must normally be compensated for not producing.
6.3 The individual constraints
When the rms cannot communicate among each other (i.e. they adopt a Bayesian-
Nash behaviour with respect to the actions of the other rms), then the Revelation
Principle applies6. In order to characterise the set of attainable outcomes of the cartel,
we can restrict ourselves to direct mechanisms that satisfy a set of Bayesian incentive
compatibility constraints (called henceforth BIC) in order to obtain the truthful
revelation of the private information held by each rm. But the cartel manager must
also ensure that the rms are willing to participate in the cartel: this gives another
set of constraints, the Bayesian individual rationality constraints (called BIR).
6.3.1 The Bayesian incentive constraints








j(1  )n jt(j) the expected transfer to be given by
the eÆcient rms to the ineÆcient rms. For a symmetric cartel, we can represent
the Bayesian incentive constraints of the two types of rms simply by one lower
bound and one upper bound on this expected transfer. Obviously, the lower bound
refers to the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint of an ineÆcient rm: it gives
the minimum expected transfer that the ineÆcient rms must receive to truthfully
reveal their information to the cartel manager. In the case of an eÆcient cartel, this
constraint is7







Note that when m(c) cqm(c)  0, an ineÆcient rm has no interest to announce
it is eÆcient, because it derives a negative gain from producing the low cost monopoly
quantity and it must also pay some transfers to the rms that do announce to be
ineÆcient. Hence, in this case there is no problem of information revelation from the
point of view of an ineÆcient rm. Therefore, we will restrict ourselves to the case in
which m(c) cqm(c)  0.
6For the Revelation Principle, see Green and Laont (1977) and Myerson (1979), among others.
7See Appendix A.6.2.
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In a similar fashion, the incentive constraint of an eÆcient rm gives an upper
limit to the expected transfer to be given by the eÆcient rms:






(1  )n 1(m(c) + cqm(c))]:
6.3.2 The participation constraints
Following Kihlstrom and Vives (1989, 1992), we suppose that if at least one rm
refuses to participate in the cartel then the cartel breaks down and the rms play a
standard Cournot competition game under asymmetric information. At this stage,
we must be explicit about the beliefs of each rm following the rejection of the cartel
contract. We assume that if rm i does not accept the cartel contract, this rm will
not change its beliefs on the types of the n   1 remaining rms, nor will the other
rms change their beliefs on the type of the rm that has refused the cartel contract.
This is the assumption of passive beliefs as made by Kihlstrom and Vives8.
In a symmetric and eÆcient cartel, we can also express the Bayesian individual
rationality constraints of an eÆcient and an ineÆcient rm as bounds on the expected
transfers9,









8Whether the assumption of passive beliefs is crucial remains an open question in this model with
two types. If eÆcient rms accept the symmetric cartel contract proposed by the cartel manager
but the cartel breaks down, it must be the case that an ineÆcient rm has rejected this contract.
The eÆcient rms know now that there is at least one ineÆcient rm in the market. This should
increase the competitive pressure for the ineÆcient rms (as the eÆcient rms will be producing
more in comparison with the prior situation) and therefore relax their participation constraints (cf.
Cramton and Palfrey, 1995). The reverse holds for an eÆcient rm: its participation constraint is in
fact tighter than the one implied by passive beliefs. We plan to explore this issue in further research.
In any case, the assumption is necessary in order to have a tractable analysis of collusion at the level
of the subcoalitions.
9For the Cournot equilibrium we must distinguish between two cases: one in which both eÆcient
and ineÆcient rms are producing and one in which only eÆcient rms produce. Indeed, if the
probability of being eÆcient (), the number of rms in the market (n), or the cost dierential (c)
is large, an ineÆcient rm will anticipate a high competitive pressure and will prefer not to produce
at the Cournot equilibrium under incomplete information. In that case, only eÆcient rms will be
active in the market and make prots equal to (1  c)2=(2 + (n  1))2. If the ineÆcient rms also





where Efcg = c+ (1  )c is the expected cost. See Appendix A.6.1 for details.
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where EfCournot(c)g is the expected prot for a c-type rm under Cournot competi-
tion based on incomplete information.
6.3.3 Individual implementability
>From now on we will use the following terminology.
Denition 6.2 An eÆcient cartel is individually implementable if there exists a set
of transfers such that all the individual constraints (participation and incentive com-
patibility) are satised10.
An illustration of the individual incentive compatibility constraints and the par-
ticipation constraints, as dened previously, is given in Figure 6.1 for the case of three
rms.
The fact that in the present context (with a nite number of eÆciency types, the
probability distribution of which is i.i.d.), budget-balanced transfers can be found that
satisfy the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints for both types, is in fact just
an illustration of the more general result of d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) in
this respect. The fact that it is possible to nd transfers that satisfy the participation
constraints for both types (the upperbound of BIR(c) is above the lowerbound of
BIR(c)) is not very surprising either: as the cartel prot exceeds the competitive
industry prot in each state of nature, it will be possible to form the cartel, given
that every rm tells the truth.
Comparing the lowerbound of BIC(c) with the upperbound of BIR(c) and the
lowerbound of BIR(c) with the upperbound of BIC(c) is less straightforward. In
particular the rst comparison poses analytical problems. Nonetheless, we obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 6.1 SuÆcient conditions for the cartel to be individually implementable
are that (i) c  cES, where cES = cES(; n) is the largest cost dierence for
which eÆcient rms are still willing to share the cartel prots equally with the ineÆ-






(; n) is the level of c for
10Our denition concerning the implementability of an eÆcient cartel includes the incentive con-
straints and the individual participation constraints. Usually, the term `implementability' refers only
to the problem of information revelation. But we use this terminology to make a clear-cut distinc-
tion between the individual constraints and the constraints concerning the subcoalitions that we will
dene later on.














all the invidual constraints
0
Figure 6.1: Individual implementation of an eÆcient cartel is always possible.
which, in the absence of transfers, the ineÆcient rms are indierent between lying
and truthtelling.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.3.
Under the rst condition, low cost rms are eectively willing to share the prots
from the cartel equally with the high cost rms. Under this transfer scheme, the `equal
sharing rule', high cost rms have no incentive to misrepresent themselves, so that
BIC(c) is satised. This suÆcient condition obviously amounts to cost dierences
which are small. The second condition stems from the fact that BIC(c) can already be
satised by zero transfers, when the cost dierences are large. In that case the bound
imposed by BIC(c) (being zero) is clearly below the bound of BIR(c) (positive).
As in Cramton and Palfrey (1990), it turns out to be impossible to completely
compare the two constraints BIR(c) and BIC(c) for general parameters without
using simulations. For cost dierences inbetween `small' and `large', we resort to
simple simulations that show that the cartel is also implementable for these parameter
values11. The result is in line with the ndings of Kihlstrom and Vives (1989, 1992)
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for the polar cases of two rms and a continuum of rms.
Note that there exists in fact a whole region (of non-zero measure) of transfers that
enable the cartel manager to simultaneously satisfy the Bayesian incentive constraints
and the Bayesian participation constraints for both types of rms. These constraints
can be binding or not, depending on the prole of transfers chosen.
6.3.4 Individual implementability with minimal transfers
Having established the result that an eÆcient cartel can be implemented, it is inter-
esting to focus on a few characteristics of the possible cartels. One such characteristic
is the minimal transfers that are necessary to operate it. After all, a cartel that oper-
ates in an industry that is surveyed by an antitrust authority will normally, in order
to minimize the risk of detection, have a certain preference for cartel schemes that
involve as few transfers as possible. We nd, on the basis of a suÆcient condition and
simulations, that whenever positive expected transfers are necessary to implement the
eÆcient cartel, it is the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint of an ineÆcient
rm that determines the level of the necessary expected transfers12.
In terms of Figure 6.1, this result tells us that whenever positive transfers are
needed, the lowerbound implied by BIC(c) is above the lowerbound implied by
BIR(c). Note that this is fairly intuitive: when the cost dierence is almost zero
(c  c), high transfers will be necessary to refrain a `high cost' rm from telling that
it is low cost; in fact, a high cost rm will require nothing less than equal sharing of
the cartel prots among all rms. On the other hand, BIR(c) implies that a high
cost rm gets more than what it would get under Cournot competition under (almost)
complete information and (almost) identical costs. Obviously, the equal sharing pay-
o exceeds this prot: hence, for c  c, the lowerbound of BIC(c) is above the one
of BIR(c). When the cost dierence increases, the cost of lying increases and the
lowerbound of BIC(c) goes down   but so will the lowerbound of BIR(c), as the
outside option of Cournot competition becomes less attractive.








11The simulations are done after rst having reduced the relevant inequality (which is an inequality
in four parameters: c, c,  and n), into an inequality with only two parameters ( and n); see
Appendix A.6.3 for the details.
12Cf. Appendix A.6.4.
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i.e. the right hand side of the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint for an
ineÆcient rm given above. The inuence of the industry parameters on the minimal
required transfer can be inferred from this value: for given n, the larger the cost
dierence (c) and the smaller the probability of an other rm being eÆcient (), the
smaller the expected transfers can be. The intuition of this result is straightforward.
Given that an ineÆcient rm only gets to produce when a c-cartel is formed, the gain
of truthtelling increases with the probability that this cartel actually forms. This
probability is equal to the probability that there is no eÆcient rm around, (1  )n.
Hence, the smaller the probability that the other rms are eÆcient, the better it is for
a rm that announces to be ineÆcient. As regards the cost dierence c, the larger
this dierence, the less attractive the option of lying becomes to the ineÆcient rm.
An ineÆcient rm, if it announces to be eÆcient, will be in a position to produce but
this will be all the more costly, the higher its unit cost of production is relative to the
cost level of the eÆcient rms in the cartel.
Is it possible for a cartel to operate without the use of any transfers at all? For
this to be possible it must be the case that the transfer scheme t(j) = 0; 8j (the `zero
transfer rule') satises the incentive and participation constraints for both eÆcient and
ineÆcient rms. Obviously, the eÆcient rms will be very contented with the zero
transfer rule: they get to produce but do not have to give any of their prots to the
rms announcing to be ineÆcient. Both the incentive constraint and the participation
constraint of the eÆcient type are satised. With respect to the ineÆcient rms,
we know from the previous discussion that we only need to see whether the zero
transfer rule satises the corresponding incentive compatibility constraint: if incentive
compatibility is ascertained for an ineÆcient rm under the zero transfer rule, then it
must be the case that the cost dierence is quite large. But then the expected prots
at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium are that small that participation by the ineÆcient
rm is ensured as well. It follows that transfers are not necessary to operate the cartel
when the cost dierence is suÆciently large or when the probability of an other rm
being eÆcient, is suÆciently small.
6.4 The formation of subcoalitions
As we have seen in the previous section, there plenty of leeway for the cartel manager
to implement the monopoly outcome. Indeed, there is a whole region of transfers
that can be used for this purpose (or a hyperplane, in case the cartel manager prefers
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to use minimal transfers). However, depending on the chosen transfers, it may be
worthwhile for some subcoalitions of rms to come together and try to manipulate
the cartel outcome, in order to reach higher gains from participation in the cartel.
6.4.1 The stake of collusion: a heuristic presentation
Assume, as a preliminary step to the forthcoming analysis, that a subcoalition of two
ineÆcient rms can overcome their informational problem and can form (for exam-
ple, this is the case if the rms in the subcoalition can credibly disclose their private
information to each other or if they have a technology to communicate with each
other). Suppose that this subcoalition is also able to use side transfers between its
members and that it tries to maximize the gains of its members. Considering again
the example of three rms, the expected total gain of the subcoalition composed of,
say, two ineÆcient rms when they reveal truthfully their costs to the cartel manager
is t(1)+(1 )1
3
m(c). If these two ineÆcient rms manipulate their announcements
and claim to the cartel manager (who does not know their cost information) that they








In the case where the cartel manager chooses a set of transfers with a high t(2) and
a low t(1), the subcoalition of two ineÆcient rms will have interest to coordinate
their cost messages and to lie to the cartel manager. This leads to some ineÆcient
production of the cartel output, which is not desirable from the point of view of
the cartel manager. Requiring that the subcoalition of two (`2') rms reveals truth-
fully that it consists of zero (`0') eÆcient rms instead of announcing to contain one
(`1') eÆcient rm gives a collusion-proofness constraint, CPC2(0; 1). For example, in
Figure 6.2, points A and B enable the cartel manager to implement individually an
eÆcient cartel but do not resist to the formation of active subcoalitions. Note that
there are four other constraints preventing deviations of the remaining subcoalitions.
This highlights an interesting property of the model we study. Contrary to the previ-
ous models on collusion under asymmetric information, there can be many dierent
stakes of collusion depending on the transfers that are used by the cartel manager to
individually implement an eÆcient cartel.
In the next subsection, we model how collusion can take place. We depart from the
crude modelling device used in the previous example, where rms can freely disclose
their cost information, and explicitly take into account the informational problem at















Figure 6.2: The stake of collusion with three rms.
the coalition level.
6.4.2 Subcoalition formation under incomplete information
In this subsection, we propose to use the framework of Laont and Martimort (1997,
2000) to model the formation of subcoalitions within the cartel. We rst begin with the
timing that explains how and when a third party can propose to a given subcoalition
of k rms a side mechanism aiming at manipulating the reports to be sent by the
rms in the cartel contract proposed by the cartel manager.
>From now on, we will use the following notation. We denote S for the set of
indices of the k rms that belong to the given subcoalition and NnS for the set of
indices of the n  k other rms that belong to the cartel but not to the subcoalition.
Accordingly, cS (resp. cNnS) is the vector of the true cost parameters of the rms
belonging to the subcoalition (resp. of the rms belonging to the cartel but not to
the subcoalition). The timing is as follows:
1. Nature draws ci 2 fc; cg, the private information of rm i 2 N according
to the common knowledge probability distribution f; 1   g. Each rm
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only learns its own type.
2. The cartel manager proposes all the rms a cartel contract, as dened
before.
3. Firm i decides to accept or reject the cartel contract, for i 2 N . If at least
one rm decides to reject it, then the cartel breaks down and the rms
come back to Cournot competition under asymmetric information.
4. If all the rms accept the cartel contract then a third party proposes a
side mechanism to the rms i 2 S. This mechanism is composed of a
manipulation function  : fc; cgk  ! fc; cgk of the messages to be sent
to the cartel manager by the rms of the subcoalition, and a vector of
monetary side transfers y : fc; cgk  ! < which must be budget-balanced
in each state of nature. If one rm refuses the side mechanism, then the
cartel contract is played non-cooperatively by the rms of the subcoalition.
If all the rms of the subcoalition accept the side mechanism, they report
their private information to the third party non-cooperatively. The third
party then assigns the messages to be sent to the cartel manager by the
rms in the subcoalition and promises to enforce the corresponding side-
transfers.
5. Finally, the reports are sent by the rms into the cartel contract, the quan-
tities and transfers proposed by the cartel manager in the cartel contract
take place, as well as the side transfers proposed by the third party in the
side mechanism.
The objective of the third party is to maximize the sum of the expected gains of
the colluding rms. What can the third party achieve, given that he is uninformed
about the private information of the rms in the subcoalition? Because the Revelation
Principle applies at this stage of the game (each rm of the subcoalition behaves non-
cooperatively within the third party framework), there is no loss of generality in
restricting the set of side mechanisms which the third party proposes to the set of
direct side mechanisms in which each rm of the subcoalition reveals truthfully its own
private information13. Hence, the third party must satisfy a set of Bayesian incentive
compatibility constraints. But the third party must also ensure that the rms of
the subcoalition are willing to participate: a set of Bayesian individual rationality
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constraints must be veried by the third party as well, where the reservation value of
one rm is its gain when the cartel contract is played non-cooperatively.
For a given state of nature cS, we denote by S and S the set of eÆcient and
ineÆcient rms. We nd the following optimality conditions for the manipulation




















One can observe that unless the variables 
i
(relating to eÆcient rms) and j (relating
to ineÆcient rms) are zero, the third party will not be manipulating eÆciently.
The variables 
i
and j reect the fact that there is an asymmetry of information
between the members of the subcoalition. The cost of bridging this informational gap,
embodied in 
i
and j, can prevent the subcoalition from realizing all the potential
gains of collusion. The values of the s depend on whether the constraints in the
program of the third party are binding or not14.
6.5 Collusion-Proofness
Being faced with the possibility of collusion by a group of rms, what is the opti-
mal response for the cartel manager? In related, but dierent contexts, Laont and
Martimort (1997, 2000) have shown that the so-called Collusion-Proofness Principle
applies. This principle states that, in characterising the outcomes that a principal
can achieve using general mechanisms, there is no loss of generality to restrict the
13We assume that each third party takes in its collusive program only the individual incentive
constraints into account. For the case of n = 3 rms this is correct as all the subcoalitions are
composed of just k = 2 individual rms. The third party for the two rms has to ensure that each
rm reveals its piece of information. However, for the case of n > 3 rms we would in fact also have
to consider the possibility that a sub-subcoalition could try to cheat on the third party. Clearly this
would add more constraints in the program of the third-party, so that his intermediation would at
best be as eÆcient as the outcome implied by the constraints in our model. Our assumption therefore
still helps us to determine an upper bound of the gain of the subcoalition.
14When a given cartel contract amounts to s being zero, the third party does not face problems
having the information revealed and can implement the eÆcient side contract. However, it would
be wrong to identify a situation in which  = 0 with a situation of complete information at the level
of the third party. If this were the case, the cartel manager could incorporate this fact in its cartel
contract and take advantage of it.
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principal to use a mechanism that is collusion-proof. In this chapter, we will use the
following denition:
Denition 6.3 A cartel contract proposed by the cartel manager is collusion-proof
with respect to a subcoalition S if and only if the null side-mechanism f = Idfc;cgk ; fyi =
0gi2Sg is an optimal response for the third party.
Dierently stated, a grand mechanism is collusion-proof when the third party nds
it optimal not to distort the announcements sent by the rms in the subcoalition to
the cartel manager and when no monetary side-transfers take place between these
rms.
Let us assess whether the Collusion-Proofness Principle applies to the current
context of cartel formation as well. The common element in the settings of Laont
and Martimort (1997, 2000) is that the principal is, by assumption, only faced with
one possible group of agents that is considering to collude, namely the entire group of
agents. In this case, the logic that underlies the Collusion-Proofness Principle is very
similar to the one of the Revelation Principle. The outcome of any general mechanism
that triggers collusion can be replicated by a direct mechanism which neutralizes the
incentive to misrepresent from the coalition's point of view. This allows for a clear
characterisation of the implementable allocations.
With the possibility of subcoalitions, it is straightforward to see that the Principle
also applies if the cartel manager knows the size and identity of a coalition that
possibly colludes15. By contrast, when the cartel manager does not know which
coalition(s) actually form   the setting of the current chapter   things are dierent.
For, if the cartel manager proposes a general cartel contract and one group colludes, a
particular allocation will result, whereas if another group colludes, another allocation
will result. Furthermore, a mechanism that is collusion-proof with respect to one
subcoalition does not need to be collusion-proof with respect to another subcoalition.
This implies that the Collusion-Proofness Principle cannot be generalised in the sense
15Cf. Appendix A.6.6. Knowing the size and identity of a coalition that possibly colludes is not
the same as knowing that it actively colludes. The rst part only refers to the coalition being known
to possess a technology to collude (i.e. a third party). As to the second part: even if the rms of the
subcoalition know whether they have accepted the side contract or not, any attempt by the cartel
manager to elicit this private information can be annihilated by the third party which can punish the
deviators from the collusive side-mechanism as much as the cartel manager can reward those who
reveal that they are colluding. This also implies that the cartel manager has to satisfy the individual
constraints.
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that the cartel manager can, without loss of generality, restrict attention to direct
mechanisms that are collusion-proof with respect to all conceivably active coalitions:
it is not guaranteed that such mechanisms replicate the allocation of the general
mechanisms16. In particular, it may be optimal for the cartel manager to focus on
some groups and to tolerate possible collusion by other groups.
Nonetheless, the focus on eÆcient cartels allows for the formulation of necessary
and suÆcient conditions for implementability. After all, an eÆcient cartel can only
be implemented if it can be ensured that no subcoalition nds it in its interest to
overstate its eÆciency (announcing that it contains more eÆcient rms than is the
case in reality) as this would lead to ineÆcient production17.
Let us call CPCk(l; l0) the collusion-proofness constraint that prevents a subcoali-
tion of size k composed of l eÆcient rms to lie and to annouce to the cartel manager
that it is composed of l0 eÆcient rms.
In the next section we will exhibit cartel contracts that implement the eÆcient
cartel. In fact, these cartel contracts turn out to prevent all conceivable types of
collusion by coalitions (that is, also collusion in the form of announcing to consist of
more ineÆcient rms than is really the case). Whether there exist cartel contracts
which satisfy the necessary and suÆcient conditions for the implementation of an
eÆcient cartel, but which do not prevent all types of collusion, remains an open
question.
6.6 Implementability when collusion is possible
In this section, we ask the following question: is it possible to nd a set of transfers
such that an eÆcient cartel is implementable even in the presence of colluding coali-
tions? For expositional purposes, we will rst address the question when it is not
necessary at all to use transfers.
16This applies not only when the size k is unknown but also when k were known, but not the exact
identity of the participating rms. Note furthermore that again this information cannot be elicited,
not from the rms actually proposed a collusive side contract nor from the rms not being proposed
such a contract.
17Note that we are considering symmetric cartel contracts. This is without loss of generality, given
that the cartel manager does not know which coalition is formed.
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6.6.1 The zero transfer rule
As has already been said, the zero transfer rule is particularly appealing because
it enables a cartel to form without having to proceed to any compensatory trans-
fers. Added to this, it appears that whenever a symmetric and eÆcient cartel is
individually implementable with the zero transfer rule, it also satises the relevant
collusion-proofness constraints (CPCk(l; l0), with l < l0).
The intuition is as follows. Let us start with a subcoalition of size k, consisting
of l eÆcient rms and (k   l) ineÆcient rms. Consider, rst, the consequences (in
terms of pay-os for the subcoalition) of one ineÆcient rm being instructed by the
third party to tell the cartel manager that it is eÆcient. These consequences can
be divided into three parts: the change in revenue for the particular ineÆcient rm
itself, the change for the l eÆcient rms in the subcoalition and the change for the
(k   l) ineÆcient rms. Now, under the zero transfer rule, ineÆcient rms never get
transfers. Hence, for the ineÆcient rms it does not matter whether one of them is
instructed to lie. For the eÆcient rms, the consequences are undoubtly negative: as
soon as the ineÆcient rm lies, there will be more `eÆcient' rms in the cartel, so
that the cartel output (i.e. the monopoly output) must be divided among more rms.
In that case their pay-os will be less than when the ineÆcient rm tells the truth.
Hence, in lying the ineÆcient rm exerts a negative externality on the eÆcient rms
in the subcoalition. So, we must compare the direct gain of lying for the ineÆcient
rm with the negative externality for the eÆcient rms in the subcoalition. Let us
clarify this comparison by means of the following extreme cases. For each case, we
will write down the constraints to be satised by the zero transfer rule and see which
constraint is the most demanding.
The case of  ! 0 In this case, the subcoalition will act under the assumption
that there will be (almost) no eÆcient rms among the rms that are not in the












m(c)  (m(c) cqm(c))  0:
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One can observe that whenever BIC(c) is satised, CPCk(0; l0) is also satised;
the latter is more easily satised because a coalition takes into account the above
mentioned externality, whereas a rm acting on its own does not. Furthermore,
CPCk(l; l0) is always satised: as there are no outside eÆcient rms, the coalition
with l  1 eÆcient rms prefers to have the whole monopoly output produced by its
eÆcient rms only.
The case of ! 1 Now, the subcoalition will anticipate that all rms are eÆcient;
it is hence with certainty that the low cost cartel will form. An ineÆcient rm or a
coalition with only ineÆcient rms will then have a strong incentive to misrepresent.
The following constraints are to be met
CPCk(l; l0)
l0   l
(l0 + n  k)(l + n  k)
( (n  k)m(c) + (l + n  k)cqm(c))  0
CPCk(0; l0)  
l0






The intuition that a coalition with only ineÆcient rms has a strong incentive
to misrepresent, is reected by the fact that the gain from lying with respect to
CPCk(0; l0) is larger than the gain of lying with respect to CPCk(l; l0). Further, one
can note that among the CPCk(l; l0), it depends which of the constraints is most
demanding. When k is small, the gain of lying is largest for l0 = k; when k is large,
the cost of lying is smallest for l0 = l + 1.
The above two extreme cases, ! 0 (all outside rms are ineÆcient) and ! 1
(all outside rms are eÆcient) give the result that whenever the zero transfer rule
satises BIC(c), it also satises all collusion-proofness constraints. This leads us to
think that also for intermediate cases (in expectation, some outside rms are eÆcient,
some are not) the same applies. Given the complicated character of the expressions
for the general case, we are not able to prove this result in general. Nonetheless, we
have
Proposition 6.2 Suppose that only subcoalitions comprising a limited number of
rms (k  2
p
n) can form. Under the zero transfer rule, when an eÆcient cartel
is individually implementable, it is also implementable when collusion is possible.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.8.
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The reason is that only when k is not too large, we are able to rank the constraints
CPCk(0; l0) and CPCk(l; l0) and to say that the former implies the latter. This is
illustrated by the above exposition of the extreme cases. For most cases, it holds that
whenever CPCk(0; l0) is satised, CPCk(l; l0) is satised as well. But when  ! 0
and c takes on the largest relevant value, the cost of lying is greater with respect
to CPCk(0; l0) than for CPCk(l; l0) when k is large18. Simulations conrm the
intuition that the proposition extends to the case of large k as well.
Note that, under the zero transfer rule, also all CPCk(l; l0) with l0 < l are satised:
an eÆcient rm has no interest to lie because it always gets a part of the monopoly
prot and does not have to give back anything to the ineÆcient rms19.
6.6.2 Positive transfers
The intuition obtained from the zero transfer rule carries over to the case where indi-
vidual implementabilty requires positive transfers. Let us again consider a subcoali-
tion of size k, consisting of l eÆcient rms and (k  l) ineÆcient rms, contemplating
to announce that it consists of l + 1 eÆcient rms. The consequences of this action
can as before be divided into three parts: the change in revenue for the particular
ineÆcient rm itself, the change for the l eÆcient rms in the subcoalition and the
change for the (k   l) ineÆcient rms. Now, under the zero transfer rule, ineÆcient
rms always get the same transfer (namely zero), so that the eect of the manipu-
lation on their pay-os was, in fact, neutral. This leads us to consider, in the case
of positive transfers, transfer structures that have the same characteristic as the zero
transfer rule, viz. the transfers to be received by an ineÆcient rm are equal for all
(relevant) states of nature. This is what we call the partial anonymity property with
respect to an ineÆcient rm. With partially anonymous transfers, it does not matter
for the ineÆcient rms in the subcoalition whether or not one of them is instructed
to lie. For the eÆcient rms, the consequences of such a manipulation are, however,
18This is so, because at this cost level, an ineÆcient rm that is instructed to lie makes no prot
by producing the eÆcient quantity. Then, for a coalition without any eÆcient rms, lying simply
means earning nothing and giving up its part of the ineÆcient cartel prot ( k
n

m(c)), an amount that
is increasing in k. For a coalition with at least one eÆcient rm among its members, lying means
reducing the quantity produced by truly eÆcient rms and giving up the concommittant prots.
19Given that all collusion-proofness constraints are satised,  = Id. Then, the incentive compat-
ibility constraints of the third party program coincide with the incentive compatibility constraints
of the cartel manager's program. Hence, if both Bayesian incentive constraints are strictly satised,
the s can be taken zero.
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again negative: as soon as one ineÆcient rm lies, there will be more `eÆcient' rms
in the cartel, so that the cartel output (i.e. the monopoly output) must be divided
among more rms. So, again, there is a negative externality on the eÆcient rms in
the subcoalition. One is left to compare the direct gain for the ineÆcient rm with
the negative externality exerted on the eÆcient rms. A suÆcient condition for the
overall benet of manipulation to be negative is that transfers are taken such that the
direct eect of misrepresentation is zero. This is obtained when the transfer that each
(reportedly) eÆcient rm has to pay equals the benet l
n lf
m(c)   cqm(c)g that
an ineÆcient rm gets when it is lying. We summarize this result in the following
proposition:
Proposition 6.3 A suÆcient condition for the cartel to be implementable when col-




Proof. See Appendix A.6.9.
The rule of the above proposition is, in fact, collusion-proof with respect to all
conceivable coalitions and dominant strategy incentive compatible. That a dominant
strategy incentive compatible transfer rule is collusion-proof is a feature that this
model has in common with other models of collusion, e.g. Laont and Martimort
(1997). Dominant strategy incentive compatibility implies that, without any compen-
sation, it is costly for each rm not to tell the truth. This makes eective collusion
more diÆcult to implement by the third party, in our model even impossible20. Still,
it is easy to construct dominant strategy incentive compatibile rules that are not
collusion-proof.
A dominant strategy incentive compatible rule naturally involves the use of more
transfers than a Bayesian incentive compatible rule. It remains, therefore, to consider
whether the rule of the above proposition satises the participation constraint of the
eÆcient type, the relevant upperbound in this respect (by denition it satises the
Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint of the eÆcient type). On the basis of two
suÆcient conditions and some simulations (cf. Appendix A.6.10), we conclude that
the (partially anonymous) dominant strategy incentive compatible transfer scheme
t(j) = n j
n
fm(c) cqm(c)g implements the eÆcient cartel.
20Note that with this particular scheme of transfers neither BIC(c) nor BIC(c) is binding at the
optimum. This implies that none of the incentive constraints in the program of the third party are
binding at the optimum, so that the particular s can be taken zero.







for an ineÆcient rm
6 Transfers that satisfy









Figure 6.3: The two couples of transfers relating to the existence result.
The rule highlighted above is suÆcient to counter collusion, but not necessary;
recall that it completely neutralizes the direct gain of the lying rms, so that the
overall eect is strictly negative. There certainly exist transfer schemes that leave
some gain to the lying rms but still produce an overall negative eect. Simulations
indicate that the set of transfers such that the anonymity property for an ineÆcient
rm is satised and such that an ineÆcient rm is individually indierent between
lying and truth-telling to the cartel manager (BIC(c) is binding) always enables
the cartel manager to implement the eÆcient cartel (whenever positive transfers are
necessary). A corollary is that the threat of collusion by subgroups does not seem to
change the level of minimally required expected transfers used by the cartel manager
to implement an eÆcient cartel.
In Figure 6.3, two partially anonymous rules (the minimum expected transfer
rule, M, and the dominant strategy rule, D) which can implement the eÆcient cartel
in spite of the threat of subcoalition formation are illustrated for the case of a three
rm industry.
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6.7 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we have addressed the question whether the approach followed in the
existing literature to interpret the problem of cartel formation as a classical Principal-
Agent problem is not too restrictive. In particular, we have veried whether one basic
assumption underlying the use of the Revelation Principle, the assumption about
subgroups of rms not attempting to jointly manipulate the cartel in their favour, is
determinative for the outcome that a cartel can achieve. The principal result of the
chapter is that this is not the case in the context of a two type industry. Whenever a
cartel can be implemented with transfers satisfying only the individual incentive and
participation requirements of the cartel members, it is also possible to implement this
cartel in a collusion-proof way, albeit with a more restricted set of transfers.
Several explanations can be given for this result. First of all, it must be noted
that the degree of freedom in the choice of transfers is substantial in this two-type
model (cf. d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) and Mookherjee and Reichelstein
(1992)). This freedom will surely help to nd transfers that not only ensure individual
implementability, but that also ght collusion. Secondly, there is a strong congruence
of interest between the cartel manager and the individual cartel members: after all,
the cartel manager is acting costlessly on behalf of the members, by maximizing their
total expected prots. As a result, the gain of colluding in a subcoalition is probably
relatively limited, compared with situations in which a principal has an objective
which goes against the interests of the agents. A third observation is also intuitive:
an ineÆcient rm that is instructed by the third party to represent itself to the cartel
manager as being eÆcient exerts a negative externality on all rms which are truly
eÆcient, including the eÆcient rms within the subcoalition. If, furthermore, the
transfers to the ineÆcient rms do not depend on the number of ineÆcient rms
present in the cartel and the direct gain of lying for the ineÆcient rms is not too
large, the total eect of the contemplated action is a negative one. In particular,
as soon as the individual dominant strategy incentive compatibility constraint of an
ineÆcient rm is satised, so will the group incentive compatibility constraints with
respect to downward cost announcements.
In our model, collusion appears to have no bite. It is not yet clear to what
extent the assumption of independence in the distribution of cost types inuences
this result. The literature leaves a somewhat mixed impression on this point. In
Laont and Martimort (2000), with two agents and correlated types, collusion by the
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grand coalition does matter.
As we have noted, the Collusion-Proofness Principle does not hold when the iden-
tities of the possibly colluding subcoalitions are not known to the cartel manager; it
no longer needs to be the case that a cartel which is collusion-proof belongs to the
class of optimal cartels. Nonetheless, the cartel contract that we have found to be
optimal, is collusion-proof also with respect to simultaneously active subcoalitions.
This result may be driven by the symmetry of the model21. Whether there are
cartel contracts that implement the eÆcient cartel, while letting collusion occur by
(some) coalitions, remains an open question22. The literature has exhibited many
settings in which it is optimal for a principal to let collusion occur. In our context,
the basic reason for the Collusion-Proofnesss Principle not to apply can be traced to
the fact that, rst, the cartel manager does not know the identity of the players he is
confronted with (he knows the rms, but not the coalitions) and, secondly, he is not
able to elicit this information.
A nal remark can be made on the emphasis on the study of eÆcient cartels.
What has been done in this model is to take the production vector of the cartel
to be the eÆcient one (the rst best solution) and then to see whether there is a
vector of transfers such that all BIR and BIC constraints are satised. As far as
general transfers are concerned this is not a problem, as it is shown that an eÆcient
cartel is indeed implementable. When transfers cannot be used (`weak cartels' in the
meaning of McAfee and McMillan (1992)) it should be interesting to consider cartels
which are not necessarily eÆcient. After all, a standard result of the mechanism design
literature is that by distorting `at the bottom', incentive compatibility constraints can
be relaxed. What we could do, therefore, is to write the cartel manager's program in
full, giving him also the opportunity to distort the production levels, and to see the
impact of collusion in this case. This is a topic for future research.
21There is both ex ante symmetry with respect to the cost levels and symmetry with respect to
the objective function of the cartel manager.
22At this point one may ask the question whether some subcoalitions are more likely to form than
others, a question addressed in the literature on endogenous coalition formation (cf. Bloch (1995)).
If the cartel manager could `predict' which coalitions are most likely to form given the cartel scheme
it is oering (e.g. because they are the only `stable' coalitions), it might, in principle, be protable
to focus on these coalitions.
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6.8 Appendices
A.6.1. Cournot competition under incomplete information
When no cartel is formed, the rms in the industry engage in Cournot competition
under incomplete information. In the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, a given rm i with




(p(EfQg)  ci)qi = max
qi
(1  E[QN fig]  qi   ci)qi




(1 E[QN fig]  ci) =: Ri(E[QN fig])
assuming that ci  1 E[QN fig], otherwise rm i will prefer to produce nothing. In
a symmetric equilibrium,







Hence, the equilibrium quantities are
qiCournot(c
i) = Ri(E[QN fig]) = 1
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(2(1  c) + (n  1)(1  )c)2




(2(1  c)  (n  1)c)2
for a high cost rm. The above expressions hold under the requirement that ci 
1  EfQN figg; 8i, which translates into c  2(1 c
2+(n 1) =: climit. For c  climit,
it is easily veried that only low cost rms will be active in equilibrium (will produce




A.6.2. Expressing the incentive and participation constraints
in terms of bounds on expected total transfers







j(1  )n jt(j). One can rewrite this level as






















The Bayesian incentive constraints
If the cartel manager wants to obtain truthful revelation of the private information
by the rms he must satisfy
BIC(ci) : E
cN fig
fi(ci; (ci; cN fig))g  E
cN fig
fi(ci; (~ci; cN fig))g 8(ci; ~ci) 2 fc; cg2:
In the case of a symmetric and eÆcient cartel, the Bayesian incentive compatibility
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t(j + 1). It follows that an upperbound on the expected total transfer is
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given by




















































In a symmetric and eÆcient cartel, the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint
for an ineÆcient rm is























(m(c) cqm(c)) + t(j + 1))
which, by a similar exercise as above, can be expressed as
Eft(j)g  n(1  )[ 1
n




The participation constraints are as follows
BIR(ci) : E
cN fig
[i(ci; (ci; cN fig))]  E
cN fig
fiCournot(c
i)g; 8i 2 N:











[m(c)  t(j + 1)]  EfiCournot(c)g
which translates into




















Eft(j)g  n(1  )  fEf Cournot(c)g   1n(1  )
n 1m(c)g:
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A.6.3. Proof of Proposition 6.1: Individual implementability
of an eÆcient cartel
In order to show that it is always possible to nd transfer schemes t that satisfy all
four individual constraints, we will compare the upper and lowerbounds on the total
expected transfer Eft(j)g which are implied by these constraints.
Comparing BIC(c) and BIC(c)
The upperbound on Eft(j)g implied by BIC(c) is above the lowerbound on Eft(j)g
implied by BIC(c) if and only if
1
n
(1  (1  )n)m(c) + (1  )n 1
1
n
(m(c) + cqm(c)) 
1
n




or (1 (1 )n)qm(c)  (1 )n 1qm(c) which is the case as 1 (1 )n (1 )n 1 =
1  (1  )n 1  0 and qm(c)  qm(c).
Comparing BIR(c) and BIR(c)
In order to show that there exist transfers that simultaneously satisfy BIR(c) and
BIR(c) it will prove to be useful to write the expected Cournot prots EfiCournot(c)g
and EfiCournot(c)g using the summation operator: this will facilitate the making











(j + 1), where i
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(j + 1) is the Cournot-Nash prot for a low cost rm when















prot for a high cost rm when there are j low cost rms among the remaining rms.
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Comparing BIC(c) and BIR(c)
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j 1(1   )n j 1
n













m(c), where we have used that

























































(0), where we have used that i
CN









(0), we can conclude
that the upperbound implied by BIC(c) is greater than the lowerbound implied by
BIR(c).
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Comparing BIR(c) and BIC(c) (partially involving simulations)
It is possible to nd transfers for which the expected total level is above the lowerbound











(1  (1  )n)m(c)  EfiCournot(c)g]:











(m(c)  m(c) + cqm(c)): (6.1)




when a low cost rm has a good probability to be the only eÆcient rm and the cost
dierence is fairly large, it may be that its conditionally expected Bayesian-Cournot
prot is higher than the monopoly prot divided by all the rms.
SuÆcient condition 1 A suÆcient condition for the lowerbound imposed by BIC(c)
to be below the upperbound imposed by BIR(c) is that c  cES, where cES is the
largest cost dierence for which eÆcient rms are still willing to share the cartel prots
equally with the ineÆcient rms.
Observe rst that the last two terms in inequality (6.1) are both positive (by a revealed
preference argument, m(c)  m(c) cqm(c)). A suÆcient condition for inequal-
ity (6.1) to be satised is that EfiCournot(c)g 
1
n
m(c), i.e. low cost rms prefer
sharing equally the cartel prot m(c) to getting the expected prot out of Cournot
competition under incomplete information. Elaborating on this, we obtain
1
n















The above calculation is based on the Cournot prot for an eÆcient rm when high
costs rms are active in equilibrium (i.e. c  climit). Obviously, when 1n
m(c) 
6.8. Appendices 209
EfiCournot(c)g for c  climit, it is also the case for larger c. Therefore, when
the obtained level cES turns out to be larger than climit, we can conclude that
1
n
m(c)  EfiCournot(c)g for all c. As a corollary, an alternative suÆcient condition





. Indeed, when 1
n
m(c)  EfiCournot(c)g for c  climit, it is also













SuÆcient condition 2 A suÆcient condition for the lowerbound imposed by BIC(c)





the level of c for which, under zero transfers, a high cost rm is indierent between
lying and truthtelling.








Using the relations m(:) = (qm(:))
2
and qm(c) = qm(c) 1
2





+ (1  (1  )n 1)cqm(c)  (1  (1  )n 1)(qm(c))2  0. This
relation with equality is quadratric in c and has two roots, one negative and one










(1  (1  )n)(1  (1  )n 1)  (1  (1  )n 1)g(1  c):
Simulations Rewriting inequality (6.1), we get
(c)
2
+ qm(c)c + (qm(c))










(1   (1   )n 1) and  =
4n
(n+1)2
  1. The determinant of relation (6.2) with equality is (2   4)(qm(c))2 > 0
as  < 0 for n  2 and   0. Furthermore, as (2   4)(qm(c))2  2(qm(c))2,
there is one positive and one negative root. Hence, for the bound of BIC(c) to be






(2   4))(1  c)
We know that if the bound of BIC(c) is below the bound of BIR(c) for c  climit,
it also holds for all c 2 [climit; 1]. Let us compare c0 and climit; if c0  climit, we
can conclude that the bound of BIC(c) is below that of BIR(c) for all parameter
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values. Observe that both c0 and climit are linear in c and that when c = 1, we have
c0 = climit = 1. We therefore only have to compare c
0 and climit for c = 0. Simple
simulations on the resulting inequality in two parameters, n and , show that indeed
c0  climit; we conclude that for all parameter values, one can nd transfers that satisfy
BIC(c) and BIR(c).
A.6.4. Minimal transfers
































We will show that, whenever positive transfers are necessary to implement the eÆ-
cient cartel, it is constraint BIC(c) that determines the level of necessary expected
transfers. This is equivalent to saying that
1  (1  )n
n




for all parameter values for which BIR(c) requires positive transfers. The latter
























is the cost dierence for which the





































 < 0, i.e. when 
is small enough, the zero transfer rule always satises BIR(c), regardless of the cost
dierence.
6.8. Appendices 211
Rewriting inequality (6.3) gives us (c)
2
+ qm(c)c + (qm(c))
2  0, where
 = n(2+(n 1))2  (n+1)2(1 )n,  = 4(n 1)(n 1 2n) and  =  4(n 1)2.
If  is positive, i.e. n(2 + (n   1))2   (n + 1)2(1  )n > 0 ( not too small), then
the discriminant  is positive and there is one positive and one negative root (which
can be discarded). Call the relevant positive root ĉ+. It holds that BIC(c) requires
higher transfers than BIR(c) if for all c  c0
BIR
, we have that c  ĉ+. By
comparing ĉ+ and c
0
BIR
for the relevant parameter values, we can see whether this
is the case. Observe that both c0
BIR
and ĉ+ are linear in c and that when c = 1,
we have c0
BIR




c = 0. Simple simulations on the resulting inequality in two parameters, n and ,
show that indeed c0
BIR
 ĉ+. When  is negative ( not too large), it easily follows
that BIR(c) is satised by the zero transfer rule, so that also in this case BIC(c) is
necessarily the most demanding. We conclude that for all relevant parameter values,
BIC(c) requires higher transfers than BIR(c).
A.6.5. The third party's program
The objective of the third party is to maximize the sum of the expected gains of the
colluding rms. Suppose the third party proposes to the group of rms a side contract
(; y), where  is the vector of manipulated cost messages of the considered group to
be sent to the principal and y the vector of internal side payments.
Let us consider the gain of rm i 2 S, with cost parameter ci that annouces ~ci to
the third party, when the cost reports of the remaining rms in the subcoalition to
the third party are ~cS fig 2 fc; cgk 1 and the cost reports of the rms belonging to
the cartel but not to the subcoalition to the cartel manager are ~cNnS 2 fc; cgn k. In
this case, we denote by m = ((~ci; ~cS fig); ~cNnS) the vector formed by the messages
sent, on the recommendation of the third party, by the rms of the subcoalition to
the cartel manager (that is (~ci; ~cS fig)) and the messages sent by the other rms
(that is ~cNnS). The gain of rm i belonging to the subcoalition is then equal to
i
S
(ci; m) = [P (Q(m))  ci]qi(m)  ti(m)  yi(~ci; ~cS fig)
The expected gain of rm i is E~cNnSE~cS fig[
i
S
(ci; m)], where, for expositional pur-
poses, we have decomposed the total expectation in the expectation over the private
information of the rms that do not belong to the subcoalition and the expectation
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over the private information of the rms that belong to the subcoalition other than
rm i.
Because the Revelation Principle applies at the third party's level, in order to
ensure the revelation of information and the participation of the rms in the subcoali-








i(ci; (ci; cS fig); cNnS)g
subject to










(ci; (~ci; cS fig); cNnS); 8(ci; ~ci) 2 fc; cg2 8i 2 N










yi(cS) = 0; 8cS 2 fc; cgk
where ~i(ci) is the gain of rm i when it rejects the side-mechanism proposed by
the third party and plays non-cooperatively the symmetric cartel contract proposed
by the cartel manager with passive beliefs.









and TP (cS) the Lagrange multipliers as-








(c) and BBTP (cS).
Optimizing with respect to the side-transfers yi(cS) and yj(cs), where rm i is eÆcient
and rm j is ineÆcient we nd the following conditions































for every eÆcient rm i and ineÆcient rm j in the subcoalition. It can be interpreted
as follows: suppose that the third party wants to increase marginally the side transfer
given by an eÆcient rm in the corresponding state of nature. The direct benet of
this operation is to relax the budget balance condition. It also enables the third party
to relax the incentive constraint of the ineÆcient rm (receiving the transfer). But it
hardens the incentive and participation constraints of an eÆcient rm. In the same
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way, increasing the side transfer corresponding to an ineÆcient rm has the same
kind of consequences. The previous relationship shows that the cost of increasing the
side transfer given by an eÆcient rm must equate the benet of the corresponding
increase in the side transfer received by an ineÆcient rm. Hence, there is no further
need to modify these side transfers.
For a given state of nature cS we denote S and S the set of eÆcient and ineÆcient
rms. After manipulations the optimality conditions for the manipulation function of







































. These two variables reect the
fact that there is an asymmetry of information between the members of the subcoali-
tion. In order to bridge this informational gap, the third party must satisfy some
constraints. These constraints have some costs, embodied in 
i
and j, that can pre-
vent the subcoalition from realizing all the gains of the collusion. Contrary to Laont
and Martimort (1997, 2000) we must take into account the incentive constraints of
both the eÆcient and the ineÆcient rms in the program of the third party.
Note that 
i
and j can be chosen in [0; 1) by the cartel manager. In particular,
as long as the Bayesian incentive constraints of the third party program are binding,
playing on the transfer payments allows the cartel manager to modify the values of
the multipliers associated with the constraints in the program of the third party.
Henceforth, he can aect the s23.
23In the framework of Laont and Martimort (1997, 2000) it is possible to determine the optimal
value of j . In our framework, it is not straightforward to determine j and i. The usual argument
goes as follows: let us nd out where the stake of collusion is; then, let us identify, in an intuitive
manner, the active subcoalitions at the equilibrium; depending on the nature of the strategic inter-
action between the actions of the rms, guess what will be the active collusion-proofness constraints
at the equilibrium; once the relevant collusion-proofness constraints are determined, then, if a par-
ticular choice of  turns out to relax all these constraints, adopt this value as being the optimal one
from the point of view of the cartel manager. However, as expained above, in our model the stakes
of collusion are not a priori dened. They depend precisely on the transfer scheme chosen.
214 Cartel formation under incomplete information
A.6.6. On the Collusion-Proofness Principle
If the cartel manager knows the size and identity of a coalition that possibly colludes,
the Collusion-Proofness Principle holds. The logic of the principle follows quite closely
that of the Revelation Principle and that of Laont and Martimort (1997)24.
Let us assume that the k rms of the subcoalition are the rst k rms of the
cartel. Let us consider a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the overall game of a cartel
contract oer CC in the presence of subcoalition formation such that a side mech-
anism SM 6= SM0 is chosen by the third party. CC maps the messages m =
(m1;    ; mk; ~ck+1;    ; ~cn) 2 M1  :::  Mk  fc; cgn k sent by the rms into an
allocation (q; t) 2 <n+  <n. CC maximizes the cartel manager's welfare taking into
account the continuation equilibrium of the game of coalition formation. We can re-
strict the space of messages for the members of the subcoalition to be fc; cgk. SM is a
side mechanism which can be taken as being a direct side mechanism mapping fc; cgk
into the set of measures on the messages spaces. SM maximizes the sum of the rms'
expected gains subject to Bayesian incentive constraints, budget balance conditions
and Bayesian individual rationality constraints i(ci)  ~i(ci) where i(ci) is the
expected gain of rm i when CC and SM are played.
Consider now the new cartel contract CC 0 = CC ÆSM . It can be shown that there
exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the overall game of cartel contract oer with
coalition formation in which the cartel manager oers CC 0 which is a direct cartel
contract from fc; cgn into the decision space <n+  <n, the third party oers the null
side-mechanism SM0 and this choice is sustained with passive beliefs.
Because SM solves the third party's program with reservation gains ~i(ci) the null
side-mechanism SM0 solves the third party's program with reservation gains 
i(ci).
Indeed, suppose that it is not the case. Then there would exist a side mechanism SM 0
such that the third party can achieve a strictly greater payo for the subcoalition than
with SM . Since by denition i(ci)  ~i(ci) the third party's payo from oering
SM 0 Æ SM would be strictly greater than that achieved with SM . But this would
contradict that SM is optimal when CC is oered. Hence, oering the cartel contract
24Laont and Martimort (1997) do not assume passive beliefs in the event that an agent rejects
the side contract. They show a collusion-proofness principle which states that there is no loss of
generality in restricting oneself to a collusion-proof contract sustained by out-of-equilibrium passive
beliefs: this is one equilibrium of the continuation game. Our approach is dierent: we assume
from the outset that beliefs are passive in order to compute the reservation gain in the Cournot
competition game. Then, since beliefs are passive at this stage, it is natural to also assume that they
are passive in case of refusal of the side contract oered by the third party.
6.8. Appendices 215
CC 0 ensures the cartel manager that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
overall game sustained with passive beliefs in which SM0 is optimal from the point of
view of the third party.
A.6.7. The collusion-proofness constraints for an eÆcient car-
tel
Writing the conditions such that the identity function is the optimal manipulation
function for the third party gives us all the collusion-proofness constraints. Note that
the identity function is symmetric, so that 
i
=  for all eÆcient rms i and j =  for
all ineÆcient rms j.



























cqm(c)  t(l0 + j)] 
k   l0
n  l0






















































n  l0   j
t(l0+j)g  0
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cqm(c)  t(l0 + j)] 
k   l0
n  l0   j
t(l0 + j)g  0





j(1  )n k j. A standard
revealed preferences argument applied to coalitions (l; l0) and (l0; l) yields the following
relationship
(1  )2   2 + (1  )  0
This indicates that there is a strong interdependence between  and . If the cartel
contract is taken to be collusion-proof, the manipulation function will be the identity
function and no distortion of the announcements and no side-transfers occur:  = Id.
Hence, the incentive constraints are the same in the program of the cartel manager
and in the program of the third party: if the incentive constraint of an eÆcient rm
is binding and the incentive constraint of an ineÆcient rm is strictly satised in the
program of the cartel manager, then it will also be the case in the program of the
third party. A necessary condition for  and  to be strictly positive simultaneously
is that the two BIC-constraints are simultaneously binding, which is not possible in
our setting. Then, either  = 0 and  > 0,  > 0 and  = 0 or  =  = 0.
Anticipating the nal results: We will show that when positive transfers are needed
to implement an eÆcient cartel, the cartel manager can use transfers that are dominant
strategy incentive compatible and satisfy the participation and collusion-proofness
constraints. In that case, none of the two Bayesian incentive constraints are bind-
ing at the optimum in the program of the cartel manager and therefore  =  = 0.
Also, when the cartel manager implements an eÆcient cartel with transfers having
the minimum expected value: playing on the values of  and  in order to relax or
strengthen the collusion-proofness constraints does not help the cartel manager: the
minimum expected value is entirely determined by BIC(c) and having one  strictly
positive does not help the cartel manager to reduce the amount of minimum expected
transfers used to implement an eÆcient cartel. For our purpose we can choose the
particular values  =  = 0 in this case.
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A.6.8. Proof of Proposition 6.2: A suÆcient condition for the
zero transfer rule to be collusion-proof
Under the zero transfer rule, coalitions of rms never have interest to report to be














j(1   )n k j. The left hand side
of this inequality is a sum of positive terms. For j = 0 the corresponding term is
equal to (1  )n km(c) which is greater than the right hand side of the inequality.








]m(c)  0, which is obviously satised.
Now, we will show that CPCk(0; k) impliesCPCk(0; l0), 8l0 < k. Indeed, CPCk(0; l0)













is increasing in l0, the above constraint is most demanding for l0 = k.
Last, because (1  )n k k
n
is increasing in k, the individual constraint BIC(c) is the
most demanding among the constraints CPCk(0; k).
It remains to be proved that CPCk(0; l0) implies all the constraints CPCk(l; l0),











































As m(c)   l
l0




m(c), and m(c) = [qm(c)]2 = [qm(c)  
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1
2














A suÆcient condition is then that this inequality is satised for c = qm(c), or
k(l + 1)  4n 8l = 1; :::; k   1, k  2
p
n:
A.6.9. Proof of Proposition 6.3: A suÆcient condition for a
cartel to be collusion-proof
Consider the transfer scheme t(j) = n j
n
fm(c) cqm(c)g. It satises the collusion-























n  l0   j













Using the fact that the transfers chosen here are such that t(l + j) = (n  
l   j)t(n   1), nt(n   1) = m(c)   cqm(c) and that l > l0 it is immediately
checked that these two inequalities are always satised. Indeed, the rst inequal-





















cqm(c)  0, which is obviously satised.








cqm(c)  0 which is also satised under our starting
assumptions. Note that the revealed preference argument applied respectively to an
eÆcient and an ineÆcient rm when a symmetric and eÆcient cartel is implemented,
gives us m(c)  m(c) + cqm(c) and m(c)  m(c) cqm(c).
Note that the proposed transfer scheme satises the requirement of dominant strat-
egy implementation. Under the partial anonymity property, an ineÆcient rm receives
the same transfer in each state of nature: 1
n j t(j) =
1
n j 1t(j + 1) or, equivalently,
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t(j) = n j













A.6.10. Implementability of an eÆcient cartel
We now check whether the collusion-proof transfer scheme t(j) = n j
n
[m(c) cqm(c)]
satises the participation constraint of an eÆcient rm (the relevant upperbound in







(1  (1  )n 1)cqm(c): (6.4)
SuÆcient condition 1 A suÆcient condition for the collusion-proof transfer scheme
t(j) = n j
n
m(c) cqm(c) to satisfy the participation constraint of an eÆcient rm
is that c  cES, where cES is the largest dierence for which eÆcient rms are
still willing to share the cartel prots equally with the ineÆcient rms.




which gives c  cES.
SuÆcient condition 2 A suÆcient condition for the collusion-proof transfer scheme
t(j) = n j
n
(m(c)   cqm(c)) to satisfy BIR(c) is that the cost dierence is large
enough: c  qm(c)
Simulations Rewriting inequality (6.4), we get
(c)
2
+ qm(c)c + (qm(c))
2  0 (6.5)
where  = n(n  1)2 (1  )2,  = 8n(n  1)(1  )n and  = 16n  4(n+ 1)2.
As  < 0, the determinant of relation (6.5) with equality is positive. Furthermore,
as (2   4)(qm(c))2  2(qm(c))2, there is one positive and one negative root.
Call the positive root c. Then, for the collusion-proof transfer scheme t(j) =
n j
n
(m(c)   cqm(c) to satisfy BIR(c) it is enough that for all relevant c (i.e.
c  climit), it holds that c  c. This will be the case whenever c  climit.
Observe that both c and climit are linear in c and that when c = 1, we have
c = climit = 0. We therefore only have to compare c
 and climit for c = 0.
Simple simulations on the resulting inequality in two parameters, n and , show that
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indeed c  climit.; we conclude that for all parameter values, the collusion-proof
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Summary in Dutch - Samenvatting
Het mededingingsrecht is een rechtsgebied waarin economische begrippen een centrale
rol innemen. Veel van de sleutelbegrippen binnen het mededingingsrecht - bijvoor-
beeld 'concurrentie', 'beperking van de mededinging', 'anti-concurrentieel eect' - zijn
immers begrippen die duidelijk een economische lading hebben.
Het is geen eenvoudige zaak om in de praktijk uit te maken of een bepaalde
handelsovereenkomst tussen ondernemingen of een bepaalde commerciele handelswij-
ze goed of slecht is voor de concurrentie. Wanneer bijvoorbeeld twee bedrijven een
samenwerkingscontract afsluiten voor de ontwikkeling van een nieuwe technologie, wat
zal hiervan het eect zijn op de concurrentie in de betreende markt? Als de twee
bedrijven van bescheiden omvang zijn, dan zal het contract geen kwaad kunnen, juist
integendeel. Maar wanneer de twee bedrijven precies elkaars twee grootste concur-
renten zijn, dan kan hun samenwerking leiden tot een algehele vermindering van de
concurrentie in de markt. Maar waar de grens te trekken tussen de twee gevallen?
Het is alleen door naar de precieze omstandigheden van de zaak te kijken dat
steekhoudende conclusies kunnen worden getrokken over de eecten op de concurren-
tie. Naast een analyse van de mogelijke eecten zal dit in veel gevallen ook een analyse
vereisen van de onderliggende beweegredenen voor bedrijven om dergelijk marktgedrag
te vertonen. Immers, daar waar het evalueren en voorspellen van markteecten geen
eensluidend oordeel kan geven, zal een analyse van de onderliggende beweegredenen
mogelijk meer licht op de zaak werpen. Wanneer men een bepaalde handelsprak-
tijk aantreft zou men zich bijvoorbeeld de vraag kunnen stellen: waarom handelt dit
bedrijf op deze manier? Is een anti-competitieve strategie voor dit bedrijf een rationele
strategie of is het waarschijnlijker dat dit bedrijf uit geoorloofde motieven handelt?
Binnen de economische wetenschap houdt het vakgebied Industriele Organisatie
zich bezig met de relatie tussen het marktgedrag van ondernemingen, de werking
van markten en de marktstructuur. Dit wetenschapsgebied was oorspronkelijk vooral
empirisch van aard, met een sterke nadruk op het vinden van empirische wetmatighe-
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den tussen allerlei bedrijfstak-kenmerken. Zeer bekend is het zogeheten Structure-
Conduct-Performance denkmodel. Volgens dit denkmodel bepaalt de marktstructuur
(het aantal bedrijven in de markt, de mate van verticale integratie, enz.) het markt-
gedrag (prijsstelling, investeringen in R&D, marketing-inspanningen, enz.) hetgeen
vervolgens leidt tot een zeker marktresultaat (markteÆcientie, winsten). Niettemin,
met zijn nadruk op het vinden van empirische wetmatigheden, wierp dit denkmodel
weinig licht op de onderliggende marktwerking en ook niet op de vraag of het geob-
serveerde marktgedrag wel als rationeel was te beschouwen.
Later heeft de Industriele Organisatie de traditionele empirische onderzoekslijn
aangevuld (en in sommige gevallen ink veranderd) met een meer theoretische ana-
lyse, die zich ondermeer toespitst op de rationaliteit van geobserveerd marktgedrag.
Een belangrijk onderzoeksmiddel voor deze analyse is de speltheorie. Speltheorie
bestudeert strategische interactie met behulp van wiskundige modellen. Een spelthe-
oretisch model speciceert de deelnemers aan het spel (bijvoorbeeld bedrijven in een
markt of individuen in een organisatie), de informatie waarover zij beschikken, de
acties die zij kunnen ondernemen, de timing van deze acties, de uitbetalingen die
resulteren bij een bepaalde uitkomst en de preferenties van de deelnemers over de
mogelijke uitkomsten. In een dergelijk model worden de deelnemers verondersteld
elk hun winst (of meer in het algemeen, hun nutsniveau) te maximaliseren in het
licht van de informatie waarover zij beschikken en de verwachte acties van de andere
spelers. Het algemeen geaccepteerde oplossingsconcept van dergelijke modellen is het
zogenaamde Nash-evenwicht. Dit oplossingsconcept is een evenwicht in die zin dat
elke speler zijn winsten maximaliseert en hierbij de tegenacties van de andere spelers
correct anticipeert.
Voor het grootste deel bestaat dit proefschrift uit het toepassen van dergelijke
speltheoretische methoden bij de bestudering van verticale overeenkomsten, d.w.z.
overeenkomsten gesloten door bedrijven die op verschillende niveaus van de bedrijfs-
kolom opereren, zoals producenten en hun wederverkopers. Veel bindingen tussen
producenten en distibuteurs gaan veel verder dan simpele markttransacties, het leve-
ren van goederen of diensten tegen een bepaalde prijs. In veel gevallen is er sprake van
langetermijn contracten die bepaalde verplichtingen leggen op de handelspartners en
daarmee hun handelsvrijheid beperken. Bijvoorbeeld, een producent die een exclusief
verkoopsgebied toekent aan een distributeur verbindt zich er doorgaans toe niet aan
andere distributeurs in dat gebied te leveren. Dergelijke contractuele verplichtingen
worden gewoonlijk 'verticale restricties' of 'verticale beperkingen' genoemd.
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Het proefschrift bestaat uit twee gedeelten. Het eerste gedeelte, Hoofdstukken 2 en
3, heeft een overzichtskarakter. Hoofdstuk 2 presenteert en evalueert de economische
literatuur over de concurrentie-eecten van verticale restricties. De bedoeling van dit
hoofdstuk is een begrip te vormen van de belangrijkste inzichten die de economische
theorie heeft opgeleverd op dit gebied. Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert de rol van economische
analyse vanuit een juridisch perspectief, door in te gaan op de rol van economische
analyse bij de toepassing van de Europese mededingingsregels ten aanzien van ver-
ticale beperkingen. Zoals zal blijken uit deze twee hoofdstukken zijn er bepaalde
eigenaardigheden aan het Europese mededingingsbeleid, maar kan gezegd worden dat
het beleid meer en meer in de richting van een echte afweging van mededingings-
bevorderende en mededingingsbeperkende eecten evolueert.
Het tweede gedeelte van dit proefschrift geeft drie concrete toepassingen van
speltheoretische analyses. In twee hoofdstukken, Hoofdstuk 3 en Hoofstuk 4, wordt de
rationaliteit van een bepaald type verticale beperking, verticale prijsbinding, getest
in een aantal specieke marktomstandigheden. Bij verticale prijsbinding is het zo
dat bijv. de producent zijn distributeurs ertoe verplicht niet tegen een lagere prijs
te verkopen dan de door hem gespeciceerde. Het volgt uit deze twee hoofdstukken
dat de noodzaak voor distributeurs om hun vaste kosten terug te verdienen een bepa-
lende rol speelt in de keuze van de producent om al dan niet verticale prijsbind-
ing te hanteren. Hoofdstuk 6, tenslotte, gaat over kartelvorming in bedrijfstakken
waar bedrijven onzeker zijn over elkaars kostenniveaus (en daarmee over elkaars prijs-
stellingsmotieven). In een speciek model wordt de wijdverbreide opvatting getest dat
kartelvorming waarschijnlijker is in geconcentreerde bedrijfstakken dan in bedrijfs-
takken waarin veel bedrijven actief zijn.
